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Ambivalent Discourses 
Alastair Nightingale under the direction of Dr Michael Quayle and Professor Orla 
Muldoon 
 
 This project explores if people employ ambivalent discourses within 
contentious political debate. And, if so, what opposing ideological themes are 
drawn upon – or left unsaid – and what is potentially being accomplished through 
the deployment of these ambivalent discourses? This project specifically explores 
the contentious immigration debate through three empirical studies. Study one is a 
discourse analysis of advocates on behalf of refugees on a national phone-in radio 
program in Ireland. Study two is a discourse analysis of speeches by leading 
populist radical right politicians at an international conference in Koblenz, 
Germany. Study three is an experiment exploring if people’s exposure to competing 
and conflicting interpretive frameworks, of identity threat discourses, patterns the 
shared construction of an immigrant group – specifically the potential ambivalent 
stereotyping of refugees. These advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of 
study one, take up a rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent paternalism’. This labours 
on a shared embodied emotional distress in response to the plight of refugees but 
avoids claims of unconditional and unambiguous inclusive solidarity. Conversely, 
the populist radical right speeches, in the context of study two, drew on a rhetorical 
strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’. This celebrates cultural diversity between 
monocultural nation-states, whilst declaring hostility to minority cultural diversity 
within nation-states. The experimental study indicates that these divergent 
ambivalent strategies is potentially due to these speakers, in both discursive studies, 
orienting to a hegemonic interpretive framework where refugees and immigrants 
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generally are depicted as an economic burden and cultural threat to the nation. But 
these advocates, in the context of study one, are constrained by the claim that the 
nation is meeting its moral and legal obligation towards refugees. Whilst the 
populist radical right speakers, in the context of study two, are countering the claim 
that the nation is not meeting its moral and legal obligation.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
A central assumption of previous traditional social psychological research is that 
people’s attitudes and opinions towards political concerns are stable, unitary and 
unconflicted, and internalized within the cognitions of isolated individuals. 
However, recent critical psychological research, particularly discursive and 
rhetorical psychology, argues that people are always socially, culturally and 
historically situated, and hence, at times, they draw on ambivalent discourses that 
are fluid, context dependent and often contradictory (Potter, 1998; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992). Importantly, it is not the individual who is considered to hold an 
ambivalent attitude, but people often drawn upon ambivalent discourses because 
they negotiate, interpret, reinterpret, and integrate multiple competing and 
conflicting positions on matters of political and social importance. They actively 
construct social reality and make sense of their social and political world through 
coproduced shared discourses and social practice (Potter, 1998).  
 Hence, ambivalent discourses are defined here as being fluid, and 
dynamically patterned by the context and what is being accomplished through the 
discourse within the interaction (Potter, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Crucially, 
ambivalent discourses contain opposing evaluations or ideological themes, but 
these opposing positions are not necessarily explicitly expressed, and one side may 
go unsaid (Billig, 1987, 2006). In other words, ambivalent discourse can be evident 




for the speaker’s claim, such as liberal values being used to justify an illiberal 
position. Or when crucial aspects of an argument are conspicuously absent due to 
the constraint imposed by hegemonic counter arguments. 
 This is a move away from the traditional social psychological concept that 
stable and unitary attitudes reside in the individual’s mind and are carried from one 
social situation to another. Discursive and rhetorical psychology forwards a notion 
of evaluative practice where speakers provide accounts and descriptions on matters 
of concern and these are variable, at times conflicted, and dependent on the context 
and what is being done by the speaker (Potter, 1998). Therefore, the discourses that 
people draw upon and deploy within contentious political debate are potentially 
ambivalent because they incorporate conflicting and contradictory themes (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 194). However, it needs to be 
stressed that the definition of ambivalence, here, is not something that needs to be 
resolved within the mind of the individual as in cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957). On the contrary, ambivalent discourses are common within the 
overarching discursive environment and evaluate, contest and sustain the tensions 
within social structure (Potter, 1998). They maintain the status quo and are the 
foundations that allow institutions to function. Furthermore, Billig (1987, 1991; 
Billig, Condor, Edwards, & Gane, 1988) has argued that the ongoing deliberation 
between the opposing sides of an argument is the substance of everyday thought 
and fundamental to the human experience. People can only be considered to hold 
an attitude on an issue if it is contested within public debate (Billig, 1987). 
However, it is important to reiterate that it is not the individual and their internal 
cognition, which is considered to be ambivalent, but people draw on ‘ambivalent 
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discourses’ to make sense of their social and political world, and potentially justify 
the status quo and ongoing discrimination (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 194). 
 In other words, people manage and draw upon numerous competing 
argumentative positions and ideologies on important social and political concerns. 
People can sometimes strategically take up the opposing argument and reverse its 
conventional understanding in support of the ideological position that they are 
presenting at the time (Billig et al., 1988). For example, people can employ 
ambivalent discourses by taking up the liberal notion of equality to justify ongoing 
racial discrimination, by making the claim that offering positive discrimination (or 
affirmative action) contravenes equality and fairness for those in positions of 
privilege (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, pp. 194 - 200). Additionally, people’s 
depictions and evaluations of other social groups tends to be ‘highly ambivalent’ 
because they are managing conflicting and competing identity threat concerns 
(Reicher, 2012).    
 These theoretical foundations point towards the premise that people 
potentially tend to rely on ambivalent discourses to make sense of political concerns 
and intergroup relations. Hence, it is important to investigate the potential 
deployment of ambivalent discourses within political debate, because they are 
possibly an efficient means to maintain inequitable power relations, uphold the 
status quo and protect powerful majority groups from criticism (Jackman, 1994). 
The politically contentious debate explored in this project is the immigration 
debate, which is described in more detail in Chapter 2 Situating this Project in the 
Social, Political Context.  




1. Do people take up and deploy ambivalent discourses in the contentious 
immigration debate?  
2. How are ambivalent discourses negotiated, presented and strategically 
employed within the contentious immigration debate? 
3. What is potentially accomplished through ambivalent discourses within the 
contentious immigration debate? 
4. How does evolving interpretive frameworks potentially pattern ambivalent 
discourses used to construct immigrant groups? 
5.  How are ambivalent discourses patterned by competing and conflicting 
identity concerns? 
 In order to answer these research questions above, this project will employ 
three empirical studies. Study one, is to be an analysis of public discourses on a 
national stage in response to an important political concern – the 2015 so called 
‘European Refugee Crisis’ (see chapter 3). Secondly study two, is to be an analysis 
of speeches by leading European populist radical right politicians on an 
international stage, who are hostile to immigration generally (see chapter 4). Finally 
study three, will be an experiment exploring if people’s exposure to competing and 
conflicting interpretive frameworks, of identity threat discourses, will pattern the 
shared construction of an immigrant group – specifically the potential ambivalent 
stereotyping of refugees (see study three chapter 5). The context of the political 
debates drawn upon in these three studies are to be outlined in more detail in chapter 
2. And a general discussion and conclusion is provided in chapter 6. 
 It needs to be noted at this juncture, although this project embraces the 
theoretical positioning of discursive and rhetorical psychology, it takes an 
epistemological ‘middle-ground’ between a constructionist and positivist position 
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that assumes the person constructs reality and the person is also constructed by 
reality (Verkuyten, 2005b, p. 28). This is discussed in more detail further on in the 
thesis, see section 1.7 The Mixed Method Approach. Secondly, I do not take a 
purely relativist position and ideologies are critically analysed. Although all 
discursive and rhetorical positions are considered to be equally valid, and it is 
acknowledged that this thesis in itself makes a rhetorical claim, not all arguments 
are morally equivalent. Hence, I take a critical perspective that assumes ‘some 
positions must be advocated as being preferable, more persuasive, and even truer 
than others’ (Billig, 1991, p. 28). 
 The remainder of this chapter will expand on the theoretical rationale for 
exploring ambivalent discourses within contentious political debate. It will further 
explore how people are situated, flexible, context dependent and tend to draw on 
dynamic ambivalent discourses (see section 1.2). Section 1.3 offers more detailed 
discussion of the importance of rhetorical psychology for understanding ambivalent 
discourse. I also take account of the recent ‘turn to affect’ within social science (see 
section 1.4), which acknowledges that people not only share, negotiate and interpret 
discourses in order to understand their social and political worlds, but they also 
share, negotiate and interpret embodied affect in everyday meaning making and 
people’s ideological positioning (Wetherell, 2012a). Importantly, Wetherell 
(2013a, 2013b, 2015) convincingly argues that it is impractical and unhelpful to 
separate affect and discourse, acknowledging their entanglement for the production 
of subjectivities within everyday affective-discursive practice. People can often 
experience, and share, ambivalent affective/discursive positions in relation to 




 Furthermore, drawing on recent theory within the Social Identity Approach 
(Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1982), I highlight that social 
categories are not predetermined concrete entities, which merely inform political 
opinions, but the characteristics and values, norms and beliefs of social categories 
are contested (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Hence, social reality is constructed 
through contested social categories and identities, which constrains and patterns the 
available discourses that people draw upon to depict ‘others’. This also offers 
further support for the understanding that the self, is flexible, fluid and context 
dependent and I expand on this notion by exploring people’s competing and 
conflicting identity concerns (see section 1.5). I conclude this chapter with a 
discussion of the epistemological and ontological concerns and a justification for 
the mixed methods approach to be employed within this thesis (see section 1.7). 
1.2 DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND AMBIVALENCE 
1.2.1 Discourse as a Social Act 
Discursive psychology provides a theoretical understanding of the person that 
underpins this project and is an analytic approach to be employed in the first two 
studies of this research project (see chapters 3 & 4). Discursive psychology goes 
beyond the traditional understanding that attitudes are fixed, enduring, internal 
cognitions that predict social behaviour. Within discursive psychology the object 
of analysis is language, talk and text, which are considered to be a significant social 
endeavours, central to people making sense of their social and political world 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).  
 Importantly, previous discursive research has shown that people’s 
orientations towards certain social issues are variable and can alter from one social 
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context to another (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 53). Discourse is not a mere 
conveyer of information between isolated independent individuals, notifying each 
other of their internal world, but it is a collaborative and interactive social act – a 
social practice (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 90). It is not possible to conclusively 
delineate the space between the personal and social, which in reality is ‘porous’, as 
voices from the public and cultural social environments are absorbed onto the self 
(Wetherell, 2003).  
 The person is seen to be socially situated, making it impractical and 
unconstructive to separate them from their social context. Therefore, discursive 
psychology focuses on the ‘action orientation’ of socially situated discourses and 
avoids drawing assumptions about the individual’s inaccessible inner world 
(Augoustinos, 2017; D. Edwards, 1997; D. Edwards & Potter, 1992; S. Goodman, 
2017b; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, 2003; Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 
90). In other words, the analytic focus is the action or function of the discourse in 
context. What is being accomplished through the discourse in the immediate social 
situation? What social project is brought into being within the discursive 
interaction? And importantly, what is being justified and legitimised through the 
discourse (Wetherell, 1998). 
1.2.2 Constructing Reality 
People are seen to deploy interpretive repertoires, which are ‘a lexicon or register 
of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events’ 
(Potter, 1998; Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 139). Repertoires are packages of 
discourse utilised in everyday meaning-making as a means for people to interpret, 




particular version of the world related to the subject position that the situated 
speaker takes up (Potter, 1996, pp. 115 - 116; 1998). Hence, the subjectivities and 
ideological positions that speakers produce through interpretive repertoires are 
flexible, fluid and context dependent. This is not to imply that certain repertoires 
are specifically tied to particular social groups, but importantly repertoires achieve 
different social actions and can be taken up across different social groups (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, p. 156). In other words, people draw upon repertoires that are not 
coupled to predetermined social identities, but are dependent upon what the speaker 
aims to accomplish in the immediate social context (Potter, 1998). Hence, identities 
or subject positions are performative social acts.  
Interpretive repertoires construct situated versions of the self and others, 
which are ‘flexible and fragmented’ (Wetherell, 2003). Particular subject positions 
are suited to the social project in a specific social context (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, 
pp. 90 - 93 & 136 - 136). Repertoires present a particular version of the social reality 
and the identity positions within it. Hence, identities or subject positions construct 
the power relationships between social categories (S. Goodman & Speer, 2007). As 
the immediate and broader social context changes the subject positions produced 
can shift and the power relationships between social categories can be redefined 
(Wetherell, 2003).  
1.2.3 Hegemonic Discourse Maintaining Privilege and Inequitable Power 
Relations 
However, this is not to suggest that speakers can take up any subject position, 
because subject positions are ‘complex and coercive’ (Frosh, Phoenix, & Pattman, 
2003). In other words, people are not free to draw on any identity as there are limits 
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placed upon membership. People cannot simply talk themselves out of one social 
group into another one because there are hegemonic discourses that constrain the 
range of available identities that they can inhabit. Available interpretive repertoires 
are limited by hegemonic discourses that define the power relations between subject 
positions and hence, uphold the social structure (Wetherell, 1998, 2007). 
Consequently, repertoires that maintain taken-for-granted power relations and 
protect privilege are more readily available and effortlessly deployed (Wetherell, 
1998). ‘Language is fundamentally both expressive and repressive’, and what goes 
unsaid is just as important, if not more important, than what is said (Billig, 2006). 
For example, the hegemonic discourse of ‘banal’ nationalism, which 
through unseen everyday social practice defines a universally accepted world made 
up of a patchwork of nation-states (Billig, 1995). The nation-states are organised in 
a hierarchy and individuals belong to a specific nation-state. This creates a situation 
where it is taken-for-granted that nation-states have an unquestionable moral right 
to exclude unwanted migrants and this transcends basic individual human rights. 
The repertoire of ‘banal’ everyday nationalism can be seen to maintain unequal 
power relations by protecting the interests of wealthy nations from poor migrants 
and desperate refugees.  
Indeed, poor immigrants cannot construct their way out of poverty or take 
up a subject position that offers them a Western passport because the hegemonic 
discourse declares a power relationship that is not in their favour. For example, an 
analysis of interviews with immigrants recently naturalised as UK citizens, and 
government policy documents, indicates that the institutionalised process of 
selective immigration mainly impacts on poor non-western immigrants (Andreouli 




seekers find it problematic to counter the hegemonic hostility towards them (Every 
& Augoustinos, 2013; S. Goodman, 2010; Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2011; 
Wroe, 2017). 
1.2.4 Ambivalent Discourses that Justify Discrimination 
Hence, it is important to take a critical view point when carrying out a discourse 
analyse in order to expose hegemonic power relations (Wetherell, 1998, 2007). An 
example from Wetherell and Potter’s (1992, pp. 128 - 137) classic text, shows that 
Pakeha (white New Zealanders) take up an ambivalent interpretive repertoire that 
constructs Maoris (indigenous New Zealanders) as ‘having culture’. On the surface 
this repertoire appears benevolent and respectful of Maori culture, but also 
perpetuates a differentiation between Pakeha and Maori based on culture and not 
race. This is in line with the shift in Western discourse away from a tainted emphasis 
on race to an acceptable discourse of incompatible cultural difference (see similar 
Rydgren, 2005).  
 Furthermore, the ‘having culture’ repertoire positions the Maoris as having 
the privilege and burden of being the site of primitive national heritage. The Maori 
are duty bound to preserve their own culture, but are also positioned as exotic, 
archaic and incompatible with modern European culture and urban life. In contrast, 
the Pakeha construct themselves as ‘having civilisation’. This ambivalent colonial 
repertoire positions the Pakeha as benevolently tolerant of cultural difference, but 
they are pragmatic and in line with the modern world. This repertoire draws on the 
‘white man’s burden’ discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 136) where the 
Pakeha are positioned as tolerant and benevolently assisting the Maori in the 
preservation of their culture. Hence, the Pakeha take up a position of ambivalent 
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paternalism constructing themselves as protective parents looking out for the 
cultural interests of the less able but more cultural Maori.  
 Importantly, the ambivalent repertoire of cultural tolerance and benevolence 
deployed by the Pakeha does not upend the social structure. Quite the opposite, it 
reifies, legitimises and maintains inequitable power relations. The repertoire that 
defines the inequitable power relationship, between the Pakeha and Maori, is not 
dependent on the psychopathology of an individual prejudiced speaker but is 
embedded within the social structure and discursive environment (Wetherell, 
2012b). Incorrectly assuming that prejudice is a psychological deficit of a few 
individuals hides the systemic institutionalised problem of prejudice, exploitation 
and disadvantage, and the legitimising discourses that facilitate it.  
But it is also important to note at this juncture that prejudice, and intergroup 
hostility, is also not an inevitable natural phenomenon of automatic unconscious 
psychology to which all people are susceptible. It is a discursive ‘interactional 
accomplishment’ that justifies ongoing institutionalised exclusionary and 
discriminatory policies that benefits the privileged (Durrheim, 2012). The power 
holders have the potential shared agency to construct reality differently and 
advocate the implementation of instructional structures that include minority 
outgroups, if they so desire (see Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 
2006).  
Available repertoires are not fixed internal schema informed by the social 
word but are malleable, co-produced between speakers and actively construct social 
reality (Potter, 1996). Repertoires can be interpreted in different ways dependent 
on the social and political context, and their expected normative meanings can be 




freedom and individual rights can be deployed to justify a prejudicial position. 
Returning again to Wetherell and Potter’s (1992, p. 194) classic text, they also show 
how Pakeha speakers employ an ambivalent discourse that takes up valued 
democratic ideologies of freedom, rights and equality to legitimise their hostility 
towards the Maori population.  
1.2.5 Ambivalent Discourse in Political Debate 
Ambivalent discursive strategies that construct social categories and define the 
power relationship between them, are an effective means to perpetuate and justify 
discrimination. For example, repertoires of ‘genuine’ versus ‘bogus’ asylum 
seekers is deployed to justify suspicion and delegitimise all people applying for 
asylum (S. Goodman & Speer, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003). Although, constructing 
some people who are seeking asylum as ‘genuine’ applicants, may appear 
benevolent, it also implicitly implies that some, and even potentially most, are not 
‘genuine’. Similarly, German media uses an ambivalent repertoire of ‘heroic 
refugees’ to categorise those refugees who assist the authorities in apprehending 
potential terrorists, whilst positioning the majority of refugees as a security risk and 
supporters of terrorism (Heinkelmann-Wild, Beck, & Spencer, 2019).  
 Speakers can draw on ambivalent discourses that co-opts liberal values in 
order to justify exclusion. For example, politicians are seen to work up an 
ambivalent repertoire, of a humanitarian Australia, in order to position people 
seeking asylum as taking advantage of Australia’s history of benevolent 
humanitarianism (O'Doherty & Augoustinos, 2008; also see Kirkwood, 2018; 
Parker, 2019). The humanitarian repertoire ambivalently constructs a subjective 
position of Western benevolence in order to justify exclusion of people seeking 
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asylum, who are constructed as corrupt and criminal. Also, ambivalent discourses 
drawing on fairness and equality are used to justify the hostility towards people 
seeking asylum because they are taking away from the needs of host citizens, 
particularly the poor, homeless and disabled (Lynn & Lea, 2003). In other words, 
the national group ambivalently construct themselves as benevolent carers of the 
vulnerable, in order to justify the exclusion of another vulnerable outgroup.  
Speakers also employ ambivalent discursive strategies drawing on 
cherished liberal values, in order to deny and sidestep accusations of racism 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 194 & 211). Research into discourse pertaining to 
refugees (S. Goodman, 2008, 2010; S. Goodman & Burke, 2010; Kirkwood, 
Goodman, McVittie, & McKinlay, 2015) and immigrants generally (Verkuyten, 
2005a) has also show this discursive strategy to be evident. This reversal of liberal 
values to deny racism is further evident in anti-immigrant discourse deployed by 
the populist radical right (see S. Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Johnson & Goodman, 
2013; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Verkuyten, 2013). To reiterate, this is not to 
imply that malignant individuals hold internal ambivalent attitudes towards 
minority ‘others’, but people are seen to, at times, draw on ambivalent discourses 
to justify hostility towards the ‘other’, whilst maintaining an appearance of 
tolerance (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 194). Hence, we see that the competing and 
conflicting discursive frameworks, contesting the threat from immigration to the 
nation, makes the contentious immigration debate an appropriate site for further 
exploration of ambivalent discourses.   




1.3.1 Ambivalent Everyday Thinking 
There are a number of points within rhetorical psychology, in relation to 
ambivalent discourses, that are worthy of discussion. Billig’s (1987) concept of 
rhetorical psychology draws attention to the argumentative nature of everyday 
thinking. People are only considered to hold an attitude, towards a social or political 
concern, if it is disputed with everyday discourse. In other words, there needs to be 
a contested argument for the notion of an attitude to be possible. Hence, people 
manage and debate multiple conflicting arguments in relation to social and political 
issues that are important to them. And at times conflicting positions will remain 
unresolved leading to the expression of ambivalent discourse. Billig also highlights 
that even when we are alone our thinking takes the form of a conversation that 
reflects public debate (Billig, 1987, p. 140; also see Harré, 1999). 
 There is considerable overlap between rhetorical psychology and discursive 
psychology, discussed in the previous section (see section 1.2 p. 24). Particularly 
in relation to people taking up and producing flexible, context dependent and often 
contradictory ambivalent discourses. People draw on divergent and conflicting 
ideological positions dependent on the social situation and the wider argumentative 
controversy that they are addressing (Billig, 1987, p. 260). Billig (2012) also 
reiterates the notion that people can ambivalently deploy enlightenment and liberal 
discourses in order to deny irrational prejudice, whilst justifying hostility and 
discrimination towards others. 
Furthermore, Billig and colleagues’ (1988, p. 143) concept of ideological 
dilemmas outlines how people’s social and political worlds are complex and contain 
shifting, opposing themes. Managing these contradictory themes does not invoke 
disinterest. Quite the opposite, they are the very substance of people’s thinking as 
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they grapple with issues of significance to them. People discuss these puzzling 
contradictory themes in everyday social interaction and even taken-for-granted 
assumptions of everyday commonsense have a contradictory form.  
Hence, people inhabit an ambivalent discursive environment that is 
constituted and reconstituted through contradictory themes. They negotiate the 
ambivalent tension between opposing arguments and are constantly debating issues 
that are significant to them. People are perpetually socially situated as they discuss 
and debate their deepest concerns with a real or imagined other. According to Billig 
(1987), managing the ambivalent tension between competing and conflicting 
ideologies within the broader discursive environment is the essence of human 
experience. This also further underlines the central point from the previous section 
that it is impractical and unconstructive to attempt to separate the individual from 
their social context.  
It is not individuals who are ambivalent towards others and hold internalised 
ambivalent attitudes, but the discourses that they draw upon are ambivalent 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 194). In other words, contradictory dilemmas do not 
reside within the cognitive processing of the individual, but ambivalent discourses 
and rhetorical strategies are available within liberal society. These dilemma and 
conflicts that maintain discrimination are readily employed because they are 
predominant within society and are institutionally sanctioned. Liberal notions of 
equality are effortlessly mobilised within discourse to argue against redress for 
groups who have experienced systemic historic and ongoing discrimination, 
because this rhetorical position is hegemonic and readily available within liberal 
societies. The issue of ongoing widespread discrimination towards minorities 




within competing interpretive frameworks, drawn upon to evaluate and articulate 
power relations and social, political and ethical concerns (Potter, 1998; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). These discursive and rhetorical frameworks constrain and enable 
what can be readily expressed. 
1.3.2 Ideological Dilemma of Liberalism  
People do not to present unitary and fixed attitudes but are seen to manage 
contradictory and opposing ideological positions when they confront political and 
social concerns (Billig et al., 1988; Condor, 2017; Condor & Gibson, 2007). For 
contemporary rhetorical analysis it is particularly important to acknowledge the 
dilemmic contradictory themes contained within the dominant ideology of 
liberalism (Billig et al., 1988). Prejudice and tolerance are deployed with equal 
merit and are entangled together within persuasive ambivalent rhetorical strategies. 
One ideological position can be taken up and deployed in support for the opposing 
position.  
 Arguments claiming that liberal values and tolerance are under threat, are 
ambivalently used as a justification for hostility towards disadvantaged others 
(Verkuyten, 2013). For example, the Australian points based immigration system 
is a liberal individualising means of protecting the good immigrant, who will 
contribute to the national economy, through a notion of fairness and equality, but 
discriminates against the poor uneducated immigrant who is constructed to be an 
economic burden (Gibson & Booth, 2017). Neoliberal and nationalist discourses, 
which might be considered incompatible, are strategically used in tandem to protect 
Australian sovereignty for the benefit of the white Australians, at the expense of the 
asylum seeker (Lueck, Due, & Augoustinos, 2015). The ideological dilemma 
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negotiated by British citizenship officers exposes the ambivalent tension between 
the representation of a humanitarian and tolerant Britain, on the one hand, versus a 
threat from immigrants, on the other hand (Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014). 
Similarly, the populist radical right Dutch politician Geert Wilders justifies 
intolerance and hostility towards Muslims by claiming that they are a threat to 
liberal tolerance (Verkuyten, 2013). This is closely aligned to the notion that people 
utilise ambivalent interpretive repertoires, based on liberal values, to justify 
hostility towards disadvantaged minority group as discussed in the previous section 
(also see Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 194). Again, we see that the competing and 
conflicting discursive frameworks, contesting the threat from immigration to the 
nation, makes the contentious immigration debate an appropriate site for exploring 
potential ambivalent discourses.   
People’s attempt to sidestep appearing prejudiced, when dealing with 
matters of exclusion, is well-document through the ‘ambivalent expression’ (Billig, 
2012) of the common denial of prejudice, ‘I’m not prejudiced but …’ (Augoustinos 
& Every, 2007, 2010; Billig, 1987, p. 269; 1991, p. 125; 2012; S. Goodman, 2017a; 
S. Goodman & Rowe, 2014; Van Dijk, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 212). 
Research has even shown that speakers not only defend themselves from 
accusations of prejudice but they will step up to defend others, with whom they 
identify, against accusations of prejudice (Condor, Figgou, Abell, Gibson, & 
Stevenson, 2006).  
Billig (2012) importantly highlights that even though the ‘ambivalent 
expression’ of prejudice denial is a means of impression-management, acting to 
protect the speaker against accusations of being prejudiced, this explanation does 




is superficial face-saving in preparation for the prejudicial declaration, which 
reflects the individual’s true internal feelings towards the other. This mistakenly 
infers that the prejudicial motivation lies deep within individual defective 
psychology, whilst society as a whole is presented as upholding the social norm of 
tolerance. This analysis falls foul of the same error that cognitive psychology makes 
by individualising the problem of prejudice. It situates prejudice in the 
dysfunctional psychology of a minority of individuals, whilst absolving society of 
prejudice and ignoring institutionally sanctioned inequality and disadvantage. It 
implies that the liberal moral majority are indeed tolerant, whilst only a few 
questionable individuals, ‘them’ not ‘us’, exhibit prejudice (Billig, 2012).  
1.3.3 From Tolerant Social Norms to Rational Arguments 
Furthermore, whilst the ‘ambivalent expression’ of prejudice denial protects the 
speaker against accusations of intolerance, it also serves to construct the argument 
as ‘rational’ and well-informed (Billig, 2012). Although the presentation of a 
positive self-image is not an incorrect explanation for prejudice denial, it ignores 
the rationalising rhetorical strategy of anticipating and countering the opposing 
argument (Billig, 1987, p. 261). This often entails co-opting the opposing argument 
and reversing its normative understanding. Speakers rhetorically co-opt and reverse 
enlightenment ideologies of egalitarianism and humanitarianism to legitimise 
disadvantage, exclusion and marginalisation. Billig (2012) also highlights that 
speakers addressing a likeminded audience, who hold the same political viewpoint 
condoning inequality and intolerance, also deny being prejudiced in order to portray 
their argument as rational. Hence, even when speakers are immune from concerns 
of being sanctioned by liberal social norms, because they are in a likeminded group, 
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they still avoid appearing openly prejudiced. However, it is important that their 
argument is convincing and persuasive, so they present the argument as rational, 
balanced and well-informed.  
Therefore, it is not incorrect to assume that social norms constrain explicit 
expressions of prejudice or racism, but it is insufficient. Liberal social norms invoke 
both arguments of tolerance and hostility towards others and both sides must be 
ambivalently acknowledged in order for the speaker to convincingly present their 
ideological position (Billig et al., 1988). The assumption that there is a prevalent 
liberal social norm, which is unaccepting of intolerance towards others, is in itself 
an ambivalent discourse that efficiently maintains structural disadvantage 
(Jackman, 1994). Even though tolerance and egalitarian values are commonly 
espoused within liberal Western societies, institutional and systemic racism has not 
been dismantled within the UK (Gilroy, 2002), Western Europe, North America 
and Australia (Leach, 2005), and South Africa (Dixon, Durrheim, & Thomae, 2017; 
Durrheim, 2017; Durrheim, Jacobs, & Dixon, 2014). This also highlights the 
‘ambivalent nature of contemporary race discourse’ within western liberal 
democracies, which continues to legitimise the marginalization and exclusion of 
racial others (Augoustinos & Every, 2007).  
Furthermore, the supposed taboo against racist discourse is often presented 
in liberal democracies as being an affront to freedom of speech (S. Goodman & 
Burke, 2010). If liberal social norms are assumed to be predominantly unaccepting 
of prejudice, and particularly racism, it is hard to explain why speakers find it 
problematic to accuse others of being racist (Augoustinos & Every, 2010; Every & 
Augoustinos, 2007; Gibson, 2017; Riggs & Due, 2010; Van Dijk, 1992). It has been 




than racist attitudes or actions themselves’ (Van Dijk, 1992). And people who 
‘challenge prejudice talk … might seriously jeopardize their relationship with 
others, which might in turn have ramifications well beyond the particular local 
context in which the ‘scene’ takes place’ (Condor, 2006).  
Additionally, the ‘ambivalent expression’ (Billig, 2012) is not confined to 
arguments where the speaker could necessarily be accused of racism or intolerance. 
Speakers, in the UK, who supported the war in Iraq are seen to deploy the 
ambivalent expression, ‘I’m not a war monger but…’, which presents their 
argument as ‘moral and rational’ (Gibson, 2012). This rhetorical position serves to 
protect the speaker from accusations of condoning mindless violence. But 
supporting one’s own nation-state in war does not necessarily contravene the liberal 
social norm of tolerance. Quite the opposite, the moral right of the nation-state to 
wage war and dispatch violence is universally accepted (Billig, 1995, pp. 1 - 4; 
Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017, p. 136; Orford, 2017). The nation-state is the taken-for-
granted legitimate container of violence that stockpiles military hardware and can 
request its citizens to sacrifice their lives in its defence. Even though sacrifice for a 
waring nation-state is often revered within liberal western democracies (Billig, 
1995, pp. 1 - 4; McConville, McCreanor, Wetherell, & Moewaka Barnes, 2016; 
McConville, Wetherell, McCreanor, Borell, & Moewaka Barnes, 2019), Gibson’s 
(2012) analysis indicated that people who supported the Iraq war are still required 
to present their position as moral and rational. They achieve this through an 
ambivalent discourse that justified the specific case for war in Iraq but denies a 
general acceptance for war. 
Therefore, denying the identity of a ‘war monger’ does not singularly 
accomplish face-saving, making a positive impression and self-monitoring but it 
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constructs the argument as moral, rational and balanced. The argument is based on 
a comprehensive knowledge of all the facts and not an irrational primordial desire 
to unleash violence for its own sake, even though war is celebrated within liberal 
democracies. This rhetorical strategy takes up the opposing position and pre-empts 
the counter argument before it is aired (Billig et al., 1988). It presents the speaker 
as having thought about the issue and taken account of the opposing opinion, which 
can be immediately and efficiently quashed.  
Billig (2012) acknowledges that the ‘ambivalent expression’ of prejudice 
denial does present a positive self-image, not necessarily due to society’s rejection 
of intolerance towards others, but because a strong convincing argument requires 
the appearance of rationality and being well-informed. Inevitably, liberal societies 
embrace ambivalent discourses that display an embarrassment of power and 
privilege but these discourses do not disrupt these inequitable structures (Billig et 
al., 1988). 
1.3.4 Immigration and Ambivalent Discourses  
In reality there are many opposing socially sanctioned arguments within the broader 
liberal discursive environment to draw upon (Billig et al., 1988). On the one hand, 
there are positions of tolerance, whilst on the other hand, there are positions of 
hostility and exclusion. The ideology of tolerance is broadly espoused, but there is 
also widespread acceptance of hostility towards disadvantage and marginalised 
‘others’. Although speakers attempt to present their position positively, it is not 
sufficient to simply assume there is a liberal social norm against prejudice 




societies that justify discrimination, inequality and poverty such as individualism 
and meritocracy. 
For example, young people in the UK grapple with an ideological dilemma 
pertaining to the issue of unemployment (Gibson, 2011). On the one hand, they 
draw on an ideology of individualism, criticising lazy fellow citizens who lack a 
work ethic and do not make the ‘effort’. Whilst on the other hand, they draw on a 
social explanation for unemployment that blames immigration. Interestingly, 
individualism serves to legitimise criticism of lazy unemployed fellow citizens, but 
this individualised work ethic is not bestowed upon immigrants. Instead the 
exclusion of immigrants is justified through a social concern constructing solidarity 
with their fellow unemployed citizens.  
Ambivalent discourses that are based on liberal values are highly apparent 
when it comes to the universally sanctioned exclusion of unwanted immigrants. 
Anti-immigrant arguments can appear rational by merely claiming to have insight 
to the ‘national feeling’ (Billig, 2012). Privileged western nations support 
international movement when they require labour, but construct immigration as 
threatening, and out of control, when they have not sanctioned it (Gibson & Booth, 
2017). This is biased to the needs of the international educated middle and upper 
class, whilst paying little attention to protecting human rights of those fleeing 
violence and poverty. Indeed, people seeking asylum are not only constructed as 
violating national sovereignty but they are also deemed harmful to the dominant 
neoliberal agenda (Lueck et al., 2015) and the welfare state, due to their depiction 
as an economic burden (Sakki & Pettersson, 2016). 
 Although speakers usually avoid accusations of prejudice or racism, they 
have no problem justifying the exclusion of immigrants (Durrheim, Quayle, & 
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Dixon, 2016; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011). In a speech in 2005 the leader of the UK 
Conservative party advocated stricter processing of people seeking asylum and 
avoided accusations of racism by drawing on a claim to rational ‘common sense’ 
(Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008). A study showed Greek speakers claiming that, in 
theory, prejudice and racism towards Albanian refugees was problematic and 
irrational. But actual acts of discrimination towards Albanian refugees were 
justified through an ambivalent discourse, where the Albanian victims were 
positioned as the cause, because they were constructed as being a security risk. And 
hence, the actions of the perpetrators were constructed as ‘reasonable and 
understandable’, even though the speakers ambivalently position themselves as not 
condoning this behaviour (Figgou & Condor, 2006).  
Furthermore, speakers defending people who are seeking asylum, are shown 
to make their argument cautiously and avoid accusing the opposition of being racist 
(S. Goodman, 2010). Similarly, an advocate on behalf of people seeking asylum 
who accused the opposition of racism, caused controversy within the Australian 
parliament and was disciplined, whilst the accused went unreprimanded (Every & 
Augoustinos, 2007). It is shown that advocates on behalf people seeking asylum, 
who draw on an argument claiming that the opposition are racist, is 
counterproductive because this argument is met with denial, avoidance and even 
anger (Every, 2013). Furthermore, even people seeking asylum, who directly 
experience racially motivated violence, avoid or delicately and reluctantly declare 
the act as being racist (Kirkwood, McKinlay, & McVittie, 2013b). People 
originating from immigrant backgrounds at times surprisingly take up membership 
of radical right populist parties that espouse anti-immigrant ideology. Interestingly, 




immigrants, and deny experiencing structural discrimination, and accuse the 
opposition of being racist against members of the radical right party (Pettersson, 
Liebkind, & Sakki, 2016). 
The liberal tolerant society is far from evident when it comes to the 
impoverished immigrant or the desperate refugee. However, whichever side of the 
argument a speaker positions themselves they must present themselves in a positive 
light, not only due to tolerant social norms, but to appear rational and well-
informed. They need to take up an argumentative position that indicates an 
awareness and is prepared to counter the opposing argument, even if it merely 
involves denial of irrational intolerance. In order to be a particularly effective 
rhetorician, the speaker can take up the opposing argument, reverse its meaning and 
deploy it in their favour of their own position. Therefore, ambivalent discourses and 
rhetorical strategies are potentially a necessary and effective argumentative strategy 
to nip the opposing position in the bud. Again, we see that the competing and 
conflicting discursive frameworks, contesting the threat from immigration to the 
nation, makes the contentious immigration debate an appropriate site for exploring 
potential ambivalent discourses.   
1.4 AFFECTIVE-DISCURSIVE PRACTICE AND AMBIVALENCE 
1.4.1 Discourse as a Demystified Carrier of Affect   
Wetherell (2012a, p. 19) acknowledged the recent criticism of discourse analysis 
for treating people as disembodied, unfeeling, empty vessels, merely exposed to the 
push and pull of competing discourses (also see Blackman, Cromby, Hook, 
Papadopoulos, & Walkerdine, 2008). This has coincided with the recent scholarly 
interest in ‘affect’, which is primarily concerned with categorisation of emotional 
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states, affective meaning-making, and importantly, how emotion is accumulated 
and can be seen to rapidly spread from one body to another (Taylor, 2017; 
Wetherell, 2014b).  
 However, Wetherell (2012a) has also argued that some affect research, and 
theory, has a tendency to present affect as being something uncanny. For example, 
by describing affective transmission using terms such as ‘contagion’, which appears 
to mystify the process and produces more questions than answers (p. 21). She 
argues that affect is performative, a social practice that is culturally patterned. There 
are culturally acceptable emotional responses that are expected in particular 
contexts. Therefore, affect can be seen to be a form of conversation (Harré, 1999) 
as people recognise other people’s emotions and at times mirror them. For example, 
if one individual displays fear in a certain situation then there is good reason for 
another individual, exposed to the same situation, to also respond fearfully. Also, if 
a person displays embarrassment, they are indicating that they have made a social 
mistake that they regret. Hence, ‘we also need to locate affect, not in the ether, or 
in endless and mysterious circulations, but in actual bodies and social actors, 
negotiating, making decisions, evaluating, communicating, inferring and relating’ 
(Wetherell, 2012a, p. 159). In other words, Wetherell attempts to offer a pragmatic 
conceptualisation of affective practice that has research utility.  
 Wetherell (2012a, p. 21) also notes that attempts to draw a separation 
between affect and discourse is impractical and unhelpful (also see McAvoy, 2015). 
People not only share discourses, but they also share emotion through social 
practice and, hence, affect and discourse are entangled within everyday meaning-
making (Wetherell, 2012a, p. 20). Our embodied experience often provides shared 




socially shared emotion (also see Harré, 1999). By treating affect as something in 
‘excess’ of discourse, it fails to offer a convincing analysis of how bodies are 
affected and how people share their embodied experience (Wetherell, 2013a). 
Discourse is what makes affect powerful because it is often the means by which 
affect is shared and spread between people (Wetherell, 2013a, p. 19). Discourse can 
act as an efficient vehicle for the transmission of affect between bodies. And 
examples of this are seen in political speeches, where actors attempt to consolidate 
an emotional response and form an affective community by drawing on personal 
emotional anecdotes.  
 Affective transmission is similar to language as it spreads through 
coproduction, situated social interaction and relational practice. Displays of 
emotion have a productive force, it is a social action and potential political 
mobilizer. Affect is a means of recruiting others by drawing on those who 
experience a similar bodily state in response to similar context (Wetherell, 2012a, 
p. 159). Certain emotional responses are culturally expected in specific social 
contexts and are considered legitimate. Therefore affect is a shared cultural practice 
and affective identities are brought into being (Van Der Merwe & Wetherell, 2019).  
1.4.2 Subjectivity and Affect 
This conceptualisation of affective-discursive practice is of particular significance 
to this research project, because of the link between emotion and identity 
(Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 
2002; Reicher, 2012; Reicher & Jogdand, 2017; Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010; 
Wetherell, 2008). Specifically relevant here is the emotional underpinning of 
national identities (Billig, 1995, p. 40; Wetherell, 2014a; Wetherell, McCreanor, 
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McConville, Barnes, & le Grice, 2015) and national belonging (Scully, 2015) and 
the way hate can become attached to certain groups such as people seeking asylum 
(Ahmed, 2013).  
 The presidents of Finland and Estonia, in 2015 and 2016, were seen to draw 
on an ambivalent affective-discursive practice as their speeches about the ‘refugee 
crisis’ shifted between ‘fear and anger’ versus ‘compassion and solidarity’ towards 
refugees (Ojala, Kaasik-Krogerus, & Pantti, 2019). White New Zealanders, a 
powerful high-status ethnic group, are seen to protect and legitimise their position 
of colonial privilege through their affective-discursive construction of national 
commemoration days (McConville et al., 2019). Furthermore, the coverage of a 
national commemoration day by the Australian print media constructs the nation as 
an ‘affective community’ with a dominant cultural identity that excludes the 
minority ethnic group (McConville et al., 2016).  
1.4.3 Complex and Ambivalent Affective Positions  
Affective-discursive practice also offers new insight into ambivalence as people 
struggle to manage a social world that often falls short of expectations (Wetherell, 
2012a, p. 2 & 127; 2015). Exploring affect affords new approaches to ambiguous 
and subtle emotions such as schadenfreude, or ambivalent affective positions such 
as ‘reluctant optimism, intense indifference, or enjoyable melancholy’ (Wetherell, 
2012a, p. 2). Hence, exploring affective-discursive practice offers the researcher the 
opportunity to investigate peoples expressed embodied investment and attachment 
to certain subjectivities. Of particular interest is peoples expressed emotional 
response when their sense of belonging and attachment to a social group is 




they expect from this affective commitment may well be disrupted, for some at 
least, when it come to the debate about immigration or refugees (Ahmed, 2013).  
 Importantly, affective responses are patterned cultural resources, and are 
therefore, constrained or opened up by culturally acceptable ways of feeling 
(Wetherell, 2015). Variability in emotional response towards ourselves and ‘others’ 
is potentially constrained through ‘emergent patterns of [social] activity’ 
(Wetherell, 2013a). People inhabit affective regimes that pattern what they can 
express and these define affective power relationships that maintain the status quo 
(Wetherell, 2012a, p. 16). Hence, people who belong to high status powerful groups 
have the privilege to take up an affective position where they can express sympathy 
and benevolence towards the less fortunate (Wetherell, 2013b). Certain emotional 
responses are socially expected, appropriate and acceptable, dependent on the 
constructed power relation between the social groups. Expressions of guilt, 
sympathy or pity are expected cultural responses but may also produce little in the 
way of political mobilization on behalf of the disadvantaged (also see Branscombe 
& Doosje, 2004; Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2002). Hence, affective-discursive 
analysis and the acknowledgement of peoples shared embodied experience affords 
the researcher more tools to examine the discourse of ‘complexity and ambivalence’ 
(Martinussen & Wetherell, 2019; Wetherell, 2003).  
1.5 IDENTITY THREAT AND AMBIVALENCE 
1.5.1 The Cognitive Beginnings of the Social Identity Approach 
The Social Identity Approach brings together Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982) 
and Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; 
Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), and provides a theoretical 
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understanding of the processes involved in the way ‘people define themselves as 
members of a social group’ (Reicher et al., 2010). Social identity specifies who ‘we’ 
are in relation to ‘others’ by making comparisons with the assumed characteristics 
of social groups. Hence, people can identifying similarities and differences they 
believe they have with social groups. Social identity provides the basis for people 
to work with others in joint ventures and collaborative social acts. Shared 
understandings of a collective history, and the present, serve as the foundation for 
social identities (Reicher et al., 2010).  
 Early social identity research indicated that participants require only 
minimal information to invoke them to identify with an arbitrary group and then 
display ingroup bias by giving preferential treatment towards this randomly 
assigned ingroup (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). What was primarily 
interesting about these findings, was how easily people moved from positioning 
themselves as an individual to positioning themselves as part of a social group, and 
their motivation to work together for the benefit of the collective to which they now 
belong. In this sense, the early findings from social identity research informed us 
less about hostility towards an arbitrary outgroup but more about the centrality of 
social groups as a site for collective action.  
 Self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987) was an 
extension of social identity theory and argues that people identify with social 
categories that are associated with certain shared characteristics or stereotypes. The 
primary significance of self-categorisation theory is that people are considered to 
self-stereotype themselves in order to fit with the salient social group with which 
they identify. They take up the characteristics that they share with other members 




norms, and values, embedded within the social category, which in part influences 
emotional expressions and behaviour (Reicher et al., 2010). People evidently 
display a motivation for a salient ingroup to be positively distinct from another 
relevant outgroup. Hence, people’s self-esteem is in part influenced by how positive 
they feel about the social group to which they belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
 Importantly, categorising people is not a means to simplify and, hence, 
misrepresent the complex social world but is efficiently functional (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2016). Often it is logical to interpret the actions of others based on the 
characteristics of their group membership in preference to their individual 
characteristics. For example, immigrants are indeed individuals originating from 
different parts of the world with individual histories, but it also makes sense to 
assess their needs and potential impact on the host nation as a group. However, the 
impact immigrants have as a group does not necessarily have to be constructed as 
a problematic burden, they could also be seen as an asset. This positive or negative 
intergroup relationship is dependent on how the contested characteristics of 
immigrants as a group, and the national ingroup, are constructed (Reicher et al., 
2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Therefore, competing and conflicting discursive 
frameworks, contesting the threat from immigration to the nation, makes the 
contentious immigration debate an appropriate site for exploring potential 
ambivalent discourses.   
1.5.2 Extending and Integrating the Social Identity Approach with Discursive 
and Rhetorical Psychology 
Wetherell and Potter (1992) criticised the social identity approach for 
conceptualising individuals as independent separate entities responding to a social 
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reality made up of a hierarchy of predetermined competing social groups (p. 47). 
However, Meyer, Durrheim, and Foster (2016) point out that the theoretical 
foundations of the social identity approach were initially written during an 
individualistic epoch, dominated by the psychological exploration of internal 
cognitive processes (also see Billig, 2002). Since then social psychology has 
embraced the ‘turn to language’ and social constructionism, which has 
complemented and advanced the social identity approach. Hence, contemporary 
social identity theorist tend to acknowledge that identities, social categories, and 
the power relations between these social categories, are not predetermined and 
enduring, but are fluid and constructed through discourse (Drury & Reicher, 2000; 
Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Social reality is constituted 
through the construction of social categories, the relationship between them and 
stereotypes (Condor, Tileaga, & Billig, 2013; Potter, 1996, p. 177; 1998). However, 
this is not to imply that individuals can construct any arrangement of social 
categories or social reality, this is constrained by the competing interests of others 
and the institutions instated by majority groups (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 48). 
But, identities, in the contemporary globalised world, and the way people define 
themselves in relation to others, can be characterised as being ‘flexible and 
ambivalent’ (Verkuyten, 2005b, p. 12). 
 Hence, the social identity approach has moved away from the assumption 
that social behaviour is a perceptive responses to predetermined social categories, 
to an acknowledgement that identities are performative (Durrheim et al., 2018; 
Durrheim et al., 2016; Reicher, 2012). Identities are historically situated, with some 
becoming redundant as new identities are produced in order to achieve collective 




2017, p. 94). Hence, identities are fluid across time and are taken up as a means to 
achieve social and political ends. Identities are performative because they declare 
how people position themselves in the world, and how they expect others to position 
them and their relationship with others (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 46). In line 
with discursive or rhetorical psychology (see sections 1.2 & 1.3) identity 
performance is a social action and what is being accomplished through the 
performance of a particular identity should be the focus for identity research 
(Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017, p. 94).  
 Consistent with discursive and rhetorical psychology the self is not fixed, 
unitary and independent of social and historical context but instead the self is 
variable, dynamic and socially situated (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017, p. 95; Reynolds 
et al., 2010). People take up and perform certain identities in accordance with how 
they believe others will see them and respond to them. Although, people may see 
themselves as individual entities, they are always positioned in relation to others 
(also see Harré, 1999). Even when alone the self is dependent on the notion of how 
‘I’ believe others see ‘me’. Therefore, people have multiple ‘selves’ because they 
consider themselves to be members of multiple social groups (for example 
nationality, gender, ethnicity, member of a sports club, political activist) (Reicher 
et al., 2010).  
 Furthermore, people’s identity can also shift between levels of abstraction 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2016). For example, the person can define themselves at an 
individual level or the level of the immediate social group or a higher-level 
superordinate overarching social group of all human beings. As people shift 
between different identity positions, or find themselves amongst others of different 
identities, they can take up different argumentative positions (Billig, 1987, p. 277). 
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For example, second generation Irish youth living in Britain claim that when they 
are in Britain they are positioned, and criticised by others for being Irish, and 
therefore, are drawn to argue on behalf of the Irish. But when they are in Ireland, 
they are positioned as being British and consequently defend the British. 
 Hence, the ‘self’ is dependent on how the person sees themselves in relation 
to others and this is dynamically dependent on the situation (Reicher & Hopkins, 
2016; Reynolds et al., 2010). People’s identity can move horizontally between 
many identity positions and vertically through various levels of abstraction, but the 
identity performed is always in relation to ‘others’ and what the individual hopes to 
accomplish within the social situation. In line with discourse analysis this identity 
performance is not limitless, there are constraints placed upon available identity 
positions, particularly in relation to ‘whether they are construed as ‘other’ or as part 
of the extended ‘we’ (Reicher & Hopkins, 2016; emphasis added). However, note 
the importance of ‘construed’ as exclusion or inclusion is not fixed and immutable 
but is fluid.  
 Therefore identities are a means to mobilise a collective, through contested 
and shared values, beliefs and understandings (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 49). 
Via identity performance, certain collective actions become possible whilst others 
are made problematic or even unavailable. Hence, identities are endowed with the 
social power to achieve social change and create social reality (Elcheroth & 
Reicher, 2017, p. 95; Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2010; Meyer et al., 2016; Reicher 
& Jogdand, 2017). Social categories are not only about the past and present, but 
importantly they forge the future and how we want to be. But there are competing 




 Hence, because social power is embedded within identities, the values, 
beliefs and shared understandings of salient identities are contested by those who 
have ambitions to direct the collective power (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 49). 
Politicians, leaders and activists, use communication strategies, such as speeches 
and the media, to attempt to present the values, beliefs and shared understandings 
of social groups as being aligned with their political agenda (Haslam et al., 2010). 
Political behaviour is dependent on the contested characteristics of social groups 
and power relations between social groups, which are constructed through discourse 
(Sindic & Condor, 2014). People can only determine the validity of their collective 
beliefs based on interaction with others who they identify with (Reicher et al., 
2010). People are therefore influenced by group members that they believe are 
knowledgeable about the prioritised beliefs, values and norms of the salient social 
group. These influential actors are ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ who are considered 
to be prototypical members of the social group (Haslam et al., 2010).  
 Therefore, social groups are not predetermined to be hostile towards each 
other, based on zero-sum thinking, but intergroup relationships are dependent on 
important group values and how the ingroup wants to see itself. Social categories 
and the power relations between them are fluid, situated and constructed through 
social practice. People perform certain identities in order to accomplish certain 
social actions. Hence, they can take up identity positions drawing from many 
intersecting social groups to which they belong. These drawn-upon identities can 
also vary by levels of abstraction or exclusivity. Because the power of collective 
action is mobilised though identities, the norms, values and beliefs of identities are 
constantly being contested. But, inevitably at times there will be conflicts between 
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competing identity concerns and, hence, how people see and respond to other 
groups tends to be ‘highly ambivalent’ (Reicher, 2012).  
1.5.3 The Contested Character of the Nation 
When it comes to the issue of immigration the primary social group of political 
interest is the imagined community of the nation-state (Anderson, 1991). The 
nation-state and its citizens have the power to exclude or include those attempting 
to cross the national border (Billig, 1995). The inclusion of minorities is dependent 
on the contested character of the nation and, hence, the values, norms and beliefs 
that are considered important to the members of the national group (Reicher et al., 
2006). Leaders, activists and the media will attempt to mobilise different 
understandings of the character of the nation and whether the accommodation of 
immigrants or refugees is problematic or not (Reicher, 2012).  
 Of course, there are other identity positions that are also relevant, making 
the governance of social power and collective mobilisation slippery. The contents 
of identities are contested, and there is also an intersecting hierarchy of identities to 
consider. Drawing on the contentious immigration debate facilitates the 
investigation of ambivalent discourses, because on the one hand, people might be 
concerned about the impact of immigration on welfare provision for their family or 
for their local community. Conversely on the other hand, they may position 
themselves at a superordinate level and be concerned about the implication of 
exclusionary polices for humanity as a whole. When it comes to policy 
implementation and justification for coercive power against migrants, the level of 
the nation-state becomes focal. Furthermore, national belonging, although banal 




inevitably is directly related to the governance of national borders and ‘boundary 
consciousness’ (Billig, 1995, p. 21). Importantly, the nation-state is the site of many 
political struggles and tensions over who should be included or excluded (Reicher 
et al., 2006). The nation-state is also the foundation of welfare institutions, such as 
education, health care and social housing, which people understandably have 
concerns about being overburdened (Calhoun, 2007, pp. 166 - 167).  
 I have highlighted that the character of a nation, like any other identity, is 
not fixed but is contested (Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). In other 
words, moral humanitarian concerns of exclusion, definitions of who should be 
offered membership and tensions over whether immigration is a boon or problem, 
are also not fixed, but are contested through public discourse, the media and the 
discourse of political actors. Potential threats to the nation from immigrants and 
refugees are dynamically produced by the social, political and historical context and 
the ebb and flow of public and political discourse. 
 In alignment with the discussion on discursive psychology, highlighting that 
people cannot simply take up any subject position or draw on any interpretive 
repertoire due to the constraints of hegemonic discourses that maintain the status 
quo (see section 1.2.3), people’s access to social identities are also constrained by 
the interests of others (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 48). Hence, immigrants and 
refugees cannot simply perform an identity which includes them in a secure wealthy 
nation-state, because they are opposed by the vested interests of the members of the 
potential host nation who use coercive institutional force to keep them out. But 
immigrants can mobilise collective action, on their behalf, by performing an 
identity position that draws attention to their plight and the injustice of exclusion 
(for example Clare, Goodman, Liebling, & Laing, 2014; S. Goodman, Burke, 
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Liebling, & Zasada, 2015; Kirkwood, 2012; Kirkwood, Goodman, et al., 2015, pp. 
162 - 179). Similarly, advocates on behalf of refugees can attempt to mobilise the 
national collective by contesting the important shared values of the nation (for 
example Bates & Kirkwood, 2013; Kirkwood, 2017; Wroe, 2017).  
 What is important here is how citizens construct the national ingroup and 
the immigrant outgroup, whilst being influenced by significant social actors. If the 
media and politicians construct the national group as under threat from 
immigration, which is often the case, then people will tend to construct immigrants 
as problematic. Conversely, if immigrants are constructed as being an economic 
and cultural asset to the nation then citizens are less likely to draw on discourses 
that present immigrants as a threat. Furthermore, if the nation is constructed as 
humanitarian and morally concerned about the plight of refugees, for example, then 
refugees are likely to be positioned as being less problematic. In reality, members 
of the nation have to manage a cacophony of competing and conflicting discursive 
frameworks, contesting the threat from immigration to the nation, which makes the 
contentious immigration debate an appropriate site for exploring potential 
ambivalent discourses.  
1.5.4 Mobilising the National Collective through Competing and Conflicting 
Identity Threats 
Hence, intergroup relations are dependent on how ‘we’ construct ourselves and 
what norms, and values define ‘us’ (Reicher, 2012); and whether a relevant 
outgroup conflicts with our goals and view of the world (Reynolds, Haslam, & 
Turner, 2012). People attempt to defend the group against ‘threats to the value of 




1999, p. 36). And ‘intergroup threat is experienced when members of one group 
perceive that another group is in a position to cause them harm’ (Stephan, Ybarra, 
& Morrison, 2016). Groups will attempt to manage threats to their identity by 
keeping the threatening outgroup ‘in their place’ (Reicher, 2012). But importantly, 
the character of the nation is contested, and hence, threats to the nation are also 
contested, by prototypical members of the nation, in order to mobilise the national 
collective to include or excluded others. The way we construct ourselves influences 
how we construct others, and therefore, depicts the intergroup relationship. Hence, 
self-stereotyping affects how people stereotype others.  
 Therefore, on the one hand, members of a national ingroup may be 
mobilised to protect the interests of their fellow citizens through the exclusion of 
outgroups. They may be influenced by discourses claiming outgroups to be a 
realistic threat to the physical welfare, material resources and political power of the 
nation to which they belong. They may also be influenced by symbolic threat 
discourses that present the outgroup as a threat to the perceived distinct values, 
beliefs and culture identity of the ingroup (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). 
Indeed, the perceived realistic and symbolic threat from immigration, for example, 
are pervasive within everyday discourse, and this has been highlighted in a number 
of previous survey studies (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Stephan et al., 
1999; Stephan, Ybarra, Martnez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998). Experimental 
manipulations of symbolic and realistic threat discourses have also been shown to 
increase expressed hostility towards immigration (Costello & Hodson, 2011; 
Falomir-Pichastor, Muñoz-Rojas, Invernizzi, & Mugny, 2004; Stephan, Renfro, 
Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). The perceived threat from refugees is a dominant 
discourse, which presents host citizens as inevitably worse off and their cultural 
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identity as being undermined when refugees are accommodated (Capdevila & 
Callaghan, 2008; Esses, Hamilton, & Gaucher, 2017; Fakih & Marrouch, 2015; S. 
Goodman & Burke, 2010; Lecheler, Matthes, & Boomgaarden, 2019; Lueck et al., 
2015; United Nations, 2018).  
 However, on the other hand, people derive self-esteem from the positively 
distinct nature of the social group to which they belong, when compared on a valued 
dimension (Branscombe et al., 1999). What is important here, is the valued 
dimension of comparison. The value that is used to make comparisons with other 
groups does not necessarily depend on a material aspect, but can also be dependent 
on, for example, pro-social behaviour (Hopkins et al., 2007; Reicher et al., 2010) 
or humanitarianism (Reicher et al., 2006). Furthermore, an important ingroup 
characteristic and dimension of comparison for positive evaluations is morality 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).  
 Therefore, influential prototypical members of the nation can also present 
an argument that exclusion of outgroups is a threat to the group’s positive image. A 
threatened positive group image can occur when the groups moral reputation is 
called into question due to mistreatment, exploitation or prejudicial transgressions 
against a lower status outgroup (Branscombe et al., 1999, p. 49; Shuman, Johnson, 
Saguy, & Halperin, 2018). People exposed to group image threat arguments, 
highlighting their privileged structural advantage and discrimination towards a 
disadvantaged outgroup, may advocate changing the social structure (Chow, 
Lowery, & Knowles, 2008; Knowles, Lowery, Chow, & Unzueta, 2014; Powell, 




 Hence, a positive group image is important to group members and this can 
be dependent on the group’s perceived moral behaviour towards an outgroup. For 
example, the Irish state has previously been publicly chastised by the United 
Nations for its treatment of people seeking asylum (see section 2.2.2 p. 84 and 
United Nations, 2015, p. 4). Although little has changed, this UN reprimand was 
widely reported by the Irish media and for many Irish citizens this may have been 
a source of national group image threat. Previous research has highlighted that 
nation-states that contravene UN conventions are likely to suffer a negative impact 
to the nation’s image due to the international community questioning the nation’s 
moral standing (Shuman et al., 2018). Hence, this reprimand from the UN 
potentially serves as an argument to mobilises the national collective in support of 
including refugees or at least increasing the numbers accommodated, which 
contravenes predominant discourses presenting refugees as unwanted and 
problematic. Here again we see that the competing and conflicting discursive 
frameworks, contesting the threat from immigration to the nation, makes the 
contentious immigration debate an appropriate site for exploring potential 
ambivalent discourses.   
1.6 THE IMPLICATIONS OF AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES FOR THIS 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
The aim of this research project is to explore if people employ ambivalent 
discourses in contentious political debate and if so, what are the main competing 
conflicting themes employed and what does the potential ambivalent discourse 
accomplish. It will examine the way people potentially draw on, and counter, 
opposing sides of an argument to present their case as rationale, balanced and 
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knowledgeable (Billig, 2012). And how speakers potentially avoid accusations of 
prejudice and construct their self-image, and their social and political group in a 
positive light (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In this regard, it is also important to 
examine the potential identity work done that attempts to mobilise collectives in 
support of political projects. Hence, this research makes a valuable contribution to 
the investigation of discourses deployed in the mobilisation of collective action 
(Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; 
Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Wood & Finlay, 2008). 
 The specific contentious political debate investigated in this research is the 
immigration debate. This debate is prevalent within most wealthy western 
democracies and is of interest here because it contains multiple shifting, conflicting 
and competing ideological positions, and contested norms, values and beliefs 
relating to relevant identity positions. For example, on the one hand, is the ideology 
of humanitarianism and the desire for the nation-state to protect its positive self-
image, particularly in relation to the accommodation of refugees (e.g. Andreouli & 
Dashtipour, 2014; Every & Augoustinos, 2008, 2013; Verkuyten, 2005a). Whilst 
on the other hand, is the expressed desire to reduce the number of incoming 
immigrants, to protect economic resources, welfare support, and cultural identity 
(for example Gibson, 2015). The ideology of multiculturalism also causes conflict 
between cultural diversity being constructed as a positive asset to the community, 
versus claims that cultural diversity undermines a cohesive society (Gibson & 
Hamilton, 2011; Verkuyten, 2004). The dominant liberal value of individualism 
also raises further controversy and contradictions within the immigration debate 
(Gibson, 2011; Lueck et al., 2015; Verkuyten, 2005a). Immigrants can be 




British workers, or economically deficient, hence being a burden on welfare 
resources (Gibson, Crossland, & Hamilton, 2018). However, this is not to assume 
that the speakers represented here will orient to the issue of immigration in these 
ways, as the competing themes and ideologies that speakers could draw upon are 
dependent on the context within which the discourse is produced and the political 
project being performed.  
 Furthermore, the immigration debate was particularly prevalent and 
contentious at the outset of this project during the European refugee crisis at the end 
of 2015. Public discourse on the matter continued to evolve over the following 
years. In parallel was the referendum for the UK to leave the EU on the 23rd June 
2016, in part contested by immigration concerns. Also, of note was the increasing 
support for the populist radical right parties across Europe and in the US in 2017 
(see chapter 2 for more contextual detail). Hence, this research project will employ 
two studies analysing discourse on opposing sides of the immigration debate. Study 
one will be a critical affective-discursive analysis (Martinussen & Wetherell, 2019; 
Wetherell, 1998, 2012a, 2013b, 2015; Wetherell et al., 2015) and rhetorical analysis 
(Billig, 1987) of advocates on behalf of refugees calling into a national phone in 
radio program (see chapter 3). Study two will be a rhetorical (Billig, 1987, 1991; 
Billig et al., 1988) and critical discursive psychology analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) of speeches by populist radical 
right politicians at an international conference who are hostile to immigration 
generally (see chapter 4).  
 These two studies of discourse will facilitate a comprehensive examination, 
by searching for discursive patterns and deviant cases on opposing sides of the 
contentious political debate (Huma, Alexander, Stokoe, & Tileaga, 2020). The 
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discourses within the two studies will differ in terms of the orators’ prominence 
(general public vs. politician), the contextual platform (national radio vs. 
international conference), the format (off-the-cuff vs. prepared speech) and 
importantly the speaker’s overarching ideological position towards immigration 
(sympathetic vs. hostile). Obviously, these explorations do not cover all possible 
discursive positions but focusses on two starkly different ideological positions and 
contextual sites. Therefore, these two discourse studies will be an efficient means 
to expose the diversity of ideological positions being justified, rejected and ignored 
in relation to the immigration debate (Billig, 2006). They will deconstruct discourse 
exposing the content, and competing and conflicting themes, and potential 
ambivalent strategies.  
 However, discourse analysis is also limited because it does not indicate 
which aspects of dominant discourses might constrain or enable people’s shared 
patterned responses to policy or constructions of immigrant groups (Verkuyten, 
2005a, 2005b). Hence, in order to further explore potential ambivalent discourse 
within the contentious immigration debate, and how it may be patterned, this project 
will also employ an experimental study. Jost and Kruglanski (2002) argue that 
experimental social psychology would benefit from exploring content, such as the 
temporary construction of ideological themes employed within language, in 
preference to focusing on internal cognitive processes. Whilst social 
constructionism could be advanced by looking at general processes that shape the 
shared construction of reality. McGuire (as cited in Jost & Kruglanski, 2002) also 
points out, empirical social psychological research should not claim to uncover 
generalisable truths but focus on ‘detecting patterns of covariation in reality’. 




interaction research but avoids falsification, there is a risk that discourse analysis 
claims can become indisputable and, therefore, nonempirical (Heritage, 2012). 
Hence, discourse analysis can benefit from being combined with traditional 
experimental social psychology (de Ruiter & Albert, 2017).  
 For example, Verkuyten (2005a) employed a discourse analysis to 
deconstruct the content of multiculturalism discourses, alongside an experimental 
test of how these deconstructions patterned people’s response to immigration 
policy. The discourse analysis exposed two competing and conflicting socially 
available interpretive frameworks within multiculturalism discourse. One, was an 
argument that individualised the action of immigrants by claiming they have 
‘personal choice’ to migrant and, therefore, should be expected to assimilate with 
the host community. The second was a situational argument, claiming immigrants 
‘lack personal choice’, which provides support for cultural diversity recognition for 
minority groups. In the complementary experimental study, he provides support for 
this interpretation by showing that exposure to the ‘personal choice’ interpretive 
framework decreases endorsement of multiculturalism policy, whilst exposure to 
the ‘lack of choice’ interpretive framework increased endorsement of 
multiculturalism policy. And this endorsement of multiculturalism, in response to 
the interpretive frameworks, was independent of the target groups either 
Turks/Moroccan or Refugee/asylum seekers. In other words, how the group is 
constructed through discourse – having personal choice or not having personal 
choice – is seen to pattern shared understandings of multiculturalism and responses 
to policy. Hence, evaluations of immigration policy are not, necessarily, prescribed 
by predetermined characteristics of the immigrant category. This form of 
experimental work can show the extent to which people are generally sensitive to 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
63 
 
discursive constraints identified in qualitative analyses and, therefore, offers insight 
into how effective particular discursive strategies may be when deployed by actors 
like politicians or journalists. It shows how people’s voting responses in 
referendums and opinion polls, which determine government policy, may be 
patterned by dominant discourse. Although important, merely exploring the 
connection between discursive patterns, repertoires and deviant cases may, at times, 
be lacking when it comes to understanding how discourses influence policy.        
 Furthermore, both discursive psychology and experimental psychology 
avoid introspection and adhere to an empirical examination of the data (de Ruiter 
& Albert, 2017). Both methodologies ask why something happens at a certain point 
under a certain condition. Hence, both methodologies can offer supporting evidence 
of why a particular patterning of a shared constructed reality may occur in response 
to certain interpretive frameworks. Also both discursive and experimental 
psychology can provide complementary supporting evidence for the concept of the 
flexible situated self, being dynamically responsive to the discursive environment 
and, therefore, patterning the construction of others (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, 2016; Reynolds et al., 2010). The social identity 
approach also indicates that people position themselves, and self-stereotype as 
group members, and threats to this group membership will in turn influence how 
they stereotype others (Reicher, 2012) (also see section 1.5).  
 Therefore, discursive analysis gives us an idea of how people position 
themselves in relation to political arguments and the resources that they draw upon 
such as the contested values and norms cherished by their social groups. The 
overarching discursive environment is comprised of a cacophony of voices debating 




constrain or expand political possibilities, ideologies and construction of the other. 
Hence, discourse analysis deconstructs the content, exposing the conflicting themes 
and ideological positions within talk, but it does not indicate which themes or 
combination of themes, within dominant discourse, patterns people’s stereotyping 
of others. Consequently, this research will also employ an experimental study, 
exploring the extent that dominant interpretive frameworks, identified in literature 
as important, impose constraints on people’s shared patterned responses. In other 
words, is there any consistency in the way that people respond to dominant 
interpretive frameworks? Specifically, the experiment will explore if people’s 
exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks, of identity threat 
discourses, will pattern the shared construction of an immigrant group – the 
potential ambivalent stereotyping of refugees (see study three chapter 5).  
1.7 THE MIXED METHOD APPROACH 
Combining discursive analyses and an experimental methodology raises some 
issues in relation to the ontological and epistemological position of this project. In 
part, I have already touched on this concern in the opening sections of this chapter 
where I discussed how the ontological position the of social identity approach 
moved from its cognitive beginnings (see section 1.5.1 on page 46) to some 
contemporary social identity scholars embracing the theoretical position of critical 
psychology and social constructionism (see section 1.5.2 on page 48). In other 
words, the social identity approach is no longer merely about people’s perceptive 
response to predetermined social categories, but has shifted its focus to explore the 
social action of identity performance, and how social identities are ‘world making’ 
and mobilise collective action (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017, p. 94; Potter, 1998). 
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This thesis follows in this ontological vein by acknowledging that the self is 
flexible, context dependent, and people construct their social reality, particularly in 
relation to social categories and the relationship between them (Potter, 1998), and 
the contested characteristics that define these social categories (Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001).  
 However, counter to established understandings, the constructionist 
conceptualisation of the flexible situated self does not rule out the employment of 
an experimental methodology, but experiments can offer further supporting 
evidence that the self is situated and flexible. Jost and Kruglanski (2002) offer a 
convincing argument that, not only should constructionism be reconciled with the 
experimental paradigm, but that constructionism and the recognition of the fluid 
situated self, in part, grew out of understandings gained from social psychological 
experiments. Counter to traditional assumptions, that the self maintains consistency 
across social situations, experimental manipulations of people’s social situation 
indicates the opposite. Although experiments are staged, they show that people 
construct their reality in the moment and this construction can be influenced by 
small manipulative changes in the person’s proximal social environment. Findings 
from discourse analysis can add ecological validity to findings from artificially 
staged experiments and observations of social interaction, such as discourse 
analysis, can benefit from supporting experimental evidence so long as appropriate 
epistemologies of the experimental method are adopted (Adams & Stocks, 2008; de 
Ruiter & Albert, 2017; Kendrick, 2017). Robust social psychological research can 
offer more comprehensive understandings of how contentious political concerns are 
managed by drawing upon divergent perspectives, theories and methodologies 




empirical benefits of rapprochement between constructionism and experimental 
design. 
 But traditionally the epistemological position of constructionist, discursive 
psychology, and positivist, experimental psychology, tends to be understood as 
being in opposition. Discursive psychology focusses on what is being accomplished 
through the construction of different forms of knowledge and questions why some 
forms of knowledge are privileged over others (Potter, 1998). Whilst experimental 
psychology tends to assume that there is a truth to be uncovered in support of 
generalisable knowledge. However, this project takes an epistemological ‘middle- 
ground’ between constructionism and positivism that assumes reality constructs the 
person and that the person constructs reality (Verkuyten, 2005b, p. 28). Also I do 
not take a purely relativist position, although all discursive and rhetorical positions 
are considered to be equally valid, not all arguments are morally equivalent, ‘some 
positions must be advocated as being preferable, more persuasive, even truer than 
others’ (Billig, 1991, p. 28). 
 Hence, knowledge is seen here as being a relationship between the world 
and shared descriptive understandings of this world (Verkuyten, 2005b, p. 28). 
People are responsive to an external reality, but how this reality is understood is 
meditated by shared discursive understandings and these discursive understandings 
also modify an evolving reality. Importantly, research should avoid prioritizing 
either the person or reality but explore the relationship between the two. Although 
language is a ‘world making’ performative social act, it also describes, and is 
responsive to, an external world and/or internal embodied experience. In this 
framework a psychological experiment cannot demonstrate “causality,” but can 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
67 
 
show the extent to which participants are generally responsive to different 
discursive strategies.  
 Furthermore, many discursive scholars acknowledge that there are 
limitations placed on the availability of repertoires that can be employed, 
particularly from a critical perspective (Augoustinos, 2017; I. Parker, 2012; Van 
Dijk, 1993; Wetherell, 1998; Wodak & Meyer, 2001). There are social cultural 
constraints place on what is deemed acceptable to express in certain contexts and, 
therefore, some ideological positions are repressed and ‘left unsaid’ (Billig, 2006). 
But it should not be assumed that repressed ideological positions are governed by 
liberal tolerance because ideologies of exclusion and discrimination are often 
voiced within liberal democratic societies. But some discourses become dominant 
and pervasive in a particular epoch making them more culturally available and 
easier to access and reproduce. Even though discourse is constantly shifting across 
time and place, at specific points in time and context shared patterns will be 
apparent and commonplace.  
  Moreover, although many contemporary social identity theorists embrace 
constructionism and acknowledge that social groups are social constructs, they also 
acknowledge that there are limits to the social identities that people can take up and 
perform (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 48). This is due to others vested interests in 
maintaining differentiation between social groups, structural power relations, and 
privileged hierarchies that are underpinned by coercive institutions. Hence, 
although people construct reality through discourse, which is constantly evolving, 
for this reality to be meaningful it has to be a shared understanding. Therefore, 
social reality is constrained and patterned by others’ vested interests, entrenched 




psychological experiments are well equipped to mirror these social structures and 
power relationships, and consequently, explore the potential patterning of social 
reality (Spears, & Smith, 2001; Tajfel, 1972).  
 Additionally, from a postpositivist perspective such as critical realism, even 
though it is accepted that social objects under investigation are constructed and, 
therefore, changeable over time and between contexts, this does not make them 
‘invalid’ (Campbell & Russo as cited in Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). In other words, 
people’s constructed realities may be fleeting and ungeneralizable, but their shared 
patterning in response to interpretive frameworks are still worthy of empirical 
exploration. Furthermore, McGuire's perspectivism (as cited in Jost & Kruglanski, 
2002), which is highly sceptical of scientific truth, still judges the endeavour of 
testing theories and their limitations against hypotheses as a worthwhile exploit.  
 Also, discursive psychology’s focus on observable social interaction and 
avoidance of making claims about internal mental representations, potentially 
ignores the interface between the social and psychological (Verkuyten, 2005b, p. 
23). Discursive psychology examines the repertoires made relevant by speakers, 
who are implicitly characterised as being motivated by self-interest to present a 
persuasive and acceptable account. Although this investigation of observable social 
interaction is a crucial endeavour, it potentially ignores how interpretive 
frameworks constrain and pattern shared responses. Discourse analysis provides an 
insight into how people negotiate and coproduce interpretive frameworks in the 
moment. But these findings could benefit further from exploring if people’s 
exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks, of identity threat 
discourses, will pattern the shared construction of an outgroup such as an immigrant 
group. This potentially adds to the understanding of whether particular discursive 
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frames (e.g. in the media or political speeches) are effective in shaping and 
constraining possible responses from their audience. 
 However, this project is potentially open to criticism for proceeding to carry 
out an experiment that explores how competing and conflicting ideological 
positions constrain and pattern people’s responses within the immigration debate. 
For example, Michael Billig and colleagues argued that research needs to take 
account that social life is ‘open and complex’ (Billig et al., 1988, p. 162) and ‘any 
quest for general laws, which neatly map particular rhetorical forms onto specific 
functions, will necessarily be doomed to failure’ (Condor et al., 2013). These 
scholars argue that traditional dominant quantitative psychological research closes 
down understandings of how social interaction and argumentation, coproduces 
constructions of social reality (see also Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 43). But the 
intentions behind the experimental study in this research project are less ambitious. 
This is not an attempt to experimentally replicate the nuanced intricacies of 
discourse and rhetoric in everyday action. An experiment could not possibly reflect 
the socially situated, cut-and-thrust of rhetorical interaction as it happens. The 
intention is not to supplant or even replicate discourse analysis, but is to simply 
complement the findings from discourse analyses and the discourse analyses to 
inform the structure of the experiment and add ecological validity to the experiment 
(Adams & Stocks, 2008; Jost & Kruglanski, 2002; Kendrick, 2017).  
 Experiments undeniably stifle the opportunity for participants to engage in 
the social interaction and prohibit the nuanced examination of discourse and 
rhetoric as a social act. But not everybody has the voice, in all situations, to contest, 
argue and debate political contentious issues. For example, democratic voting offers 




inequitable power relationships between social groups, and hegemonic discourses 
constrain speakers (Wetherell, 1998), and even constrain what can be thought 
(Billig, 1987) and felt (Campbell, Smith, & Wetherell, 2017; Martinussen & 
Wetherell, 2019). In this regard, experiments are potentially a valuable resource 
because they allow the researcher to dictate the terms of the argument and available 
responses in similar ways to the responses often available to the general public, like 
voting in a referendum (Reicher, 1997; Spears & Smith, 2001). In part, the cleavage, 
between experimental design and constructionism, has appeared because 
researchers make the incorrect assumption that experiments are apolitical, value 
free, and that the individual can be isolated from the outside social, cultural and 
historic context (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002; Spears & Smith, 2001; Tajfel, 1972). On 
the contrary, experiments are political artefacts reflecting society’s power relations 
and this makes them effective research tools as long as the researcher is reflexive 
of their role and takes account of the broader social, cultural and historic context 
(Adams & Stocks, 2008; Danziger, 1985; Spears & Smith, 2001; Tajfel, 1972).  
 The experiment in this project will constrain the debate to discourses that 
are common within the broader discursive environment and limit the potential 
responses to stereotyping of refugees. The experiment is far from a natural social 
interaction, but the constraint placed upon participants is arguably close to what is 
discursively available, although it must be kept in mind that the experiment is 
merely a ‘caricature’ of the real word (Tajfel, 1972). Admittedly, this artificial pre-
determined experimental setting is one amongst many possibilities, but the 
competing and conflicting ideological themes to be employed in the manipulations 
can be derived from prior discursive studies. For example, research, into refugee 
discourse has indicated that pragmatic ‘cost to self’ (which can be extended to the 
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cost to the nation) arguments tend to be in conflict with ‘duty to others’ arguments 
(based on egalitarian and humanitarian arguments) (Every, 2008). Hence, in order 
to offer a comprehensive understanding of the contentious immigration debate, an 
experiment can explore whether exposure to these competing and conflicting 
interpretive frameworks constrains and patterns people’s construction of an 
immigrant group by way of an experiment.  
 In sum, this project takes an epistemological ‘middle-ground’ between 
constructionism and positivism that assumes the person constructs reality and is 
also constructed by reality (Verkuyten, 2005b). It does not assume that experiments 
provide access to the individual’s internal psychology or exposes internal cognitive 
processing (for similar see Verkuyten, 2005a). Neither is this experiment 
considered to necessarily offer universal truths because it is understood to be 
situated in a specific social, cultural and historical context (Adams & Stocks, 2008; 
Spears & Smith, 2001; Tajfel, 1972). But participants’ responses to the 
experimental manipulation are understood to be a discursive social act, even if the 
available responses are limited and somewhat artificial (Harré, 1999).  
 The experiment will attempt to explore people’s flexibility, and how 
situated selves are responsive to the local experimental context within the broader 
discursive environment (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). Crucially, this project is 
innovative because it reunites complementary methodologies, which are 
traditionally considered to be in opposition, in order to convene a comprehensive 
picture of potential ambivalent discourses within the contentious immigration 
debate (Adams & Stocks, 2008; Kendrick, 2017). The experimental study is 
informed by discursive and rhetorical psychology, including the studies within this 




the discursive studies are complemented by exploring if and how competing and 
conflicting identity threat discourses constrain and pattern the construction of an 
immigrant outgroup – refugees. However, it is crucial that the researcher is reflexive 
of their role in the experimental design and the broader, social, cultural and historic 
context, to which I turn next.  
1.8 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 
Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 105) argued that the researcher carrying out a 
discourse analysis should first situate the task in the social, political and historic 
context, relevant to the subject being examined. Then after analysing the data the 
researcher should interpret and resituate their findings within the relevant context. 
Furthermore, it is particularly important for the analysis of ideology to take into 
account the ‘field of power relations’ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 105). In other 
words, the researcher needs to question who or what benefits from the ideology 
under investigation? Whose privileged interests are being defended and protected?  
Additionally, when carrying out a critical discourse analysis, as will be done 
in the first two studies of this project (see chapter 3 & 4), the researcher should be 
aware that hegemonic discourses, which maintain entrenched power relations and 
perpetuate inequitable social structures, tend to be more readily available and 
effortlessly deployed (Taylor, 2001; Wetherell, 1998). Whilst discourses that 
challenge the status quo are less accessible and more problematic to express. Hence, 
the social, political and historic context pertaining to the discourse studies in this 
research project, and the reflexive positioning of the researcher, are discussed in 
detail in the next chapter (see chapter 2). 
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 As discussed in the previous section, due to the evolving social, cultural and 
political context, generalisations from experiments need to be tempered and 
contextualised (Tajfel, 1972). The context that the experiment takes place within, 
and the situation that the experiment is attempting to represent, in itself requires 
analysis and the researcher needs to be reflexive of their role. Experiments tend to 
be reductionist because they individualise social interaction and ignore the 
collaborative and transformative nature of social interaction. Tajfel (1972) 
recommends using simulation experiments that represent social interaction and 
employ genuine social variables. Experiments can be seen to be a simulated 
truncated part of the social world that is intended to resemble the broader social 
environment but in a controlled and restrictive format (Verkuyten, 2005a) that 
represent a recognisable social context in their own right (Danziger, 1985). Hence, 
the experiment to be carried out here will attempt to resemble the competing and 
conflicting interpretive frameworks and allow the participant to construct their 
social reality in relation to an outgroup, but admittedly, in a constrained format.  
 To reiterate, the experiment is not intended to replicate or replace discourse 
analyses, which access the nuance complexity of everyday social interaction, but is 
intended to complement and be supported by the two discourse studies. The 
contextualisation of the experiment, in this project, is achieved in four ways. Firstly, 
I outline, in detail, the social, political and historic context of the project, and 
reflexively position the researcher (see chapter 2). Secondly, the experimental study 
is to be complemented by two observational analyses of real-world social 
interaction, namely the two discourse analyses of the contentious immigration 
debate from opposing arguments (see chapters 3 & 4). Thirdly, I embed a discussion 




of the experimental study (see section 5.2.5). Finally, I discuss the contextual 
constraint on assumptions of generalisability and the inability of an experiment to 
address all the potential augment positions within the contentious immigration 
debate (see section 6.6 Limitations and Further Research). 
1.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter started out with a description of discursive psychology and its analytic 
focus on the action orientation of situated discourses (see section 1.2). It highlighted 
that people’s attitudes towards ‘others’ are not unitary and fixed, but people are 
better understood to be flexible, context dependent and potentially draw on 
ambivalent discourses. Crucially, ambivalent discourses are defined here as being 
fluid, dynamically reactive to the context and the action orientation – what is being 
accomplished through the discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Ambivalent 
discourse contains opposing evaluations or ideological themes, but these opposing 
positions are not necessarily explicitly expressed as one side may go unsaid (Billig, 
2006). In other words, where we may expect one side of the evaluation or 
ideological theme to be logically supported with further argument and evidence, it 
can be conspicuously absent.  
 I have also drawn attention to how social reality is not predetermined but is 
constructed through discourse. Hence, people take up repertoires that position 
themselves, position ‘others’ and declare the power relations between social groups. 
However, there are constraints on the social availability of repertoires, which tend 
to protect privileged and maintain the status quo (Wetherell, 1998). Significantly, 
ambivalent discourses are potentially drawn upon to justify discrimination and 
exclusion, whilst maintaining an allegiance to liberal aspirations such as 
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egalitarianism. For example, ambivalent discourses that present wealthy western 
nations as upholders of humanitarian ideals are deployed as a justification for the 
exclusion of refugees (Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014; O'Doherty & Augoustinos, 
2008). And populist radical right politicians draw on ambivalent discourses 
claiming that liberal tolerance should be protected through the exclusion of Muslim 
immigrants (Verkuyten, 2013). 
 The chapter proceeded to discuss rhetorical psychology, which draws 
attention to the argumentative nature of everyday thinking and social interaction 
(see section 1.3). People are constantly debating opposing themes and grappling 
with ideological dilemmas on issues that they consider important to them. Also 
highlighted is that liberal aspirations of egalitarianism and tolerance, for example, 
are not necessarily dominant, but discriminatory and exclusionary arguments are 
equally available. However, successful rhetoricians need to present their argument 
as rational and moral by acknowledging the opposing argument. At times they can 
take up the opposing argument, reverse its normative understanding, and deploy it 
in support of their own position. Hence, it was shown how people draw on 
ambivalent arguments in everyday talk to justify exclusion and this is highly evident 
when it comes to the contentious immigration debate to be explored here (for 
example Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014). 
 I briefly outlined the need to acknowledge the significance of affect within 
social practice and everyday shared meaning making, particularly when it comes to 
national identity and immigration issues (see section 1.4). Affective-discursive 
practice draws attention to the entanglement of affect and discourse and offers 
further recognition of people’s variability, complexity and ambivalent emotional 




ambivalent when they feel that their nation’s action towards immigrants is morally 
questionable, but they feel unable to bring about change. 
 Attention is then drawn to the evolution of the social identity approach to 
embrace understandings from discursive and rhetorical psychology, which indicate 
that identities, social categories and the power relations between social groups are 
not predetermined but are constructed and contested (see section 1.5). Here again 
we see how identities and hence, versions of the self, are fluid, multiple and socially 
situated. Identities are performative as they are a means to accomplish a social act 
and a source of social influence. They are a means to mobilize the collective and 
hence, hold significant social power. Due to this the character of identities, the 
important norms, values, and beliefs are contested by politicians, the media and 
activists. Importantly, these contested stereotypes of the social category determine 
if an outgroup is considered to be threatening and hence, provide a potential 
understanding of the competing and conflicting argumentative themes in relation to 
the contentious immigration debate.  
 Section 1.6 reiterates the potential significance of ambivalent discourse 
within contentious political debate and explains why this project specifically draws 
on the immigration debate as an exploration site. I briefly outline the two discourse 
analyses to be carried out in this project exploring opposing sides of the contentious 
immigration debate (see chapter 3 & 4). The two discourse analyses will 
deconstruct and expose the competing and conflicting ideological themes within 
the contentious immigration debate, whilst a further experimental study will explore 
if people’s exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks, of 
identity threat discourses, will pattern and constrain the shared construction of an 
immigrant group (see study three chapter 5).  
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 Section 1.7 discusses the ontological and epistemological issues pertaining 
to the mixed methods approach to be used within this project. Primarily, this project 
takes up an epistemological ‘middle-ground’ that assumes people construct reality 
and they are also constructed by reality (Verkuyten, 2005b, p. 28). It also takes a 
critical realist position, accepting that the constructed reality is constantly shifting 
across time and place, but this does not make it ‘invalid’ and unworthy of empirical 
exploration (Campbell & Russo as cited in Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). Finally, I do 
not take a purely relativist position, therefore some ideological and argumentative 
positions are considered more morally preferable and even ‘truer’ than others 
(Billig, 1991, p. 28). At the close of the chapter I briefly discuss the importance of 
acknowledging social, political and historic context when doing a discourse 





SITUATING THIS PROJECT IN THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND 
HISTORIC CONTEXT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The relevant context, outlined here, is crucial information for carry out a 
comprehensive discourse analysis (see chapters 3 & 4). As Wetherell and Potter 
(1992, p. 105) note it is vital that the social, political and historic context is 
acknowledged, and the pattern of discourse exposed within the analysis is resituated 
within it. Questions can then be asked about who is benefiting from the discourse 
and what is being justified and legitimised (Wetherell, 1998). However, although 
not traditionally acknowledged, context it is also important for the experimental 
study within this project (see chapter 5), because experiments and the participants 
are not isolated from the broader contextual environment but are situated within it. 
Indeed, the aim of the experiment here is precisely to position people in social 
situations characterised by particular discursive strategies. Furthermore, 
experiments are political artefacts and the experimenter makes procedural decision 
based on their interpretation of the context (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002; Spears & 
Smith, 2001; Tajfel, 1972). For a more detail discussion of the importance of 
context see the previous section 1.8.  
 This chapter begins with a general discussion of the refugee issue and why 
it is important for social psychological research (see section 2.2.1). It proceeds to 
outline the so called European ‘refugee crisis’, in 2015, and discuss a notable 
display of sympathy towards refugees at the initial stage (see section 2.2.2). Then 
discussed is the subsequent rise of the populist radical right who are explicitly 
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hostile towards immigrants generally, particularly poor immigrants and refugees 
(see sections 2.2.3). However, the populist radical right did not only gain support 
in response to the ‘refugee crisis’, it has been noted previously that their 
international presences has been on the rise since the 1980’s, which is discuss in 
Section 2.2.4. At the end of this chapter, in section 2.2.5, I engage in reflexivity that 
positions myself, the researcher in relation to the research project, which also has 
relevance for both the discourse analyses and the experimental study. 
2.2 THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 
2.2.1 Increasing Displacement and the Importance of this Research Project 
There are an unprecedented 68.5 million people displaced across the globe fleeing 
persecution, conflict and violence (UNHCR, 2017). Where data is available, there 
are equal proportions of women and men, and 53% of the displaced are under 18 
years of age. Significantly, 28.5 million displaced people are forced to migrate 
across an international border in search of security (UNHCR, 2017). The majority, 
85%, only seek refuge in poor and underdeveloped neighbouring countries, which 
tend to lack the resources to meet their humanitarian needs (UNHCR, 2017; United 
Nations, 2018). Whereas wealthier western governments, that are better positioned 
to offer sanctuary to refugees, are increasingly hostile towards accommodating 
them due to the prevalent assumption that refugees are an economic burden and 
have a negative impact on the lives of citizens in host countries (Capdevila & 
Callaghan, 2008; Esses et al., 2017; Fakih & Marrouch, 2015; S. Goodman & 
Burke, 2010; Lueck et al., 2015; United Nations, 2018).  
 Nevertheless, in the summer of 2015, and continuing to the present day, a 




Europe, which the media labelled as either the ‘migrant crisis’ or ‘refugee crisis’ 
dependent on their position of sympathy or hostility respectively (S. Parker, Naper, 
& Goodman, 2018). By the end of 2015, 1.2 million people applied for asylum 
across the EU with over one third of these applying to Germany (Eurostat, 2016). 
The majority of these, 29%, were fleeing the escalating civil war in Syria, and 14% 
and 10% were fleeing ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. The 
rest originated from Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iran and other 
countries. The main routes across the Mediterranean Sea were from Turkey to 
Greece and North Africa to Italy (Crawley, Jones, McMahon, Duvell, & Sigona, 
2016). By the end of 2015 it was estimated that 3,771 migrants had drowned in the 
Mediterranean Sea attempting to find sanctuary in Europe (IOM UN Migration, 
2016). 
 At the time of writing, the EU is in the process of reassessing its migration 
policy based on four pillars: 1) reducing the incentives for irregular migration by 
addressing its root causes; 2) improving returns and dismantling smuggling and 
trafficking networks; 3) saving lives and securing the external borders; 4) 
establishing a strong EU asylum policy, and providing more legal pathways for 
asylum-seekers and more efficient legal channels for regular migrants (European 
Parliamentary Research Service, 2019). The so called ‘refugee crisis’ put pressure 
on the EU's asylum system, partly because not all EU countries treat asylum seekers 
uniformly and recognition rates differ. Furthermore, due to their geographical 
position only a few countries end up carry most of the responsibility for the majority 
of asylum claims.  
 The primary intention of the EU is to relieve the pressure on Greece and 
Italy, which have received most of the initial asylum claims and the majority of 
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permanent settlement. The aim is to distribute successful claims evenly across the 
EU member states. Furthermore, the EU under its ‘hotspot approach’ plans to 
register asylum claimants on arrival and provide adequate reception centres. Up to 
now the registering has been highly successful, but the provision of temporary 
accommodation remains a serious concern. Additionally, preventing loss of life in 
the Mediterranean Sea is dependent on continued and coordinated search and 
rescue. 
 A priority for the EU is to develop a common immigration policy that shares 
the responsibility of asylum seekers across member states drawing on balanced 
solidarity. Intentions are to streamline the asylum procedure, ensuring that 
standards across member states are uniform, rights are protected, and secondary 
movement is discouraged in order to increase the prospect of integration. However, 
this has proved problematic, because certain states, due to internal public opinion, 
are unwilling to comply. Hence, there is an urgent requirement for European wide 
research into portrayals immigrants and people seeking asylum, and its shaping of 
public discourse and policy. Although there are differences across EU countries the 
majority of citizens (72% in 2018) desire that the EU takes more action on 
immigration (Schulmeister, Defourny, & Maggio, 2018). ‘The migration policy 
area has one of the largest gaps between citizens' expectations and their evaluations 
of EU involvement’ (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019). Hence, 
more needs to be done to bridge this gap by way of social psychological research 
into people’s responses towards the issue of immigration and the discourses 
employed within this contentious debate.  
 Therefore, the European Union is now taking stock of its stance on external 




called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015. This is reflected in the ‘Asylum, Migration and 
Integration’ research funding of 3.137 billion euro offered by the European 
Commission (European Commission, 2016). Consequently, it is paramount to 
provide comprehensive and nuanced social psychological research into the social, 
cultural, political and moral concerns framing people’s orientation towards refugees 
and immigration more generally (Esses et al., 2017; Verkuyten, 2017). Domestic 
policy addressing provision for refugees is, in part, determined by philosophical 
moral considerations, but this also requires the support of pragmatic empirical 
evidence to establish what is feasible and how it can be achieved (Carens, 2019).  
 Research is vital to inform policy, not only at a national level, but also at an 
international level for the successful implementation of the United Nations 
proposed ‘Global compact on refugees’ (United Nations, 2018). This proposed 
international cooperation declares evidence-based interventions are required that 
promote cooperative and harmonious coexistence between refugees and host 
communities. Furthermore, it advocates international ‘burden and responsibility 
sharing’, where wealthier nations are obligated to assist poorer nations in providing 
humanitarian assistance for refugees. But for these recommendations to be 
implemented successfully, it is crucial that comprehensive and nuanced 
understandings of citizens’ expressed position towards refugees and immigration 
generally are compiled. Hence, this research project aims to help policy makers 
understand people’s flexible context dependent position on the matter of 
immigration, the potential ambivalent discourses drawn upon and the utility of these 
discourses within the contentious immigration debate.  
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2.2.2 European Refugee Crisis and a Groundswell of Sympathy 
 During 2015 there were a number of tragic events that potentially increased 
a sympathetic response towards the refugees arriving at the shores of Europe. On 
the 18th April 2015 over 600 refugees drowned when a boat capsized in the 
Mediterranean Sea (Spindler, 2015). Later, on the 28th August 2015 a refrigerated 
truck was found abandoned on the Austrian Hungarian border containing the bodies 
of 71 asphyxiated refugees. Pictures of Aylan Kurdi’s body washed up on a Turkish 
beach, a three-year-old refugee Syrian boy drowned in the Mediterranean Sea, were 
viewed around the world on 2nd September 2015. The release of pictures of Aylan 
Kurdi was a defining moment that undoubtedly increased a shared sympathetic 
position towards the plight of the refugees (S. Parker et al., 2018). Thousands of 
people took to the streets across Western Europe in support of accommodating more 
refugees (AFP, 2015; Graham-Harrison, Davies, & Schmidt, 2015; Hilliard, 2015). 
In response the German chancellor Angela Merkel used her now infamous phrase, 
‘we can do it’ (Harding, 2015; Hutton, 2015) to construct the German character as 
humanitarian, inclusive and upholders of the international convention by offering 
sanctuary to the refugees (for similar contesting of the national character see 
Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). She opened Germany’s borders 
and nearly one million refugees were welcomed into Germany. At the time a poll 
carried out by the German public broadcaster, ZDF, indicated that 60% of the 
population supported Angela Merkel’s response (AFP, 2015). 
 However, it is important to note that this upsurge in sympathy towards 
refugees in 2015 was unusual, as there has been overwhelming evidence 




hostility towards refugees (for example Bates, 2017; Esses et al., 2017; Every & 
Augoustinos, 2008; S. Goodman, 2008; S. Goodman, 2010; S. Goodman & Burke, 
2010; S. Goodman & Narang, 2019; S. Goodman, Sirriyeh, & McMahon, 2017; S. 
Goodman & Speer, 2007; Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2011; Hanson-Easey, 
Augoustinos, & Moloney, 2014; Kirkwood, Goodman, et al., 2015; Kirkwood et 
al., 2013b; Kirkwood, McKinlay, & McVittie, 2015; Lynn & Lea, 2003; O'Doherty 
& Augoustinos, 2008; S. Parker, 2018b, 2019; Wroe, 2017). And the specific 
historic response of Ireland towards refugees, where study one (see chapter 3) and 
study three (see chapter 5) are situated, is certainly no exception to other western 
nations. The print media in Ireland has been noted for its prevalent and consistent 
hostility towards people seeking asylum (Haynes, Devereux, & Breen, 2006). The 
Irish state has also been criticised for its ambivalently racist immigration policy as 
it fights for the rights of undocumented immigrants in the US, of Irish descent, 
whilst judging people who are seeking asylum in Ireland as unwanted illegal 
immigrants (Lentin, 2007). In a referendum in 2004, the removal of the right of 
citizenship for children born within the Irish state to immigrant parents without Irish 
citizenship, received 80% support. Irish government policy has been noted for its 
open hostility towards people seeking asylum compared to its enthusiasm for 
immigrants who are deemed ‘useful economic commodities’ (Lentin, 2007).  
Furthermore, the United Nations has strongly condemned Ireland for 
violating the basic human rights of people seeking asylum due to its draconian 
Direct Provision system:  
The Committee regrets that the International Protection Bill 
has not yet been adopted. It is concerned at the poor living 
conditions and the lengthy stay of asylum seekers in direct provision 
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centres, originally designed as a short-term arrangement and run by 
private actors. The centres have a negative impact on asylum 
seekers’ right to family life, their mental health and their children’s 
best interests. The Committee is also concerned at the restrictions 
asylum seekers face in accessing employment, social security 
benefits, health-care services and education (United Nations, 2015, 
p. 4). 
In other words, Ireland stands accused of providing inadequate cramped 
living conditions and it has been highlighted that people seeking asylum are 
suffering from malnourishment (Breen, 2008). Many asylum applicants can spend 
up to eight years within the Direct Provision system waiting for a decision. This 
situation is particularly concerning for children in Direct Provision as the Irish state 
is in contravention of its international obligation under the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (Thornton, 2014).  
The Direct Provision system has been likened to the appalling Irish legacy 
of the institutionalisation of the ‘unwanted’, such as the Magdalene laundries 
(homes for unmarried mothers), industrial schools, workhouses and mental health 
asylums (Lentin, 2016). Evidently the Direct Provision system is a means to 
monitor people seeking asylum within the state and deter future arrivals (Loyal & 
Quilley, 2016). Importantly, not only does the Direct Provision system resemble 
Ireland’s historic propensity to institutionalise the ‘unwanted’, but it has been noted 
that the Irish state and the general public are now responding in the same way as 
they did in the past, by ignoring and taking up a position of ‘not knowing’ about the 
plight of these institutionalised people (Lentin, 2016, 2018; Thornton, 2014). In 




the past, that systematically hid the unwanted from public view, but Irish society’s 
response towards people seeking asylum also replicates the conspicuous ‘looking 
away’.  
It is also argued that the subjugation of black and brown bodies, detained in 
Direct Provision awaiting asylum applications, allows the state and its citizens to 
take up an ambivalent affective humanitarian position that draws on the notion of 
the white saviour discourse (Fernando, 2016). This masks Western complicity in 
neo-colonial wars and violence that brings about the force displacement 
contributing to refugee movements. Evidently, unmitigated sympathy amongst the 
Irish towards people seeking asylum is certainly not the norm and at best their 
response could be described as ambivalent or at worst institutionally racist (Lentin, 
2007).    
2.2.3 Rising Hostility towards Refugees and an Embolden Populist Radical 
Right 
By the end of 2016 the response towards the arriving refugees appeared to change 
across Europe, becoming noticeably more hostile (Wodak, 2019). It was noted that 
the UK media shifted its labelling of the situation, and categorisation of the people 
attempting to enter Europe, from ‘refugee crisis’, around the time of Aylan Kurdi’s 
drowning, back to a more hostile ‘migrant crisis’ (S. Goodman et al., 2017). After 
receiving over one million refugees and migrants the European media and public 
opinion became far more unwelcoming towards refugees and this was associated 
with a shift in EU asylum policy to a more restrictive position (Dekker & Scholten, 
2017; Greenhill, 2016; Ojala, Pantti, & Laaksonen, 2019). This shift in policy 
eventually culminated in the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016. This statement of 
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cooperation attempted to stop the refugee movement through the enforced return of 
all irregular migrants who crossed the Mediterranean Sea back to Turkey. In 
exchange the EU agreed to take a Syrian refugee from Turkey back to the EU for 
each irregular migrant returned.  
 Furthermore, on 21st June 2016 the Brexit referendum in the UK was won 
by those wishing to leave the European Union and this campaign drew heavily on 
anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment. UKip (UK Independence Party; 
supporting leaving the EU) made an explicit link between hostility towards refugees 
and Euroscepticism with its infamous campaign poster showing a queue of refugees 
alongside the statement – ‘Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all’. This UKip 
poster was accused of being racist (Durrheim et al., 2018) and likened to Nazi 
propaganda (Stewart & Mason, 2016). Discursive psychology research also showed 
that the issue of allowing refugee children into the UK was used as a further 
justification to leave the EU (S. Goodman & Narang, 2019). 
 Not long after the Brexit referendum, at the end of 2016, Donald Trump 
won the election for the US presidency. His campaign was also noted for its 
populist, protectionist, nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric (Inglehart & Norris, 
2016; Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2018; Pettigrew, 2017). Furthermore, 
the racist and sexist rhetoric deployed by Trump has been shown to be the primary 
reason for him gaining support amongst white voters who have not attended college 
(Schaffner, Macwilliams, & Nteta, 2018). He was also seen to be a skilful 
entrepreneur of identity, presenting himself as a prototypical American, offering 
‘hope’ to the left behind working class by promising to protect and bring back jobs 




 Importantly, by the beginning of 2017 the European radical right parties 
were now emboldened by what they saw as significant political shift in support for 
their ideological position, which Geert Wilders’ hailed as the ‘patriot spring’ 
(Adler-Nissen, Galpin, & Rosamond, 2017). By this point many people across 
Europe were now questioning the wisdom of Angela Merkel’s decision to allow 
nearly one million refugees into Germany. Whilst Nigel Farage (leader of UKip) 
and Donald Trump had just fought successful nationalist populism campaigns based 
on anti-immigrant rhetoric and racist ‘dog whistling’.  
  On the 21st January 2017 Europe’s leading populist radical right politicians 
held a historic international conference in Koblenz, Germany, hosted by the 
Alternative for Germany (AFD) party. The speakers at this conference were 
members of a European parliamentary group called the Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF, 2017), which was recently replaced by the Identity and Democracy 
group since June 3rd, 2019. Also, at the time the ENF group mainly consisted of 
MEPs from the French National Front (FN) now reinvented as the National Rally 
since June 18th, 2017. Study two uses this ENF conference as an ideal site to collect 
data and explore discourse, which is hostile towards immigration (see chapter 4).  
 The central speakers at the conference are Markus Pretzell and Frauke Petry 
representing the AfD, Marine Le Pen representing the FN, Geert Wilders 
representing the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (VVD; Party for Freedom), Matteo 
Salvini representing the Italian Lega Nord (Northern League), Harald Vilimsky 
representing the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), Tom Van Grieken and Gerolf 
Annemans representing the Belgian Vlaams Belang (VB; Flemish Interest), Janice 
Atkinson who is a British Independent, Tomio Okamura representing the Freedom 
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and Direct Democracy (SPD) from the Czech Republic and Laurentiu Rebega a 
Romanian Independent.  
 The ENF conference in Koblenz was an unprecedented display of 
international solidarity between Europe’s populist radical right politicians who 
emphasis their nationalist, protectionist and nativist credentials. This is not to say 
these political actors never meet – on the contrary – as pointed out above, they were 
all members of the ENF, European parliamentary group and it has been noted that 
they are increasingly engaged international networking (Caiani, 2018). But this 
meeting was historic because it was the first time that these political actors had 
publicly met on an international stage and conspicuously celebrated their 
international solidarity based on their shared core nationalist nativism ideology 
which is hostile to immigration.    
2.2.4 The Populist Radical Right’s Rising International Presence 
It is important to note at this juncture that the international rise of the populist 
radical right was not only in response to the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ but has been an 
ongoing phenomenon since the 1980s. The populist radical right are now the fastest 
growing political collective in Europe (Golder, 2016), and they have also gained 
increasing support in Australia, Israel, Japan and the United States (Rydgren, 2018). 
And arguably this international rise can also be extended to Narendra Damodardas 
Modi the Prime Minister of India, President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and 
Jair Messias Bolsonaro the president of Brazil.  
 Rydgren (2005) noted that in the 1980’s the French National Front 
rebranded their political image by moving away from a tainted ideology of 




of majority democracy and ‘cultural racism’, which he refers to as the ‘new master 
frame’ (see also Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 55). This ‘new master frame’ based 
on a core ideology of ethnopluralism, which advances the notion that functional 
nation states need to be culturally homogenous and distinct from each other, 
achieved considerable electoral success for the French National Front. Due to this 
the success the ‘new master frame’ was taken up by populist radical right parties in 
other nations through a process of ‘cross-national diffusion’ (Rydgren, 2005). This 
also ties into the debate about whether the present-day radical right can be seen to 
be convincingly doing transnational populism or not (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 
2017). Furthermore, it has been noted that the success of populist radical right 
parties in Europe have all been dependent on mobilizing grievances towards 
immigrants and immigration (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Significantly, little previous social 
psychological research, if any, has addressed the ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 
1988) inherent within the populist radical right’s mobilisation of a global political 
collective based on an inward looking ideology of nationalist nativism that is hostile 
to immigration.  
 Specifically, the ENF who hosted the conference in Koblenz, Germany, 
explored within this project (see chapter 4), were a political group, formed in 2015, 
within the European parliament, comprising of MEP’s from nine member states. I 
adopt Mudde’s (2007, p. 33; 2016) term populist radical right to classify the 
political ideology of the speakers represented at the ENF conference. The three 
defining core principles being nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 
2007, p. 22). Nativism is xenophobic nationalism driven by the assumption that a 
functional political unit, the state, is reliant on a homogenous native culture, the 
nation. Therefore, the political doctrine strives for a monocultural state through 
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enforced internal cultural assimilation and exclusion of immigrants. Mudde (2007, 
p. 23) defines authoritarianism as an emphasis on law and order, and support for 
harsh punishment for transgressions. And populism is the representation of a pure 
homogenous ‘people’ against a corrupt elite. Populism comes into conflict with 
liberal democracy, which demands the will of the majority should be constrained 
by a constitution and the judiciary, in order to protect the interests and rights of 
minorities and individuals (Golder, 2016). Populist see themselves as the promoters 
of a true democracy that only answers to the will of the majority. 
 This intolerance of national diversity is evident in the third fundamental 
principle of the ENF charter:  
‘Identity: the parties and individual MEPs of the ENF Group base 
their political alliance on the preservation of the identity of the 
citizens and nations of Europe, in accordance with the specific 
characteristics of each population. The right to control and regulate 
immigration is thus a fundamental principle shared by the Members 
of the ENF Group’ (emphasis added ENF, 2017).  
Also, the notion of different cultures being integral to each state and its territory is 
orientated to in the fourth principle: 
‘Specificity: the parties and individual MEPs of the ENF Group 
recognize each other’s right to defend their specific unique 
economic, social, cultural and territorial models. The ENF Group 
seeks to preserve the diversity of the political projects of its 




  The law and order definition of authoritarianism is not directly addressed 
within the ENF’s charter, possibly indicating a lack of consensus on the issue. 
However, it is noteworthy, that the ENF Group are evidently defensive towards 
accusations that they are ‘authoritarian’ and anti-democratic. Hence, the first 
principle of the ENF charter is:  
‘Democracy: the parties and the individual MEPs of the ENF Group 
base their political project upon conformity with the democratic 
principles and the charter of fundamental rights and therefore reject 
any past, present or future affiliation, connection or sympathy to any 
authoritarian or totalitarian project’ (ENF, 2017).  
The necessity to explicitly declare support for democracy and distance themselves 
from authoritarian or totalitarian projects of the past, is in itself telling. This explicit 
declared rejection of authoritarianism and totalitarianism is significant because the 
French National Front and Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), who are members of 
the ENF, have undeniable roots within historic European fascism (Wodak & 
Richardson, 2013, p. 3). Even though they superficially distance themselves from 
this dark past, Engel and Wodak (2013) have exposed the FPÖ’s discursive strategy 
of ‘calculated ambivalence’, which covertly signals their ongoing sympathy with 
their extreme racist base (Wodak, 2011). And ‘calculated ambivalence’ has also 
been noted within the talk of the leader of the British National Party (Bull & Simon-
Vandenbergen, 2014).  
 Copsey (2018) adeptly argues that there is no clear destination between the 
ideological position of the new populist radical right and fascism. The present day 
ideology of the populist radical right is simply a sophisticated evolved neofascism 
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that fits the present epoch and is a recalibration of fascism (Copsey, 2007). They 
are not anti-immigrant per se, but are distinctly hostile towards immigrants who are 
culturally different, which presently tends to be expressed in explicit anti-Muslim 
rhetoric (Copsey, 2018). They sidestep accusations of racism by claiming that their 
critics are the racists, because they undermine their desire to protect their own 
ethnocultural group (Atton, 2006; Johnson & Goodman, 2013; Rooyackers & 
Verkuyten, 2012; Sakki, Hakoköngäs, & Pettersson, 2017) and therefore, their 
liberal critics are anti-white and anti-French (Copsey, 2018).  
 Sakki et al. (2017) carried out a comparison of the discourse deployed in 
present day Finnish, anti-Muslim blogs and 1930’s anti-communist newspapers. 
Both periods construct an enemy stranger outside the nation and an enemy within. 
But the present-day bloggers go to greater lengths to deny racism and turn the 
accusation back on their opponents. Evidently, the populist radical right attempt to 
present a new palatable and sanitized political image, whilst maintaining a sinister 
ideological position that is openly hostile to people from different cultures and 
religions (G. O. Edwards, 2012; S. Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Wood & Finlay, 
2008). 
2.2.5 Positioning the Researcher 
I will outline my personal motivation for this research project and position myself 
in relation to the project. Reflexivity is a desirable aspect of doing qualitative 
research in order to declare the researcher’s viewpoint. I would also argue that 
reflexivity is necessary for quantitative experimental work, although traditionally 
not a consideration. The experimenter makes value laden decision based on their 




format of the experiment and the interpretations of the results (Spears & Smith, 
2001; Tajfel, 1972).  
 I was born in the UK, but when I was eleven my parents went to work on a 
British Aid program in Ndola, Zambia for eight years. Hence, during my formative 
teenage years we travelled widely throughout the African continent and in my early 
twenties I travelled to India and Nepal. These experiences of the, so called, 
‘developing world’ made me acutely aware of global inequality, Western and white 
privilege and the legacy of colonialism. Crucial to this research project is the 
undisputable fact that our place of birth in the world is the strongest predictor of 
our life chances and opportunity, which Shachar (2009) concisely refers to as the 
‘birthright lottery’. Hence, I am incentivised to research the discourses that people, 
in a position of Western privilege and power, draw upon within the contentious 
immigration debate. 
 Later in my early twenties I took to the road, living in an old Bedford bus 
that I had converted into our family home. I travelled throughout the UK, Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland with my partner and two young children. At 
best we were categorized as ‘New Age Travelers’, but generally demonized by the 
media, often receiving more derogatory labels such as ‘Medieval Brigands’. 
Inevitably the ownership of public and private space, the right of movement, the 
right to settle, and even the right to clean drinking water all became significant 
aspects of my everyday life. A life which felt, at times, to be far outside the norms 
and physical boundaries of the majority settled community.  
 During this period, I experienced hostility and prejudice, which at times 
turned violent. We were shot at, refused service in shops, denied access to water, 
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blockaded by the police and threatened with the removal our children into state care. 
One winter night in the hills of Derbyshire above Tideswell village a group drove 
onto the site where we were camped and smashed all the windows of our home. At 
the time my eldest son was two years old and the youngest was only a couple of 
months. In an instant a vulnerable family was sadistically thrust into homelessness. 
I will never forget the response of the police the next morning – ‘well it wasn’t us’.  
 However, this story is not only about the dark side of intergroup hostility. 
We were also overwhelmed by the kindness shown by the people from the nearest 
village. They reached out across the group boundary to the scruffy, unconventional 
strangers on the hill. Some of the local farmers, who we had been working for, 
offered whatever they could to assist in making repairs to our home. Others from 
the village also offered help, food and clothes. Unforgettably, the family who ran 
the small corner shop in the village offered us the keys to a flat they owned in 
Manchester. Looking back, not only were the people from the village sympathetic 
to our plight, but they also displayed shame and disgust that members of their own 
community had perpetrated such a heinous act.  
 This experience of marginalization, intergroup hostility and the willingness 
of people at times, to reach across group boundaries, stimulated my interest in social 
identities, prejudice, discrimination and importantly social justice and the 
possibility for social change. Specific to this project is the notion that intergroup 
relations are far from consistently hostile (Reicher, 2004) and people desire that the 
group they identify will be seen positively by others (Branscombe et al., 1999). Of 
particular importance to this positive ingroup image is that the group is seen to 
behave in a morally dignified way towards other lower status groups (Ellemers et 




interpretive framework, describing the threats to a powerful majority group, may 
pattern constructions of a marginalised outgroup (see chapter 5). This project also 
explores how people strategically manage and construct their group image through 
discourse and affective practice (Martinussen & Wetherell, 2019; Wetherell et al., 
2015). 
 I would like to make one further point as I reflect on this period of my life, 
which I feel is relevant to the motivation behind this research project. There was a 
strong sense of community and belonging between the people who fell into this 
category of so called ‘New Age Travellers’, which is particularly interesting as the 
social network between the group members was dispersed, fluid and tenuous. We 
were a diverse bunch coming from many different social backgrounds. But most, 
notably young families, lived alongside single people, and also those with addiction 
and metal health problems. The more able of us did our best to support the 
vulnerable who came looking for shelter. Although this situation was far from ideal, 
I believe many of these individuals today would be sleeping rough on city streets.  
 However, the reason I draw attention to this, is at times we had to police our 
own space by making some individuals, who we considered to be potentially 
harmful or even dangerous to our community, feel unwelcome. Here there is a 
notable ambivalent tension between our freedom of movement throughout the 
wider community and governing the movement of other individuals across our 
group boundary. In other words, we were constantly in confrontation with the 
majority settled community, about where we could live, whilst placing similar 
constraints on those who we accepted into our community. Whilst living on the 
margins of mainstream society we were willing to offer support to some but deemed 
others to be beyond our capacity to accommodate. For example, those with violent 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
97 
 
mental health concerns and addiction problems. In part, due to this experience, I 
take a very liberal stance on the issue of freedom of movement, but also 
acknowledge people’s concern for the protection of their community and the 
limitations of welfare provision. 
 When my children reached school age I settled in the west of Ireland, where 
I live today nearly thirty years later. Although I am ethnically and culturally similar 
to the Irish community, I am an ‘immigrant’. I would unquestionably reject the 
arrogant category label of ‘expatriate’ that some British living abroad fondly take 
up. Although, if a little tongue in cheek, I have at times also described myself as a 
‘political refugee’ who fled Thatcher’s Britain. Due to the limitations of space I will 
avoid extensive digression into how Brexit now impacts on my self-definition. But 
briefly, Brexit has certainly contested what it means to be English (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001) and in particular upends what it means to be English living in 
Ireland. Due to the ongoing Brexit negotiations, particularly in relation to a hard 
border across the island of Ireland and negligent disregard for the achievements of 
the Good Friday agreement, I feel a sense of embarrassment, shame, disgust, and 
anger towards the arrogance of the English position.  
 However, the Irish people have been overwhelmingly welcoming, which is 
surprising considering Ireland’s history of colonial occupation and the ongoing 
tensions in Northern Ireland. I have rarely experienced hostility. Nevertheless, I do 
know what it feels like to not fully belong and at times, I have had my sense of 
belonging implicitly and explicitly questioned by others. As the Brexit fiasco drags 
on, I feel a diminishing sense of Englishness, but cannot claim to be a genuine 
authentic Irish person (Scully, 2015). I tend to shift my identity to a higher 




Brexit I will have to formalize this through the Irish naturalization process. I may 
also have to settle for what Theresa May disingenuously refers to as a ‘citizen of 
nowhere’. But I also have to acknowledge that I have the privilege of holding a 
‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ passport, which many 
individuals in a less fortunate position would literally risk dying for. This 
ambivalent tension between protecting my privilege and feeling some level of 
dissent towards my allocated nation, due to its questionable behaviour, is a very 
close to the central questions of this research project. 
 It is also important to note that I am well aware of my own position of 
privilege as a white, heterosexual able-bodied man. I was born into the middle class 
in the UK and I was well educated. In other words, I was dealt all the trump cards 
of privilege and this best positions me to explore and question the way we legitimize 
privilege. I am particularly interested in how ambivalent discourses may be a means 
to efficiently perpetuate inequality and maintain privilege (Jackman, 1994). 
 Based on my life experience and the anecdotes I have briefly outlined here; 
I will explicitly position myself in relation to this research project and the central 
concern of international migration. I am a strong supporter of the case for ‘open 
borders’ (for a well argued case see Carens, 2013) and believe the present situation 
of ‘global apartheid’ (Lynn & Lea, 2003) is immoral, undesirable and untenable. 
However, I do also recognize the desire to protect one’s own community and the 
welfare of the vulnerable members within that community. The tension between 
these competing identity concerns and how it may pattern ambivalent discourses 
evaluating the ‘other’ is a foundation of this research. The central aim of this 
research is to explore what is accomplished through potential ambivalent discourses 
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that people draw on within the contentious immigration debate and the social and 
political concerns that may pattern these discourses. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter offered a summary of the context, relating to the contentious 
immigration debate, during the time of this research project. The beginning of the 
chapter supplies an overview of the issue of increasing displacement of people 
across the globe and the reluctance of wealthy nations to accommodate refugees 
and poor immigrants. It outlined the European perspective and summarise the so 
called European ‘refugee crisis’ from 2015 onwards. Importantly, for the EU to 
address the situation of inward migration it needs to implement new policies and 
find consensus across member states. This needs to be in line with the desires of 
European citizens and protect the human rights and successful integration of 
immigrants. Hence, there is an increasing need for research from a social and 
political psychological perspective to examine peoples’ nuanced, flexible, and 
context dependent positioning and the ambivalent discourses that people potentially 
draw upon within the contentious immigration debate (see section 2.2.1). 
 The chapter then discusses an upsurge of sympathy towards refugees at the 
initial stage of the so called ‘crisis’ at the end of 2015 in western Europe. This 
sympathetic position is unusual within the overarching, historic and ongoing 
hostility towards refugees. Specifically, highlighted is the mistreatment of people 
seeking asylum by the Irish state, through the Direct Provision system and the 
attempt of the Irish people to ignore the humanitarian transgression (see section 
2.2.2). At the beginning of 2017, alongside a return to hostile evaluations of 




Europe for the emboldened populist radical right parties. These parties adhere to a 
core ideology of nationalist nativism and take up a rhetorical position which is 
hostile towards immigration. Specifically, highlighted is a historic international 
gathering on a public stage of the leading European populist radical right 
politicians, which took place in Koblenz, Germany on June 21, 2017 and was 
organised by the ENF (see section 2.2.3). It is also noted that this international rise 
in support of the populist radical right is not only in response to the European 
‘refugee crisis’, but they have been receiving steadily increasing support since they 
rebranded their political image in the 1980’s to the ‘new master frame’ (Rydgren, 
2005, 2007). The French National Front shifted their core ideology from a tainted 
‘biological racism’ to a sanitised ‘cultural racism’ and ethnopluralism and this was 
take up the populist radical right in other countries through a process of ‘cross-
national diffusion’ (see section 2.2.4). Finally, I offer a reflexive exploration of the 
researchers position in relation to this research project (see section 2.2.5). The 
context of the contentious immigration debate as outlined in this chapter and my 
reflexivity, is crucial for all three of the empirical studies carried out in this project 
(for more detail discussion of the importance of context see section 1.8) 
 




‘IT’S JUST HEART BREAKING’: DOING INCLUSIVE POLITICAL 
SOLIDARITY OR AMBIVALENT PATERNALISM THROUGH 
SYMPATHETIC DISCOURSE WITHIN THE ‘REFUGEE CRISIS’ 
DEBATE. 
 
This chapter is an expanded version of the published article:  
Nightingale, A., Quayle, M., & Muldoon, O. (2017). ‘It’s just heart breaking’: 
Political solidarity and sympathetic helping discourse within the ‘refugee crisis’ 
debate. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 27(2), 137-146. 
doi:10.1002/casp.2303 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
This article explores how people do sympathetic talk in relation to the European 
“refugee crisis.” The analysis was grounded in critical discursive psychology and 
also drew on the concept of affective–discursive practice. Data was retrieved from 
a phone‐in program on Irish national radio over a 6‐month period when the refugee 
crisis debate was at its height. It is shown that speakers deployed elaborate 
sympathetic repertoires with ease that described their normative emotional response 
to the plight of the asylum seekers. But these same speakers found it problematic to 
present explicit, unambiguous, and unconditional calls of inclusive political 
solidarity with the asylum seekers, advocating increased asylum provision in 
Ireland. These findings are discussed in light of the hostile affective–discursive 




states have the moral right to exclude, which appears to constrain the talk to a 
position of ambivalent paternalism. 
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores how people do sympathetic talk in relation to the ‘refugee 
crisis’ and what this talk achieves. Early work in discursive psychology showed that 
constructions of the racial other are flexible, context dependent and predominantly 
ambivalent. For example, Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 197) showed how white 
New Zealanders displayed racist hostility whilst strategically denying a negative 
prejudicial identity. Similarly, Jackman (1994) showed how those in positions of 
power and privilege espoused ambivalent paternalism towards the less fortunate by 
cloaking inequality in benevolent and caring discourse whilst simultaneously 
rejecting policies that may achieve social change. Ambivalence efficiently 
maintains the status quo whilst legitimizing structural inequality. The aim of the 
present paper is to critically examine sympathetic affective-discursive practice 
(Wetherell, 2012a) within the European ‘refugee crisis’ debate to explore its 
functions, particularly in relation to offering refuge to the asylum seekers and 
potential ambivalent paternalism. 
 Sympathy towards the plight of asylum seekers is frequently expressed in 
public discourse but is tempered by the taken-for-granted notion that individuals 
belong naturally to a specific nation within a world of bounded nations (Billig, 
1995). Dominant nationalist discourse is seen to constitute the nation-state as a 
moral entity with the indisputable right to exclude ‘others’ (O'Doherty & 
Augoustinos, 2008). The prevailing neoliberal agenda is also dependent on 
nationalism because the state is assigned the right to exclude, based on economic 
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benefit, and the protection of resources and property (Lueck et al., 2015). A 
common thread is apparent within nationalist rhetoric of a country under siege by 
unlawful asylum seekers. Young people discussing citizenship in the UK avoid 
explicit use of ‘race’ and national identity as a justification for exclusion but ‘it is 
notable that exclusion per se was not typically treated as problematic’ (Gibson & 
Hamilton, 2011). Sanitised expressions of exclusion are the norm within everyday 
nationalist discourse, they merely need a rational pretence and at times can even 
express ‘sympathy’ for the immigrant but above all accusations of racism are 
tactically sidestepped (Durrheim et al., 2016). 
 Hence, dominant discourse justifies the harsh treatment of asylum seekers 
due to commonsense economic reasoning and accusations of racism are denied 
(Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; S. Goodman & Burke, 2010). Sympathetic 
arguments are elicited that support specific genuine asylum seekers who have fled 
persecution, bring desirable skills and intend to contribute to the host society. But 
this category distinction also provides rhetorical space to demand stricter border 
regimes, due to the supposed general prevalence of bogus asylum seekers and their 
ensuing economic burden (Lynn & Lea, 2003). These categories are not only 
demarcated but they are conveniently conflated to question the legitimacy of all 
asylum seekers (S. Goodman & Speer, 2007) and construct an endemic ‘culture of 
disbelief’ (Souter, 2011). Hostile discourse towards asylum seekers is also 
prevalent in Ireland (Haynes et al., 2006). And the Irish government operates a 
inhumane policy of deterrence, where asylum claims through the ‘direct provision’ 
system have the second lowest success rate in Europe and the public takes up a 




 Recent work has shown that ambivalence is common in discourse 
orientating to asylum seekers. Callers to an Australian radio program mitigated 
accusations of prejudice by embedding hostility towards refugees in expressions of 
sympathy (Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2011). Australian politicians emphasised 
the country’s humanitarian credentials to frame justification for excluding asylum 
seekers (Every, 2008). Similarly, citizen officers in the UK displayed an ambivalent 
tension between humanitarianism and pragmatism (Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014), 
constructing their British identity as both tolerant but realistic. In these examples 
the persuasive power of humanitarianism in support of asylum seekers was easily 
neutralized by nationalist rhetoric focusing on economic arguments.  
 Some discursive work has examined arguments explicitly supporting 
asylum seekers. For example, those protesting against the removal of children from 
asylum seeker families in the UK employ images of ‘loving families’ (S. Goodman, 
2007). Groups fighting against detention and deportation of asylum seekers in the 
UK, appeal to shared humanitarian values and mobilise identities of solidarity 
(Bates & Kirkwood, 2013). Defenders of asylum seekers in Australia attempt to 
shame the opposition, but this strategy can be counterproductive, further 
entrenching the targets’ hostile positions (Every, 2013). Kirkwood, McKinlay, and 
McVittie (2013a), show that disputing the normative hostile position towards 
asylum seekers requires considerable discursive labour.  
 But these studies tend to pertain to issues of integration and treatment of 
asylum seekers who are already inside the state. Less work has examined arguments 
advocating the relaxation of the asylum processes and declaring inclusive political 
solidarity with those outside the nation-state. One exception would be Every and 
Augoustinos (2008) who showed how asylum advocates in the Australian 
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parliament cautiously construct a counter argument against the opposition. They 
note that this argument is constrained to a liberal position and avoids more radical 
political demands that question the legitimacy of border restrictions and global 
power relations. This strategy potentially lacks potency due to the dependence on 
humanitarian motivations of caring and concern rather than rights and justice. 
 Despite asylum from persecution being a fundamental human right, asylum 
seekers are dependent on winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the citizens of 
Europe who have the power and privilege to offer or withhold inclusion (Subasić, 
Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). Advocating inclusion is not only dependent on shifting 
group boundaries but is reliant on the groups self-representation and embedded 
prized norms and values (Reicher et al., 2006). These norms and values are forged 
by contesting the nature of prejudice and what counts as legitimate exclusion 
(Durrheim et al., 2016). The nature of prejudice is continually contested by those 
attempting to persuade and mobilise audiences in support of inclusion or not. 
Similarly, dominant national narratives, not only define who deserves inclusion and 
governs what can be felt and said in relation to asylum, but also who has the power 
and privilege to influence what is felt and said (Wetherell, 2013b).  
 The present study explores how Irish callers to a national radio show, deploy 
sympathy towards the plight of people arriving at the borders of Europe within an 
affective-discursive environment that is prevailingly hostile or at best ambivalent. 
Specifically, our aim is to scrutinise what sympathy accomplishes within the talk 





Data was drawn from ‘Liveline’, a phone-in program on Irish national RTE radio, 
over six months from 1st August 2015 when the ‘refugee crisis’ debate was 
prominent. ‘Liveline’ deals with topical social and political issues and has an 
estimated 378,000 daily listeners accounting for 10% of Irish’s adults. It is aired at 
1.45pm every weekday. Hence, this institutional setting diverges from what 
Hanson-Easey and Augoustinos (2011) describe as evening ‘shock jock’ radio. 
Here repertoires are potentially tempered by normative understandings. The 
‘stakes’ are high for speakers who are ‘accountable’ to a large day-time national 
audience (Potter, 1996), which places constraints of social acceptability on their 
affective-discursive repertoires. These data are particularly suited to our aims 
because the speakers are likely to be intent on persuading and mobilizing an 
audience. The broadcaster’s website synopses were used to identify shows relevant 
to the ‘refugee crisis’ during the sampling period. These were downloaded 
providing five hours of data for analysis. They were transcribed using an 
abbreviated Jefferson notation (Jefferson, 2004). 
 The analysis first inductively coded for overtly sympathetic, antipathetic or 
ambivalent positions. From there, focus was narrowed to sympathetic talk 
orientating towards a humanitarian position (e.g. expressing overtly positive 
appraisals of the asylum seekers and advocating care, support and help to be 
offered). Particular attention was paid to how possible arguments were addressed 
in calls for inclusive political solidarity. Extracts have been presented in the analysis 
below that exemplify the processes identified and show the way that culturally 
recognisable affective-discursive practice was reproduced and how speakers 
orientate to the issue of where the people arriving at the borders of Europe might 
find refuge.  
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3.3.1 Analytic framework.  
 This study is grounded in critical discursive psychology (Wetherell, 1998; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992), interrogating how discourses maintain, normalise and 
legitimise inequitable power relations through commonsense understandings (Van 
Dijk, 1993). Hence, we play particular attention to what repertoires are chosen, how 
easily they are deployed and what goes unsaid (Billig, 1999, p. 140). 
 Due to the significance of emotion within intergroup relations (Billig, 
2002), and nationalism particularly (Billig, 1995, p. 18; Wetherell, 2014a) and our 
specific interest in expressions of sympathy, we draw on the notion of affective-
discursive practice (Wetherell, 2012a). This acknowledges the performance of 
recognisable well-established affective patterns and routines that are culturally 
prescribed and evident in social interaction. It avoids an unhelpful dualism by 
conceptualizing affect and discourse as inseparable and entangled. Therefore, while 
acknowledging sympathy as an embodied experience for participants (cf. Hanson-
Easey & Augoustinos, 2011), we are primarily concerned with what a sympathetic 
position accomplishes within discourse. 
3.4 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Speakers who expressed sympathy towards the people arriving at the shores of 
Europe, who joined this phone-in program, tended to focus on extensively 
describing their emotional distress in response to the plight of refugees. But avoided 
any discussion of how to manage these people or whether they should be offered 
sanctuary within Europe. However, the analysis here focussed on the few speakers 




where the people arriving at the borders of Europe might find sanctuary; and 
explored how these speakers managed this contentious issue in this context. One 
exception is Elianna, extract four, who avoids the politically contentious issue of 
where refugees should find sanctuary. Elianna’s repertoire is included as an 
example of the tendency for the speakers who draw on sympathetic repertoires, in 
this context, to express their emotional distress, but avoid the contentious issue of 
were the refugees should be accommodated. The rest of the speakers examined here 
employed extensive affective-discursive labour, potentially to mobilise sympathy 
and helping for the people arriving at the shores of Europe. But even for these 
speakers it was noticeable that they struggled to explicitly advocate unconditional 
inclusive political solidarity with the refugees. These speakers, in this context, 
potentially attempt to mobilise a sympathetic alliance with the audience, which 
offers limited and temporary help to the people arriving at the shores of Europe.  
 This highlighted two repertoires. The first, ‘It’s just heart breaking,’ 
oriented to the largely emotional work done to elicit sympathy within the audience. 
One would expect that this affective discourse would lead to calls of inclusive 
political solidarity with the asylum seekers. But as highlighted in the second 
repertoire, ‘Struggling to advocate inclusive political solidarity,’ it was problematic 
for the speakers to explicitly, unambiguously and unconditionally advocate 
inclusive political solidarity with the asylum seekers. In line with previous 
discursive work, exposing the normative repression of prejudice, talk attempting to 
contest the norms defining inclusion is problematic or even repressed (Durrheim et 
al., 2016) due to the taken-for-granted assumption that the nation-state has the 
moral right to exclude (Billig, 1995). It is important to note that the two repertoires 
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are demarcated for analytic purposes, but in practice they are probably better 
understood as being entangled and occurring concurrently.  
3.4.1 It’s just heart breaking.  
The speakers frequently orientated to their emotional reaction to the ‘refugee crisis’, 
potentially in an attempt to mobilise a sympathetic collective in support of refugees. 
An Irish man, Pat, calls from the Greek island, Leros, where he is on holiday on the 
21st August 2015. He spends 15 minutes 33 seconds on the program and also calls 
to Liveline again on the 28th August, once he has returned to Ireland and speaks for 
an additional 6 minutes 50 seconds. He describes at length how he is confronted by 
asylum seekers landing on the island’s shoreline and his consequential emotional 
distress. Extract one is from an early point of Pat joining the first program, where 
in his own words, he describes how he is ‘devastated’ by ‘what confronts’ him 
(extract 1, line 1), and this emotional reaction provokes him to get involved with a 
group handing out food and water to the refugees. It is important to note Pat’s 
extensive detailed description of his affective position and how he presents this as 
influencing his consequential helping of the refugees. Potentially he shares his 
affective position and helping reaction with the national radio audience in an 
attempt to convince them that they should feel the same, towards the plight of 
refugees, and hence, respond in a similar manner towards refugees.  
3.4.1.1 Extract 1: Pat 21/08/2015 
1.   Pat: I am just devastated with what I with what confronted me 
2.   when I went to the port area and saw the amount of refugees 




4.   Julie asked me would I be willing to help her uhm distribute food 
5.   be willing to help her uhm (.) 
6.   Host: OK 
7.   Pat: distribute food and water and so I went to the port police station 
8.   and I was just shocked by what I saw there was about a thousand  
9.   refugees sleeping under the hot sun without any food without  
10. any water without any facilities and uhm we have been busy  
11. trying to uhm collect food and we were up really early this  
12. morning buying cheese from the local supermarkets  
13. and making sandwiches it’s just it's just very stressful  
14. and very emotionally upsetting to see people suffering like this 
 Extract one contains clear examples of affective-discursive practice 
(Wetherell, 2015; Wetherell et al., 2015) as Pat takes up a compassionate subject 
position and draws on a repertoire that constructs himself as an emotionally 
motivated humanitarian. From his privileged position as a holiday-maker, Pat’s talk 
initially orientates to his response to the human suffering ‘I am just devastated with 
what I with what confronted me’ (extract 1, line 1). The scale of the problem has a 
strong emotional impact on him, ‘I was just shocked’ (line 8), and ‘it's just very 
stressful and very emotionally upsetting to see people suffering like this’ (line 13 – 
14). This emotional distress justifies his willingness to help, by distributing food 
and water to the refugees (line 4 – 7), who are ‘sleeping under the hot sun’ (line 9).  
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 Extract one provides a brief example of Pat’s extended description of his 
emotional embodied distress in response to the refugees arriving in Leros. This 
single extract does not provide sufficient evidence of Pat’s extensive discursive 
labour that he dedicates to describing his affective and humanitarian position, hence 
it is worth looking at some further examples.  
3.4.1.2 Extract 2: Pat 21/08/2015 
1.   Pat: about 500 people this morning we had  
2.   sandwiches made for three hundred  
3.   Host: okay  
4.  Pat: and the dilemma is you know when  
5.   we reach the end of three hundred how  
6.   do we tell the people we have no more food? and  
7.   uhm it’s just heart breaking and .hhh ((sounds close to tears)) 
 Extract two is another example of Pat’s protracted affective-discursive 
repertoire constructing his sympathetic reaction and humanitarian action. Pat 
repeatedly explicitly describes the affective impact of the situation, for example 
‘it’s just heart breaking’ (extract 2, line 7). Just after this statement Pat’s emotion is 
made palpable for the audience as he struggles to hold back the tears (audibly 
available in the data). This affective-discursive practice is not merely a simple 
description of a perceptive response to an environmental stimulus, it is performative 
and potentially mobilises sympathy within the audience by presenting an embodied 




 Due to the extensive discursive labour Pat dedicates to describing his 
emotional distress, and consequential humanitarian action, it is worth examining 
further extracts from Pat later in the same program. Pat reiterates this embodied 
affective response, ‘it’s just heart breaking’ (extract 3, line 1). Furthermore, in 
contrast to the previous extracts examined (extract 1 & 2), where the host Joe Duffy 
takes an unobtrusive role in the interaction, it is noteworthy that in extract three, 
Joe potentially attempts to coproduce a positive humanitarian ‘Irish’ identity. 
3.4.1.3 Extract 3: Pat 21/08/2015  
1.   Pat: you know it’s just heart breaking  
2.   Host: and are there other Irish 
3.   Pat: we do what we do (.) what we can  
4.   Host: I know you’re you’re obviously doing what you can Pat 
5.   Pat: yer it’s you just can't you just can’t sleep at night  
6.   you know you have to help you know (.) 
 Firstly, it needs to be highlighted that Pat precedes his affective declaration, 
‘it’s just heart breaking’ (extract 3 line 1), with ‘you know’ (line 1) as a potential 
means to arouse a taken-for-granted shared understanding between members of the 
same community (Tree & Schrock, 2002). ‘You know’ is not a question, it is a 
mobilising statement. The collective audience should have shared knowledge of 
this recognisable affective response, ‘it’s just heart breaking’ (line 1), when 
confronted with a humanitarian crisis, such as ‘refugees sleeping under the hot sun 
without any food without any water without any facilities’ (extract 1, line 9 – 10). 
Pat appears to draw on a recognisable, culturally patterned, affective practice 
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(Martinussen & Wetherell, 2019). A repertoire that assumes the audience will 
‘know’ (line 1), they will understand his affective meaning making in response to 
the distressing humanitarian scene that he describes. Through the use of these 
affective repertoires, Pat performs his reaction to the humanitarian situation for the 
audience. This is potentially an attempt to mobilise a collective who will be 
sympathetic towards the plight of the refugees by drawing on culturally 
recognisable – normative – affective practice. 
 In contrast to the previous extracts (1 & 2), where the host Joe Duffy is 
unobtrusive, in extract 3 he embarks on a reconnaissance for ‘other Irish’ (extract 
3, line 2) being involved in the humanitarian effort to help the refugees. Joe’s 
probing of Pat could be passed off as simply looking for the Irish story. But he is 
also potentially searching for evidence of a positive Irish humanitarian identity that 
is compassionate towards refugees to relay to the national radio audience. 
Interestingly, Pat responds by drawing on a collective ‘we’ as he states, ‘we do what 
we do (.) what we can’ (line 3), to help the refugees. This response, employing a 
reference to an ambiguous ‘we’, does not reference the Irish and does not explicitly 
answer Joe’s question. In turn, Joe concedes that the ‘we’ Pat draws on does not 
refer to ‘other Irish’ because Joe shifts his footing (Potter, 1996, p. 143) back to an 
acknowledgement of Pat’s individual humanitarian effort; ‘I know you’re you’re 
obviously doing what you can Pat’ (line 4). They appear to mutually, but implicitly, 
acknowledge that the group of people helping the refugees on Leros does not have 
any other Irish members. Joe’s attempt to emphasise the significance of Pat’s 
Irishness, and ‘other Irish’ helpers, is potentially an attempt to construct a positive 
shared humanitarian identity. This is in stark contrast to Joe’s repertoire in extract 




identity is notably constrained. This is potentially, because the responsibility of the 
Irish nation is directly being questioned at this point in extract eight which I 
examine later. Contrastingly, here in extract three, Joe is merely looking for fellow 
Irish humanitarians active on the Greek island of Leros.   
 Pat takes up Joe’s lead returning the humanitarian focus to his own 
individual effort by again reiterating his embodied emotional distress; ‘yer it’s you 
just can't you just can’t sleep at night you know you have to help you know you 
know you have to help you know’ (line 5 & 6). Here again we see Pat prompt, and 
potentially mobilise, the audience through the use of ‘you know’ (Tree & Schrock, 
2002). He is stating that the audience should ‘know’ and recognise his helping 
response as being a normal reaction to his described embodied emotional distress 
of being unable to sleep due to the plight of the refugees. 
 The three previous extracts have shown how Pat expends extensive 
affective-discursive labour on describing his embodied emotional response to the 
plight of the refugees and his consequential helping. These extracts have also 
indicated how Pat potentially mobilises a collective in support of refugees by 
orienting to his recognisable, culturally patterned, affective practice. In other words, 
he describes in detail his embodied emotional state of heart break, shock, stress, 
emotional upset, devastation, and sleeplessness, that potentially the audience should 
recognise as an understandable, or even as a culturally expected affective response 
to the plight of the refugees. Potentially, Pat performs this extensive discursive 
labour outlining his affective position, on national radio, to mobilise a sympathetic 
collective and prompt the audience into being more compassionate towards 
refugees. Also highlighted in extract three, is how the program hosts makes a brief, 
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but unsuccessful, identity reconnaissance for ‘other Irish’ being involved in the 
group of humanitarian helpers. 
 To add further evidence of this extensive use of affective discourse to 
potentially mobilise a sympathetic collective in support of refugees it is worth 
exploring other speakers on the program. Elliana calls into the program on the 21st 
August 2015 and speaks for 5 minutes. She is Irish and a regular visitor to Syracuse 
in Sicily (extract 4). She also displays sympathy towards refugees who are crossing 
the Mediterranean and echoes Pat’s affective position using the trope, ‘it’s just heart 
breaking’ (extract 4, line 9). Importantly, extract four also shows how the host 
initiates the coproduction of an affective alliance between Pat and other callers.  
3.4.1.4 Extract 4: Elliana 21/08/2015  
1.   Host: you were listening to Pat obviously very distressed  
2.   on the island of Leros doing his best (.) 
3.   he is on holidays from Kilkenny trying to help the migrants  
4.   who are landing there twenty-four seven an awful situation (.) 
5.   you live in Sicily for some months of the year  
6.   Elliana: I do yeah in Syracuse which isn't how do I  
7.   it’s not really a port where the asylum seekers land  
8.   so the people I have met are all young men in fact  




 In extract four the host, Joe, is seen to initiate the building of an affective 
alliance between Pat and the present caller Elliana, and potentially the audience, as 
he summarizes Pat’s affective position to be, ‘obviously very distressed’ (extract 4, 
line 1). Joe provides confirmation of Pat’s extended affective-discursive labour 
done describing in detail his emotional distress in response to the plight of the 
refugees, which Joe interprets as being ‘an awful situation’ (line 4). The magnitude 
of this ‘awful situation’ is highlighted through reference to the constant arrival of 
‘the migrants who are landing there twenty-four seven’ (line 4). Joe also proceeds 
to outline Pat’s admirable humanitarian reaction to his emotional distress by doing 
his ‘best’ to ‘help the migrants’ (line 2 – 3).  
 It is worth noting that even though Joe aligns himself with Pat’s affective 
position and is supportive of his humanitarian helping, unlike Pat, who always uses 
the label refugees, Joe vigilantly labels the people arriving on the island of Leros as 
‘migrants’. This use of the category ‘migrants’ is an implicit means to question the 
legitimacy of the claim for asylum (S. Goodman & Speer, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003). 
Elliana is also ambiguously cautious and hesitant about how she categorises the 
people arriving on the shores of Syracuse; ‘it’s not really a port where the asylum 
seekers land so the people I have met are all young men in fact’ (line 7 – 8). She 
appears to encounter young men who are not necessarily even seeking asylum, and 
this is a ‘fact’ (line 8). This is evidence of the discursive sensitivity in relation to 
the categorisation of migrants arriving at the shores of Europe (S. Goodman & 
Speer, 2007). However, Elliana’s repertoire proceeds to highlight her concern and 
sympathy for these ‘young men’ by describing her emotional response, which is in 
alignment with Pat earlier in the program, ‘it’s just heart breaking’ (line 9). In other 
words, although Joe and Elliana’s discourse appears to construct an affective 
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alliance with Pat, they also show noticeable deviation when it comes to depicting 
the legitimacy of the people arriving at the shores of Europe.  
 The next extract (extract 5.) draws attention to how William, who joins the 
program after Elliana and speaks for 6 minutes and 28 seconds, further builds an 
affective alliance with Pat who spoke previously. The analysis of William’s talk 
adds evidence to the notion that these speakers in this context attempt to mobilise a 
sympathetic collective in support of refugees based on their description of their 
shared affective position. This affective mobilisation is clearly evident in the 
following extract because William explicitly declares that he shares Pat’s affective 
position and clearly points out to the audience if they do not also share this affective 
position they are abnormal (extract 5, line). Whereas Pat (extracts 1 – 3) and Elliana 
(extract 4), in the previous extracts, potentially attempt to implicitly mobilise 
sympathetic support for refugees by describing their own affective response, 
William (extract 5) employs a repertoire, explicitly declaring the moral high ground 
of the sympathetic collective and hails the audience to align themselves with his 
and Pat’s normative affective position.  
3.4.1.5 Extract 5: William 21/08/2015 
1.   William: Pat and Pat sounded genuinely you know  
2.   just shocked by what he witnessed (.)  
3.   I I think if you have any empathy and any humanity in you  
4.   you couldn’t but be (.) I think his reaction is admirable  
5.  but it’s it’s normal because you couldn’t  




7.   happening there […] 
 William calls from Dublin, having recently returned from Lebanon working 
for five weeks with the NGO, ‘Schools for Syria’. He forms an affective-discursive 
alliance with Pat, ‘Pat sounded genuinely you know just shocked’ (extract 5, line 
1). William takes up the sympathetic repertoire and pursues the persuasive 
performance declaring to the audience that Pats reaction is ‘genuine’. By inserting 
‘you know’ he is drawing upon an inferred shared understanding between members 
of the same community (Tree & Schrock, 2002). Hence, he hails the audience to 
align themselves with the sympathetic position of understandable ‘shock’ 
(Wetherell, 2012a). 
 Furthermore, he hails the audience using the referent ‘you’ and states ‘if you 
have any empathy and any humanity’ (line 3), ‘you’ would feel the same. William 
challenges the audience by declaring Pat’s reaction as ‘admirable but … normal’ 
(line 4 – 5), arguing there is nothing special about Pat and if the audience dispute 
this position they stand to be accused of a deviant abnormal response. This 
proclamation is emphasised by ‘you’d want a heart of stone not to be moved by 
what is happening there’. The frequent usage of ‘you’ invites the audience to join 
his sympathetic position. William forms an alliance with Pat and presents a 
persuasive performance consisting of a recognisable normative affective-discursive 
repertoire (Wetherell, 2012a). This talk employs affective performance to mobilize 
shared humanitarian values and to potentially induce a sympathetic collective 
response (Durrheim et al., 2016). 
 William’s talk in extract five shows how he explicitly builds an affective 
alliance with the previous speaker, Pat, and repeatedly hails the audience to also 
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join this alliance or be judged abnormal. It is worth looking at another example of 
this affective alliance building, from a different episode of the Liveline program, to 
provide an indication of how widespread this affective-discursive strategy was 
employed by these advocates on behalf of refugees in this context. Mary calls into 
the Liveline program on the 3rd September 2015 and speaks for 6 minutes 38 
seconds. This is the day after the picture was released of the three-year-old, Aylan 
Kurdi, found drowned on a Turkish beach. Subsequently, there was an outpouring 
of sympathy for the asylum seekers, of which Mary’s voice is one example among 
many on this program. She is an Irish woman calling from the South of France, who 
echoes the affective trope used previously, ‘it’s heart breaking’ (extract 6, line 1). 
3.4.1.6 Extract 6: Mary 3/09/2015  
1. Mary: I have cried since I saw it it’s heart breaking (.) 
2.       we did it for the Special Olympics (.) Joe as I emailed you  
3.       and I remember distinctly the joy and  
4.       the feeling in the country was amazing (.) 
5.       these people want help for the moment  
6.       they want to go back to their own country eventually  
7.       we all do we all do home is home  
8.       but we have to help them now there is no point in hanging around  
9.       and suggesting that we take six hundred is absolutely a disgrace (.) 
10.       I mean that the eighty-two thousand in Croke Park  




12.     I don’t suggest we take eighty-two thousand 
 Mary constructs her emotional response, echoing Pat and Elliana – ‘it’s 
heart breaking’ – and she describes her embodied reaction of how the photograph 
brought her to tears (extract 6, line 1). This emotional distress is echoed by many 
other callers to this program. Mary’s affective preamble then demands the audience 
to provide ‘help’ to the asylum seekers by using the referent ‘we’ (line 7, line 4). 
The sympathetic helping is emphasised by drawing on an temporary affective 
national occasion the Special Olympics (Wetherell, 2014a) which reportedly 
promoted ‘joy’ within the national collective (line 3). She makes an explicit 
reference to the shared national affect due to the Special Olympics, ‘the feeling in 
the country was amazing’ (line 3) and implies that the nation would experience a 
similar shared affect of amazing joy if they help the refugees. Mary’s performance 
is a culturally patterned and a recognisable emotional response to the ‘refugee 
crisis’ (Wetherell, 2012a) and she is seen to evoke an affective-discursive alliance 
potentially intended to mobilises sympathy within the audience (Durrheim et al., 
2016).  
 Across these six extracts it has been shown how the advocates on behalf of 
refugees, in this context, labour on affective repertories describing their shared 
embodied emotional response to the plight of the refugees. Potentially, this is an 
attempt to mobilise a sympathetic collective within the listening Irish national 
audience in support of refugees. Pat (extracts 1 – 3) accomplishes this by using his 
own emotional reaction and consequential helping action as a prototypical example 
of a sympathetic collective. He is an affective entrepreneur of identity performing 
his emotional position and humanitarian helping (Reicher & Jogdand, 2017). He 
brings the domestic audience to the refugee frontline and makes them aware of the 
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desperate plight of the refugees arriving on the shores of Greece. Secondly, he 
describes in extensive detail his affective response by working up his embodied 
emotional distress. For example, his repeated deployment of the affective trope 
‘heart breaking’. Potentially this is an effective means to mobilise the audience by 
drawing on a recognisable, culturally patterned and understandable response to such 
distressing humanitarian circumstance (Martinussen & Wetherell, 2019). Thirdly, 
he constructs a responsive relationship between his affective reaction and his 
consequential humanitarian helping of refugees. Describing what he is compelled 
to do, in order to relieve his distressing emotional position.   
 The host, Joe, and Elliana proceed to coproduce an affective alliance with 
Pat (extract 4). Joe summaries Pat’s emotional distress as obvious and outlines his 
response as doing his best to ‘help the migrants’. In turn, Elliana employs an 
affective repertoire that echoes Pat – ‘heart breaking’ – to describe her reaction to 
the situation. But, in contrast to Pat, both Joe and Elliana avoid labelling these 
people as legitimate refugees.  
 William (extract 5) explicitly constructs an affective alliance with Pat and 
accuses the listeners of affective abnormality if they do not also take up the same 
affective position and consequential helping. Additionally, Mary, calling into a later 
program (extract 6), consolidates the affective mobilisation by echoing Pat’s 
embodied response using the trope ‘heart breaking’. She also orients to a temporary 
affective national event, the Special Olympics, that evoked ‘amazing joy’ within 
the national community. In other words, these speakers in this context, describe 
their emotional response to the refugee crisis and present it as being a recognisable 
and culturally expected way to react to a humanitarian crisis. They imply to the 




refugees. Next, we look at how these advocates on behalf of refugees directly 
address the issue of the accommodation of refugees and the discursive resources 
they draw upon. 
3.4.2 Struggling to advocate inclusive political solidarity.  
The analysis now turns to focusing on how the few speakers, who drew on 
sympathetic repertoires, also addressed the contentious issue of where the people 
arriving at the shores of Europe should find sanctuary. Notably, the majority of 
speakers who attended this phone-in radio program did not address the contentious 
issue of where the refugees should find sanctuary, even those who drew on 
sympathetic repertoires, and Elianna in extract four above is a good example of this 
position. Also, an example of Anne’s (extract 7 below) emotional response to the 
plight of the refugees, which was common across the phone-in radio program, is 
not provided in the previous analytic section. But Anne is included in this section 
because her repertoire is similar to Mary’s (extract 6 above) and provides 
supporting evidence of some speakers’ tentative orientation to offer limited and 
temporary help for the refugees. 
 Firstly, Mary is seen to build a case towards inclusive political solidarity 
requesting that Ireland should volunteer to take in more asylum seekers, and this 
resonates with other speakers on the program. Mary’s statement, ‘suggesting that 
we take six hundred is absolutely a disgrace’ (Extract 6, line 9), is orientating to 
Ireland’s offer of accepting 600 asylum seekers over two years as being insufficient. 
Interestingly, this call is framed in an affective term, ‘disgrace’, which is an inward-
looking reference to the loss of honour for those in a position of power and 
privilege.  
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
123 
 
 However, these calls of inclusion expressed on this program where 
noticeably constrained because they were delivered with conditional restrictions. 
For example, ‘these people want help for the moment they want to go back to their 
own country eventually we all do we all do home is home’ (Extract 6, line 5). 
Mary’s political request to accommodate more asylum seekers is undeniably well-
intended, but it does not suggest to the audience that the refugees are to be offered 
indefinite stay and a home to build a new life. Mary repeats this temporary condition 
later and it is echoed by others voices on this program (for example see extract 6). 
A conditional restriction of quantity is also deployed ‘I don’t suggest we take 
eighty-two thousand’ (Extract 6, line 12). These conditions undermine the 
authenticity of inclusion, suggesting the cost to the state ultimately overrides 
humanitarian concern (Every, 2008; Lueck et al., 2015) and is underpinned by an 
explicit acknowledgement that the nation-state has the moral right to exclude 
(Billig, 1995; O'Doherty & Augoustinos, 2008). This position of temporary 
sympathetic help is further emphasised by Mary drawing a comparison with the 
‘Special-Olympics’ (line 2), a time limited event that also implicitly equates people 
seeking refuge to people with disability, who are often construed as warm but 
incompetent. This exposes a position of ambivalent paternalism (Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002).  
 Importantly, when this political position is viewed alongside Mary’s 
preceding construction of emotional distress induced by the picture of Aylan Kurdi, 
it is strikingly constrained in its remit. Mary is seen to effortlessly deploy a 
repertoire of sympathy which the audience will recognise. But when it came to 
advocating increased offers of sanctuary for the refugees, Mary finds it necessary 




providing temporary accommodation for more than 600 but less than 82,000 
(Durrheim et al., 2016). Hence, extract six shows that Mary takes up a repertoire, 
with ease, expressing her distressed embodied affective position in response to the 
picture of Aylan Kurdi. She even accesses a repertoire describing the nation’s 
affective position by outlining the potential shift to national ‘amazing joy’ if Ireland 
helps more refugees. But at the same time, when she negotiates the politically 
sensitive issue of accommodating refugees in Ireland, the repertoire is constrained. 
Although she advocates the accommodation of more refugees than the government 
suggests, she is also required to place a limitation on the number and the length of 
time that they can be accommodated. Importantly, Mary avoids contesting the 
notion that refugees are a problematic burden. Her repertoire implicitly accepts the 
taken-for-granted assumption that refugees are an economic burden and cultural 
concern that can only be managed in limited numbers over a limited length of time. 
Refugees are clearly not constructed, by these advocates in this context, as being an 
economic and cultural asset to the host nation.  
 However, Mary is only one voice displaying a constrained inclusive 
political solidity with the refugees, hence it is worth looking at another speaker, 
Anne, who calls into the same program as Mary and speaks for 5 minutes and 4 
seconds (extract 7). Anne also takes up an affective alliance with Mary by 
expressing sympathy for refugees in response to the picture of Aylan Kurdi’s body 
and advocates increased accommodation of refugees in Ireland. But Anne also 
appears to find it necessary to stipulate a limitation on the number of manageable 
refugees and explicitly state that the accommodation of refugees is not permanent.  
3.4.2.1 Extract 7: Anne 3/09/2015 
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1. Anne: easily that uhm there is plenty of accommodation and 
2.   especially in the country regions may be not in the  
3.   cities like Dublin where students can hardly get a  
4.   room .hhh but definitely in the country regions  
5.   in parishes and communities plenty of families will be  
6.   willing to take .hhh uhm small groups of people and  
7.   provided you that there is .hhh you know the people will  
8.   eventually go back to their own country when peace returns 
9.   and things will settle down again 
 Anne initially points out that there is plenty of accommodation in Ireland 
for refugees, but not in the cities only in rural areas (extract 7, line 1 – 4). In the 
cities, she appears to privilege the accommodation needs of ‘students’ over refugees 
(line 3). Furthermore, responsibility is not directly placed on the Irish state to 
provide accommodation for refugees, but it is the responsibility of parishes, 
communities and even families; ‘in the country regions in parishes and communities 
plenty of families will be willing to take .hhh uhm small groups of people’ (line 5 
– 6). Even though Anne initially makes a generous unlimited claim, there are 
‘plenty of families’ who are ‘willing’ to accommodate refugees, she also appears to 
be compelled to add a clarifying limitation that parishes and communities should 
only be expected to manage ‘small groups of people’ (line 6). Anne also echoes 
Mary by highlighting that the commitment to accommodate refugees is only 
temporary; ‘provided you that there is .hhh you know the people will eventually go 




(line 7 – 9). The obligation to accommodate any refugees is dependent on the 
condition – ‘provided’ – that the ‘small groups’ will return ‘back to their own 
country’.  
This conditional statement is a clear example of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 
1995), which is a taken-for-granted assumption that individuals belong to a specific 
nation within the universally accepted world made up of nations. And nations have 
the moral right to exclude unwanted others. This banal position is emphasised 
through – ‘you know’ – as this universal common-sense understanding is a 
knowledge that the audience will share (Tree & Schrock, 2002). It is understandable 
and normal that citizens of secure wealthy countries are emotionally affected by the 
suffering of the refugees. But it is also reasonable for these same voices to advocate 
that the number of refugees offered accommodation should be limited and the 
refugees should be expected to return to their own country.  
 Furthermore, although returning home may be the hope of many refugees, 
it is also a naïve and arguably tokenistic position put forward by a potential host 
community. Arguing that peace will inevitably return and ‘things will settle down’ 
(line 9) is potentially a means to reassure the audience that the taken-for-granted 
burden caused by refugees can be limited and temporary. The repertoire is directed 
at relieving the concerns of the potential host community, but not aimed to reassure 
refugees of their security. For example, Afghanistan has been torn apart by ongoing 
conflict, with varying degrees of Western and Russian involvement, since, at least, 
1978. And even if relative peace does return to a fractured and violently divided 
nation, it is unlikely that those who fled will feel safe to return or necessarily relish 
rebuilding their lives in the wreckage (S. Goodman et al., 2015).   
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 It is worth exploring further examples of discourse, used to confront the 
contentious issue of where the refugees should be offered sanctuary, because these 
advocates on behalf of refugees, in this context, tended to focus on their shared 
affective position and avoided or struggle with the politically contentious issue. 
Directly following Pat’s protracted repertoire of sympathy discussed previously 
(see extracts 1, 2 & 3) he makes the audience privy to a crucial ideological dilemma, 
where should the asylum seekers find refuge (Billig et al., 1988), by way of a 
reported interaction with the asylum seekers (extract 8). 
3.4.2.2 Extract 8: Pat 21/08/2015 
1.  Pat: a lot of the the men are coming up to me  
2.   and asking for advice to know which 
3.   country they should go to ↓  
4.   I really can't advise them because (.) hhh it’s difficult 
5.   you know and they say we don't speak German  
6.   we speak English can we go to 
7.   your country can we go to England and  
8.   I said (.) don't go to Calais for god’s sake (.) 
9.   Host: well Germany is taking is Germany not taking 800,000  
10.   Pat: yeah I think Sweden yeah yeah but it's just (.)                              
11.   Host: incredible figure Sweden has has an incredible figure 




13.   they are hoping the weather will get windy  
14.   so the boats won't be able to arrive to ease the number of  
15.   but you know they keep coming and you know (.) arrive (.) 
 In light of Pat’s extensive sympathetic preamble, it is significant that he 
proceeds to describe an interaction between himself and the asylum seekers, 
declaring how he ‘can’t advise’ the men arriving in Leros on what country they 
should head to (line 4). Reportedly they explicitly ask him, ‘we speak English can 
we go to your country’ (line 6 – 7), and he avoids telling them that he is Irish and 
not English. He does not recommend that they should attempt to proceed towards 
Ireland or even point to Ireland on the map. On one side of the dilemma sits a 
protracted sympathetic repertoire, whilst on the opposing side is a resignation to the 
‘banal’ unspoken acceptance of the nation’s right to exclude (Billig, 1995). This 
commonsense position needs no explanation and the sympathetic repertoire is 
insufficient to facilitate an explicit call of inclusion.  
 Pat attempts to mobilise sympathy in the audience but struggles to advocate 
inclusion. Instead he performs his encounter with the asylum seekers, which makes 
the audience privy to this ‘difficult’ dilemma (line 4), allowing the audience to 
observe the situation for themselves and acknowledge how ‘difficult’ it is (Holt, 
1996). By deploying the inference ‘you know’ (Tree & Schrock, 2002) he evokes a 
shared commonsense understanding. Pat’s affective-discursive repertoire of 
sympathy is readily available and effortlessly deployed but citing Ireland as a 
possible place of refuge is problematic and off-limits. He engages in ontological 
gerrymandering (Potter, 1996) because the duty of responsibility owed by the Irish 
government, and people, to protect the human rights of the asylum seekers is not 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
129 
 
explicitly addressed. Understandably, it is ‘difficult’ for Pat to openly express a 
position of inclusion to the asylum seekers because they are unlikely to be 
welcomed in Ireland and in suggesting Ireland as a destination, he may expose them 
to the indignities of the Irish ‘Direct Provision’ system. 
 It is also noticeable that Pat’s talk assumes a resigned pragmatic realism and 
is less emotive. His conversation with the asylum seekers is ‘difficult’ not ‘heart-
breaking’. Pat is left with no option but to tell the asylum seekers ‘don’t go to 
Calais’ (line 8) which strategically sidesteps the preceding question, ‘can we go to 
your country’ (line 6 – 7) and places Calais on the map whilst keeping Ireland 
hidden. He appears to have little option than to display ambivalent paternalism by 
cloaking the Calais option in a return to an affective display of sympathetic caring 
‘don't go there for god’s sake’ (Jackman, 1994). 
 The host takes control of the direction of the conversation and further avoids 
the contentious issue of offering Ireland as a site of sanctuary for the refugees. 
Instead he steers Pat in a search for alternative countries of refuge, whilst keeping 
Ireland hidden – ‘Germany is taking is Germany not taking 800,000’ (line 9). 
Initially, Pat also takes up this search for alternatives and presents Sweden as a 
second possibility (line 10). But at the end of line 10, Pat attempts to change tack 
and commences to return the orientation back to the central concern of the refugees 
continuing to arrive on the shores of Europe – ‘but it's just’ (line 10). The host cuts 
across Pat, maintaining the focus on alternative countries of refuge – ‘incredible 
figure Sweden has has an incredible figure’ (line 11). This orientation to the 
‘incredible’ number of refugees taken in by Sweden, or referring back to the 
800,000 taken in by Germany (line 9), appears to frame this policy response as 




unacceptable. Similar, to the previous speakers, Mary (extract 6) and Anne (extract 
7), the host’s repertoire is implicitly accepting that refugees are a problematic 
burden, which can only be managed in limited numbers and 800,000 would be an 
‘incredible’ number to take in.  
 Pat retakes control of the direction of the interaction and completes the 
declaration that he initiated in line 10, with the refugees ‘you know they keep 
arriving’ (line 12). He is orienting to the intake of refugees by Germany and Sweden 
as being insufficient, which is evidenced by the refugees continuing to arrive and is 
potentially covertly implying to the audience that Ireland needs to offer more. 
However, Pat appears to concede that he will not find a country for the refugees and 
is resigned to the best outcome being a change in the weather; ‘they are hoping the 
weather will get windy so the boats won't be able to arrive to ease the number’ (line 
13 – 14). He potentially uses an ambiguous ‘they’ (line 13) to put this desire beyond 
himself. The change in weather is not something he personally hopes for. But his 
repertoire accepts that the crucial problem is to ‘ease’ the number of refugees (line 
14) because finding a willing country of refuge is ‘difficult’ (line 4). And at no point 
does he explicitly suggest his own country, Ireland, could be the country of refuge. 
This concern of the number of refugees to be offered sanctuary, highlights that, 
although these advocates, in this context, effortlessly access a repertoire describing 
their emotional distress and sympathy towards the plight of the refugees, they also 
avoid countering the taken-for-granted argument that refugees are a problematic 
burden. Pat is resigned to outline to the audience the reality as he sees it; ‘you know 
they keep coming and you know (.) arrive (.)’ (line 15). 
 This rhetorical scenario exposes an affective-discursive constraint placed 
upon Pat due to the taken-for-granted restrictive immigration policy. Potentially, 
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Pat could take up a repertoire requesting the Irish nation to accommodate more 
refugees if he felt this might be an acceptable position and a strategic mobilising 
repertoire. Instead he acknowledges the ideological dilemma and implicitly accepts 
the notion that refugees are a taken-for-granted threat to the nation, leaving him 
with little option, but to describe how others hope for bad weather to stop the arrival 
of refugees. However, he describes the central dilemma that he potentially hopes 
the Irish listeners will recognise and attempt to confront. His repertoire implicitly 
acknowledges that the refugees need more than cheese sandwiches and water. They 
need somewhere to go and rebuild their lives. But, on the other hand, his affective-
discursive repertoire is constrained by the assumed threat to the national community 
and taken-for-granted assumption that refugees are a burden.  
 In this regard, it is worth exploring one final example of the few advocates 
on behalf of refugees, in this context, that addressed the politically contentious issue 
of how the refugees should be accommodated. As described previously William 
forms an affective-discursive alliance with Pat and extends the mobilisation of 
sympathy (Extract 5). William then goes on to address the political issue of potential 
refuge in Ireland but constructing a position of inclusive political solidarity as 
problematic. To convey his sensitive political repertoire, he avoids making direct 
demands on the audience and is ambiguous about where the asylum seekers should 
find refuge (extract 9). 
3.4.2.3 Extract 9: William 21/08/2015 
1. William: where the refugees are coming in but they can’t stay there (.)  
2.     they are going to have to move you know  




4.     and it it’s incumbent upon all of us to make large gestures at this stage  
5.     uhm I would certainly be very happy if there was if if there you know  
6.     if our government could extend what they are doing  
7.     in terms of bringing in refugees (.) 
 William initiates the argument by pointing out that the asylum seekers ‘can’t 
stay’ where they are (extract 9 line 1). The repertoire then becomes ambiguous 
when he states that these people ‘are going to have to move you know west and 
west and west throughout Europe’ (line 2 – 3), which can only be assumed to mean 
the asylum seekers are likely to reach Europe’s most westerly point, Ireland. He 
then places a demand upon the audience, ‘it’s incumbent upon all of us to make 
large gestures’ (line 4). It is ambiguous what he means by ‘large gestures’ and at 
this point who he specifically means by ‘us’. He then makes a number of false starts, 
indicating the talk is approaching a sensitive matter, ‘if there was if if there you 
know if our’ (line 5). Finally, he arrives at making a tentative statement of inclusion 
but he tactically shifts footing (Potter, 1996) away from ‘us’ to ‘I’ (line 5) in order 
to express his individual request to ‘our government’ (line 6). Although he initially 
states, ‘it’s incumbent upon all of us’ (line 4), he then carefully avoids provoking 
the collective and presuming that the audience will join him in his lone request to 
‘our government’. William is cautious not to alienate the audience who may 
position themselves in opposition to him (Durrheim et al., 2016).  
 William’s tentative suggestion ‘if our government could extend what they 
are doing’ (line 6) is literally a proposal and hardly a call of inclusive political 
solidarity. It is what they ‘could do’ and not what it they ‘should do’. It is not framed 
as a moral, legal or justice obligation rooted in international human rights 
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legislation. Premised on making him ‘happy,’ it is merely a suggestion to ‘extend’ 
present policy not to change it.  
 The insertion of the referent ‘our’ before ‘government’ provides ‘banal’ 
clarification for the audience that William is indeed talking about the Irish 
government. But in this instance national belonging is being contested (Durrheim 
et al., 2016) and nationalism has moved from ‘banal’ to ‘hot’ (Billig, 1995, p. 139). 
Interestingly William’s talk is in stark contrast to that used by anti-asylum 
politicians in Australia who repeatedly and boldly restate the country’s title, 
‘Australian soil, Australia’s treatment, Australia’s right, Australia’s resolve, etc.’ 
(O'Doherty & Augoustinos, 2008). Notably all of the speakers are seen to be 
tentative about naming Ireland as a place of refuge. 
 William’s restrained rhetoric constructing a political argument is distinct 
from his sympathy-raising rhetoric (Extract 5), were he made extensive use of 
‘you’, pointing an accusatory finger at the audience compelling them to join his and 
Pat’s sympathetic alliance or be accused of ‘abnormal’ inhumanity. The ease of 
expression shows that this sympathetic affective-discursive repertoire is a 
recognisable commonsense response to the ‘refugee crisis,’ flowing easily from 
those who have the privilege feel it. In contrast, suggesting that the government 
should change its policy is problematic and off limits. The cautious rhetorical 
strategy exposed here, indicates that unconditional inclusive political solidarity is 
problematic for these speakers in this context.  
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Recognisable emotional talk is effortlessly deployed in an attempt to mobilise 




constructed as normal, commonsense understandings of how people should respond 
and are entangled with more problematic attempts at inclusive political solidarity 
(Subasić et al., 2008). Pat provides protracted detail about his emotional distress 
before tentatively presenting an ideological dilemma of where the asylum seekers 
should go. William shifts from the accusatory ‘you’ when he is mobilizing 
sympathy to a humble ‘I’ when he presents a weak call for inclusion. Mary evokes 
an emotive national occasion and implores the collective ‘we,’ to provide ‘help’, 
but puts strict restrictions on her call for action.  
 The speakers draw on affective-discursive repertoires of caring and concern 
to choreograph their identity performance that tentatively contests the norms 
defining national exclusion (Durrheim et al., 2016). But evidently sympathetic 
repertoires have limited power to facilitate explicit, unambiguous and unconditional 
inclusive political solidarity. In Pat’s words the situation is ‘difficult,’ which 
renders him relatively silent on the appropriate response from his own nation. 
William’s repertoire is ambiguous about where the people should seek refuge and 
he suggests that the Irish government ‘could extend’ present policy and not change 
it. Both Pat and William avoid making direct inclusive political solidarity demands 
on the audience. After pictures of Aylan Kurdi’s drowned body were released, 
political statements that advocated an increased refuge provision in Ireland were 
more prevalent, but even then, calls were bounded and conditional, limited to ‘help’ 
rather than inclusion.  
 Callers cautiously endeavoured to mobilize inclusive political solidarity 
amongst their fellow citizens (Subasić et al., 2008) and to construct a case for 
‘helping.’ However, this analysis shows that while it is easy to deploy affective talk 
to achieve consensus about human tragedy, it is much more difficult to capitalize 
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on that discursively shared affect to call for specific action. Speakers engaged in a 
delicate identity performance that used sympathy to contest normative 
understandings of national belonging. However, exclusion is integral to nationalist 
rhetoric and as long as it can be constructed as non-prejudicial exclusion is espoused 
with ease (Durrheim et al., 2016; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011). In this public context, 
unanimous and powerful sympathy was simply not enough to dispute the 
assumption that the state has the moral right to exclude (Billig, 1995). 
 Speakers utilise recognisable social practice expressing sympathy, caring 
and concern (Wetherell, 2012a), but its effectiveness is undermined by the 
sacrosanct patchwork of bounded nation-states and commonsense migration 
regimes. The identity performance occupies a persuasive middle-ground which 
tentatively advances the inclusive political solidarity agenda. But the hostile 
affective-discursive environment enforces an ambivalent paternalistic constraint on 
sympathetic repertoires, which undermines potency for political change and merely 
reproduces a recognisable discomfort that cloaks power and privilege. These 
findings add support to the notion that liberal humanitarian ideologies are 
potentially limited in their persuasiveness for those advocating on behalf of asylum 





THE TRANSNATIONAL PATRIOT: CELEBRATING CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY BETWEEN NATION-STATES WHILE PROMOTING 
HOSTILITY TOWARDS DIVERSITY WITHIN NATION-STATES.  
 
This chapter is an expanded version of the published article:  
Nightingale, A., Muldoon, O., & Quayle, M. (2020). The Transnational Patriot: 
Celebrating Cultural Diversity Between Nation-states while Promoting Hostility 
towards Diversity within Nation-states. European Psychologist, 
https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000416 
4.1 ABSTRACT 
This article explores how the populist radical right manage identity talk on an 
international stage. Speeches from the Europe of Nations and Freedom conference 
held in Koblenz, Germany, on the January 21, 2017, were analysed using a 
rhetorical and critical discursive psychology approach. This occasion was a 
celebratory public display of international solidarity between political actors who 
privilege national interests, advocate stronger immigration control and are 
Eurosceptic. Results highlight two interdependent rhetorical strategies that 
construct an inclusive diverse transnational political community, built on the core 
shared ideology of exclusionary nationalist nativism. Firstly, ‘Constructing the 
Transnational Patriot’ works up a superordinate political category often labelled the 
“patriots” that transcends individual nation-states. Temporal and spatial boundary 
work was done to construct the political collective as extensive, expanding and 
enduring. This capacity for the speakers to position themselves as prototypical 
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members of a transnational political community, facilitates and demands the second 
rhetorical strategy, “Ambivalent Diversity”. Here speakers acknowledge and 
celebrate the cultural diversity of their political collective through a precious 
‘national diversity’ between nation-states whilst simultaneously displaying hostility 
to cultural diversity within nation-states. Speakers present themselves, and their 
political collective, as courageous protectors of the segregated national diversity 
against the threatening collusion between the violent oppressive political “elite” and 
exploitative immigrants. The speakers hijack the liberal understanding of diversity 
and reconfigure it in support of an argument defending the victimised majority and 
national cultural homogeneity.  
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
A wealth of psychological research has explored the discourse of populist radical 
right politicians aimed at mobilizing the citizens of their home nation-state (e.g. 
Mols & Jetten, 2014, 2016). But little attention has been paid to the capacity of the 
populist radical right to mobilize a political collective at a transnational level, whilst 
paradoxically advancing their core ideology of inward-looking nationalist nativism. 
Hence, this article explores the populist radical right’s presentation of transnational 
solidarity on an international stage through the analysis of speeches from a historic 
international conference held by the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF, 
2017) in Koblenz, Germany on the 21st January 2017. This event was attended by 
eleven leading populist radical right members of the European parliament, offering 
rare insight into a public display of transnational collaboration and discourse aimed 
at an international audience. Furthermore, at the time of this conference, several 




the UK voting on June 23, 2016 to leave the EU and Donald Trump’s victory in the 
US elections on November 9, 2016. We were particularly interested in the 
discursive identity work done, in an attempt to mobilise a transnational collective 
and how this was managed alongside the contradictory core ideology of nationalist 
nativism. 
4.2.1 The Populist Radical Right Mobilise the Political Collective through an 
Exclusionary Ideology.  
In the 1970’s the French National Front, the largest membership of the ENF Group, 
rebranded their political image through an ideological shift from ‘biological racism’ 
to ‘cultural racism’, which Rydgren (2005) refers to as the ‘new master frame’. 
After electoral success in 1984 other populist radical right parties emulated the ‘new 
master frame’ through a process of ‘cross-national diffusion’. This transnational 
rebranding can also be recognised through the ideological shift away from racial 
superiority to ethno-pluralism, which advocates the preservation of 
incommensurable pure homogenous national cultures that require being kept 
separate through restrictions on immigration and rejection of supranational 
institutions, such as the European Union (Bastow, 2002; Rydgren, 2007; 
Spektorowski, 2000, 2003).  
 Hence, the populist discourse of the radical right presents them as 
possessing the political will to protect the interests of the majority homogenous 
‘people’ against culturally diverse immigrants, political ‘elites’ and supporters of 
multiculturalism (Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Sakki et al., 2017; Sakki & 
Pettersson, 2016; Wodak, 2013). Multiculturalism is constructed as a failed 
ideology (Mols & Jetten, 2014) that victimises the ‘ordinary hard-working 
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taxpayers’ (Mols & Jetten, 2016) and is imposed upon the indigenous citizens (Bull 
& Simon-Vandenbergen, 2014). Ethno-pluralism is a xenophobic discursive 
strategy that justifies the exclusion of Muslims from European nation-states (Kutay, 
2015). Crucially, national economic concerns tend not to be at the core of the 
populist radical right manifesto, but the primary anxiety is the threat to the national 
community from cultural diversity (Golder, 2016; Jay, Batruch, Jetten, McGarty, & 
Muldoon, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2016). 
 However, Sakki and Pettersson (2016) highlight the populist radical right’s 
construction of an enemy ‘other’ is not unique to Swedish and Finish discourse but 
is a ‘transnational’ phenomenon. Caiani (2018) also notes that the populist radical 
right is increasingly engaged in international networking and events. And they 
efficiently mobilise a transnational collective, based on a shared ethno-nationalist 
ideology, by employing social media to disseminate cartoons that humiliate 
immigrants and refugees (Doerr, 2017). Nevertheless, others dispute the radical 
right’s ability to convincingly perform transnational populism, because their 
concept of the ‘people’ is dependent on the nation (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; 
Moffitt, 2017). Hence, an examination is warranted into the discursive and 
rhetorical identity work being undertaken to potentially achieve transnational 
mobilisation of the populist radical right using a new sanitized political image. 
4.2.2 Politicians Construct an Inclusive Identity to Mobilise and Expand their 
Political Constituency 
Previous research indicates that social categories are not predetermined concrete 
phenomena drawn from the contextual backdrop to simply inform political debate. 




strategic construction of boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Elcheroth & Reicher, 
2017, p. 91). Social categories define who belongs and, importantly, what values, 
norms and beliefs are significant to the members. Hence, social categories are a 
means to mobilise a political collective through the production of a shared social 
reality that informs how people can act within the world. They construct, 
consolidate and reaffirm, shared understandings and representations of the social, 
political an historical context. 
 Effective political speakers mobilise support through identity performance 
as entrepreneurs of identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The skilful leader will 
present themselves as a prototypical member of an overarching common ingroup 
that draws together a diverse constituency. To extend the reach of their constituency 
they will proclaim their political project to be inclusive and reflecting the norms, 
values and interests of all the members of the common identity category. Political 
speakers tend to construct the ingroup as all-encompassing and extensive, whilst 
the outgroup is presented as a diminished minority. For example, Barack Obama 
presented himself as the embodiment of a diverse America (Augoustinos & De 
Garis, 2012). Whilst speakers on the political margins, unable to point to a cohesive 
overarching ingroup in the present, may orient to an aspirational common identity 
located in the future (Condor et al., 2013). 
 Often political actors will invoke the national category and present 
themselves as prototypical citizens, because it appeals to the entire electorate 
(Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2017b). Politicians construct 
a version of the national character that aligns with their political project (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001). However, political actors can also seek legitimization beyond the 
nation-state by presenting their political position as representing the whole world 
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and being universally beneficial to all (Billig, 1995, p. 171; Haslam et al., 2010, p. 
157). In a globalised world the presentation of a global political identity is 
increasingly important (Gleibs & Reddy, 2017) and the notion of ‘cross-national 
diffusion’ (Rydgren, 2005) potentially indicates that a global identity is also 
important to the populist radical right. However, the identity work – and hence the 
construction of a shared representation of the social world – that underpins the 
internationally expanding populist radical right has received little exploration. To 
date, research has focused on the populist radical right’s construction of national 
categories, and their rejection of cultural diversity. The paradox of constructing an 
inclusive transnational political collective based on the core ideology of 




Videos of the eleven speakers at the Koblenz, ENF conference, January 21, 2017, 
were retrieved from online sources providing 140 minutes 48 seconds of transcribed 
speeches (see Table 4.1 Data Details). We utilised publicly available English 
translations where speakers used languages other than English, because this 
captures the international online presence of the conference and the multilingual 
nature of the conference itself. Where footage was provided with subtitles, we 
privileged these over impromptu spoken translations, with the rationale that the 
translator producing subtitles after the event had the benefit of knowing the full 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.1 Data Details 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
143 
 
4.3.2 Analytic Framework 
We employed a discursive psychology framework, because it considers discourse, 
not to be a mere conveyer of information, but a collaborative social act that 
constructs social reality, mobilises social categories and hence, explores the action 
orientation of discourse (D. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
This approach differs from other discourse analysis, because it focuses on 
fundamental psychological phenomena such as the social categorisation of the self 
and others, but it avoids making assumptions about the speaker’s inaccessible 
internal world by attending to what is being accomplished through the discourse 
(Augoustinos & Tileagă, 2012; McNamara, Stevenson, & Muldoon, 2013; 
Stevenson & Muldoon, 2010). Furthermore, discursive psychology is strongly 
influenced by conversation analysis, and hence, employs systematic and fine-
grained analysis of talk and text to show how people construct, debate, and contest 
shared understandings of the social world (Augoustinos & Tileagă, 2012). 
 Additionally, we took a critical perspective, which entails highlighting the 
hegemonic discourses that maintain inequitable power relations between social 
groups (Nightingale, Quayle, & Muldoon, 2017; Wetherell, 1998). Hence, 
particular attention is given to social category work done through the discourse, the 
drawing of boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and defining the values, beliefs and 
norms that are important to ‘us’ (O'Donnell et al., 2016). We also drew on rhetorical 
psychology (Billig, 1987), which explores the argumentative strategies employed 
by speakers to counter and delegitimise the opposing position through the 






The analysis involved five interconnected iterative phases. Firstly, the videos where 
watched and transcribed whilst making notes about, wide ranging interpretations of 
what was said by the speakers, general points of interest, broad observations of 
speaker’s actions and audience responses, the general visual affective scene and 
dramatic ordering of the event. For example, notes were taking regarding the staged 
opening of the conference that employed rousing music accompanied by a 
sophisticated light show. The dramatic entrance parade for the speakers escorted by 
national flag wavers. The chants and placards waved by the audience and a closing 
display of solidarity with all speakers sharing the stage for a flower presentation.  
 Second, the transcripts where read and re-read with regular returns to the 
videos, immersing the analyst within the data, whilst adding further notes, memos 
and wider ideas. For example, highlighting mobilisations of a positive political 
collective through appeals to rational arguments. Also, at this juncture, in order to 
contextualise the data, the analysist explored the cross disciplinary literature, 
concerning the rise and credentials of the populist radical right. The analyst also 
examined the media pertaining to the conference and relevant online information 
about the individual speakers, the parties they represented and the ENF group.  
 Third, the data was probed, exploring the action orientation of the discourse. 
Broad overlapping codes were allocated to the data, using NVIVO software, 
focusing on what is being accomplished through the discourse in terms of 
“justifications and blaming” (Potter, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 55). 
Specifically, repertoires were coded that speakers employed to attributed blame for 
present social and political problems. And justifications that supported these 
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blaming accusations were also coded. For example, immigration, refugees, and 
Islam leads to insecurity, social disruption, lower standard of living and cultural 
dilution. And the EU elite was presented as being complicit in encouraging 
immigration, undermining democratic sovereignty and a threat to cultural diversity.  
 Fourth, the analyst stepped back from the data taking an overview 
perspective and examined the data for recurring patterns and commonalities across 
speakers (Taylor, 2001). Hence extracts were identified for initial analysis on the 
bases of being exemplars of political identity performance and positioning as an 
entrepreneur of identity in order to mobilise a political collective. Following from 
Reicher and Hopkins (2001), the entrepreneur of identity is seen to 1) construct a 
cohesive superordinate identity category that is inclusive of a diverse audience; 2) 
tie their political agenda to the norms and values prized by the invoked identity 
category; 3) position themselves as prototypical of the identity category. Therefore, 
extracts where explored containing discursive repertoires that “hailed” members 
and mobilised, and celebrate, the political collective. For example, extracts were 
highlighted that employed ambiguous category referents, such as first-person plural 
terms “we” and “us”, to enlist the audience. Also highlighted was the deployment 
of second-person “you”, to call upon the collective membership and the provision 
of category labels to construe an imagined political community. Notes were also 
made of the orientations to spatial and temporal boundary markers of the political 
collective. Specifically, celebration of boundary expansion and solidarity of the 
collective and the use of affective affiliations to construct an intimate alliance 
between members where highlighted.  
 Fifth, the analysist returned to the data to explore ambivalent rhetorical 




liberal commonplaces (Billig et al., 1988; Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 177), such 
as diversity, liberty, freedom and equality used to present anti-immigration and anti-
EU arguments. These extracts were analysed in detail taking a critical perspective 
and employing an analysis that explored broad discursive patterns. Discursive 
devices, particularly in relation to persuasion, mobilisation and rationalising 
strategies were also highlighted. The strongest exemplars of speakers’ orientation 
to persuasion and mobilisation of a political collective are presented here as 
extracts. 
4.4 RESULTS 
The analysis exposed two interdependent discursive and rhetorical strategies 
deployed in the construction of a transnational political collective. The first 
strategy, ‘Constructing the Transnational Patriot’, works up a unified superordinate 
identity, which transcends individual nation-states and is often referred to by 
speakers as ‘us patriots’. The spatial and temporal work done constructs the ‘patriot’ 
identity as extensive, expanding and enduring. The ‘patriot’ is presented as an 
aspirational and ambiguously inclusive political identity (Condor et al., 2013). This 
tendency for speakers to position themselves as prototypical members of a 
transnational political collective, the ‘patriots’, requires them to also take up the 
second rhetorical strategy of ‘Ambivalent Diversity’. Here the populist radical right 
speakers who are ordinarily hostile towards cultural diversity within nation-states 
orient to a precious cultural diversity between nation-states. This ambivalent 
position towards cultural diversity enables the populist radical right to construct an 
inclusive diverse transnational political community built on the core shared 
ideology of exclusionary nationalist nativism. 
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4.4.1 Constructing the Transnational Patriot 
A striking aspect of the speeches at the ENF conference was the considerable 
identity work that the speakers dedicated to constructing an inclusionary 
transnational political community and celebrating an expanding membership. The 
construction of this extensive, expanding and enduring political category, often 
referred to as ‘us patriots’, stands in stark contrast to the exclusionary nationalist 
nativism ideology that defines the political identity.  
4.4.1.1 Extract 1. Janice Atkinson 
1 what a great year 2016 was for us patriots (.) Brexit Trump just to name 
a few (.) 
2 the political pendulum in Europe across and across the Atlantic has 
swung 
3 and more is yet to come (.) UK will be leaving the EU  
4 but don’t worry my friends 
5 we are not pulling up the drawbridge we are merely unshackling  
6 ourselves from the unaccountable anti-democratic EU 
 
 Atkinson declares a unifying political community, ‘us patriots’, which she 
positions herself and the audience within, using the first-person plural ‘us’ 
(extract1, line 1). She presents the ‘patriots’ as being an expanding category, an 
aspirational identity (Condor et al., 2013), by declaring their recent transnational 
success, ‘what a great year 2016 was for us patriots’ (line 1). She confirms the 
‘great[ness]’ of the ‘patriots’ political reach by orienting to two concrete 




the UK voting to leave the EU in the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s 
election as US president, extends the ‘patriot’ boundary beyond the immediate 
audience to include supporters of these ‘patriot’ victories. Furthermore, these two 
examples are embedded within an infinite three-part list culminating in ‘just to 
name a few’ (Jefferson, 1990). Hence, the list has not been exhausted but is 
strategically unconstrained. Implying that there are too many undeclared examples 
of the ‘patriots’ expanding international support to mention them all. 
 This expansion of the category boundary of the ‘patriot’ collective is 
reiterated through the metaphor ‘the political pendulum … has swung’ (line 2). 
Atkinson proceeds to claim that the weight of the ‘political pendulum’ is not about 
to commence its return swing as, ‘more is yet to come’ (line 3). The transnational 
political expansion is specifically evident ‘in Europe across and across the Atlantic’ 
(line 2) but this is only the start of the rise of the ‘patriots’ as the political momentum 
moves increasingly in their favour. Where these future victories will occur is 
ambiguously unspecified, ‘just to name a few’ (line 1). The aspirational ‘patriot’ 
identity is constructed as inclusive and the expanding transnational boundary is 
limitless. 
 The UK’s departure from the EU should render the alliance with Euro-
sceptic members of the European Parliament redundant. But Atkinson reassures her 
fellow ‘patriots’, that ‘we’ (line 5) [the British] are committed to an enduring 
transnational ‘patriot’ collective, ‘don’t worry my friends we are not pulling up the 
drawbridge’ (line 4 – 5). This commitment is independent of the EU, which is 
portrayed as an oppressive tyrant, ‘we are merely unshackling ourselves from the 
unaccountable anti-democratic EU’ (line 5 – 6). Atkinson constructs the political 
collective as being an informal alliance of ‘friends’ that will endure her having to 
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leave the EU parliamentary group after Brexit. Even though the European ‘patriots’ 
that she addresses as ‘friends’ (line 4), will no longer be welcome to freely live and 
work in Britain. Atkinson rhetorically manages the tension between constructing an 
inclusive transnational ‘patriot’ identity and the core exclusionary nationalist 
ideology by resorting to a paradoxical claim that ‘we are not pulling up the 
drawbridge’ (line 5). But it is undeclared who or what passes over the metaphoric 
bridge. Presumably it purely serves to maintain ties between members of an 
enduring transnational ‘patriot’ collective. 
 The use of ‘patriot’ to invoke a political community by the populist radical 
right has not been highlighted in previous research, but it appears to be particularly 
useful for producing solidarity between nationalist speakers in this international 
context. Here, Geert Wilders also makes use of the ‘patriot’ identity to construct an 
inclusive and expanding category (Extract 2). 
4.4.1.2 Extract 2: Geert Wilders (Punctuation from subtitles) 
1 There is, however, much positive news. There is reason for hope.  
2 There is light at the end of the tunnel. Better times will come. 
3 The wind started to shift last year. It brought us the victory of 
4 -- and from here, congratulations to -- Donald Trump, 
5 the President of the United States. 
6 But not only in America. We also see it here in Germany, the Netherlands, 
7 France, Italy, Austria, throughout Europe: The patriots are winning.  
8 The time for a change has come. And that is why, my friends, 
9 it gives me tremendous courage to see you all here today. 




11 It shows me that Germany is not lost! 
 
 Wilders orients to the recent victories of the populist radical right, ‘There 
is, however, much positive news’ (Extract 2. line 1). There is reason for hope’ (line 
1). He embeds this positive turn of events in an aspirational repertoire that offers 
‘hope’ (line 1) for the future and now ‘there is light at the end of the tunnel. Better 
times will come’ (line 2). Equivalent to Atkinson’s reference to the swing of a 
‘political pendulum’ (extract 1. line 2) to indicate increased global support, Wilders 
draws on the metaphor, ‘the wind started to shift last year’ (extract 2. Line 3). His 
speech offers an ambiguously inclusive and aspirational political identity (Condor 
et al., 2013), declaring the political change last year ‘brought us the victory’ (line 
3) of ‘Donald Trump’ (line 4). This political ‘victory’ not only occurred in 
‘America’ (line 6), but it is also repeated in political events across a number of 
nation-states, ‘Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Austria, throughout 
Europe: The patriots are winning’ (line 6 – 7).  
 In line 8 Wilders draws on the notion that political change is imminent and 
hence transnational support for the ‘patriot’ political agenda is on the rise, ‘the time 
for a change has come’. He then consolidates the ‘patriot’ identity, ‘that is why, my 
friends, it gives me tremendous courage to see you all here today’ (line 8 – 9), by 
locating himself amongst ‘friends’ (line 8) and ‘German patriots’ (line 10) upon 
whom his position of ‘tremendous courage’ (line 9) is dependent. He is the 
embodiment of ‘courage’ (line 9) bestowed upon him by the ‘room full of’ brave 
‘German patriots’ (line 10) who will fearlessly protect ‘Germany’ from being ‘lost!’ 
(line 11).  
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 The brave ‘patriots’ offers relief from the pervasive darkness, ‘There is light 
at the end of the tunnel. Better times will come’ (line 2). Wilders consolidates and 
mobilises the ‘patriots’ through a victorious battle cry, ‘Germany is not lost!’ (line 
11). He constructs a shared position, characterising the ‘patriots’ as brave 
combatants against the forces of darkness that conspire to bring down the nation-
state (line 3). Their ‘courage’ offers hope (see also Reicher & Haslam, 2017b), an 
end to the long suffered appalling situation. And, more importantly, those in 
opposition to the ‘patriots’ are implicitly depicted as a threat who allow the dreadful 
situation to perpetuate and actively promote ruin.  
4.4.2 Ambivalent Diversity  
4.4.2.1 Extract 3: Frauke Petry 
1 It’s a real paradox we are 
2 the universality that we are offering to these to the immigrants  
3 is something we are denying our own people. 
4 We are not recognising the differences between our European countries  
5 and we are actually serving the masses of immigration  
6 because this was something that was dreamt up by European bureaucrats 
7 and sold to us as diversity. 
8 But what is diversity? This continent has got cultural linguistic 
9 culinary national diversity we have got so many different models 
10 and yet in this world in Europe it is all becoming very similar. 
 
 Petry constructs a clear categorical distinction between them and us – ‘the 




outline a fundamental ‘paradox’ (line 1). A ‘universality’ (line 2) is ‘offered’ by the 
ingroup (‘we,’ line 2) to the ‘other’ (‘the immigrants,’ line 2), which ‘paradoxically’ 
(line 1) is being denied to the ingroup (‘we are denying our own people,’ line 3). 
‘Our own people’ are represented as naively benevolent towards the other, ‘the 
immigrants’ (line 2), because they are potentially becoming culturally 
overwhelmed, ‘serving the masses of immigration’ (line 5), which is resulting in 
‘Europe … becoming very similar’ (line 10).  
 Specifically, this ‘universality’ offered to the other is a ‘diversity’ (line 7), 
which is ‘dreamt up by European bureaucrats’ (line 6). Here the repertoire 
orientates to a liberal understanding of ‘diversity’ embedded in EU institutional 
directives, promoting cultural recognition, free expression, inclusion, acceptance, 
and respect for individual and minority group uniqueness. However, ‘diversity’ 
(line 7), which is institutionally sanctioned by ‘European bureaucrats’ (line 6) to 
protect the rights of individuals and minority groups within the nation-state, is 
presented here as problematic and juxtaposed with ‘recognising the differences 
between our European countries’ (line 4). ‘The immigrants’ (line 2) are explicitly 
distinguished from ‘our own people’ (line 3) and the ‘diversity’ offered to them 
undermines the fundamental concern of ‘our own people’, which is the recognition 
of ‘the differences between our European countries’ (line 4).  
 The liberal understanding of ‘diversity’ deployed in arguments supporting 
‘immigrants’ (line 2) and ‘immigration’ (line 5), is presented as imaginary, ‘dreamt 
up’ (line 6) and a notion that necessitates being ‘sold to us’ (line 7). ‘Our own 
people’ (line 3) are ignorant of the actual (line 5) intent of the false ‘diversity’. The 
appeal to fact through the use of ‘actually’ (line 5), is a rhetorical strategy that 
presents the speaker as objectively impartial and protects them from accusations of 
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prejudiced for what is about to be said, ‘serving the masses of immigration’ (line 5) 
(Augoustinos & Every, 2007; Dixon, 2017).  
 Evidently, the false diversity ‘actually’ co-opts ‘our own people’ into 
servitude (line 5) for the ‘masses of immigration’. ‘Masses’ (line 5) is a common 
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986), presenting the movement of migrants 
as overwhelming and out of control. The rhetoric works up a disturbing ‘actual’ 
truth that opportunistic masses are taking advantage of ‘our own people’s 
misguided benevolence (line 6 – 7) and this is facilitated by the ‘European 
bureaucrats’ (line 6). This notion of ‘diversity’ presents the dominant majority 
culture as the victim (McNeill, Pehrson, & Stevenson, 2017) and the liberal enemy 
within as colluding with the enemy immigrants from outside, which is a common 
rhetorical strategy used by the populist radical right (Kutay, 2015; Reicher & 
Haslam, 2017b).  
 Significantly, Petry proceeds to ask the question ‘what is diversity?’ (line 
8). In answer the true diversity is defined, ‘this continent has got cultural linguistic 
culinary national diversity’ (line 8 – 9). The repertoire celebrates a precious genuine 
‘national diversity’ (line 9), which is in opposition to the ‘dreamt up’ (line 6) 
diversity that requires being ‘sold to us’ (line 7). Evidently, ‘national diversity’ is 
the genuine ‘diversity’, because it is inherent within the ‘the differences between 
our European countries’ (line 4) on this ‘continent’ (line 8), which is constituted 
through different cultural, linguistic and culinary practices (line 8 – 9) of ‘our own 
people’ (line 2) and not ‘the immigrants’ (line 2). The ‘dreamt up’ (line 6) diversity 
that is ‘serving masses of immigration’ (line 5) is a significant threat to the 
cherished ‘national diversity’ (line 9) due to its homogenizing influence, ‘in Europe 




 The notion of ‘diversity’ was not wholly discredited but was taken up as a 
valued commodity and celebrated when it was conceptualised as the ‘differences’ 
between discrete monocultural nation-states. Whilst the liberal understanding of 
‘diversity’ within the nation-state was condemned as imaginary (line 6) and self-
sabotaging. In other words, the argument against immigration was not 
accomplished through simple dismissal of the notion of ‘diversity’, but ‘diversity’ 
was hijacked and reconfigured in support of differences between discrete 
monocultural nation-states (Billig, 1987, p. 270). 
4.4.2.2 Extract 4: Harald Vilimsky 
1 They see that we all respect the character of our continent 
2 more than the other parties. 
3 Our continent has got thousands of years of history and culture 
4 we are a continent of pluralism and diversity. 
5 A continent which has managed to ensure that all cities 
6 – all countries rather – stand friendly to one another. 
7 That we have managed to overcome the wars of the past. 
8 No one no one is now looking jealously at their neighbours  
9 to do something to harm their neighbour quite the opposite. 
 
 In extract 4. Harald Valimsky orients to the fundamental shared principle of 
the populist radical right, ‘we all respect the character of our continent’ (line 1), and 
skilfully positions himself as a superordinate spokesperson transcending national 
boundaries. He proceeds to depict the essentialist character of ‘our continent’ based 
on an inherent cultural heritage reaching back into a distant time, which ‘has got 
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thousands of years of history and culture’ (line 3). Nostalgic repertoires, intended 
to mobilise a national identity based on an imagined shared history and culture, are 
common amongst populist radical right speakers (e.g. Mols & Jetten, 2014; 
Rydgren & van der Meiden, 2019). But here, a transnational position is taken up by 
invoking ‘our continent’ and an inclusive diverse political identity is constructed 
through the first-person plural: ‘we are a continent of pluralism and diversity’ (line 
4). 
 Intriguingly, Vilimsky’s speech heads off the potential argument that this 
cultural diversity between nation-states is a potential threat to security (line 6 – 9). 
He claims that Europe has managed to overcome its violent past and a nationalist 
ideology is not problematic. The present peaceful relationship between European 
nations is accentuated by presenting the nation-state as a person (Lakoff & Chilton, 
1995; Stenvall, 2018), ‘all countries – rather stand friendly to one another’ (line 6). 
They are relaxed informal ‘friends’ and ‘neighbours’ (line 8 & 9) who no longer 
experience violent ‘jealousy’ (line 8) desiring to inflict ‘harm’ (line 9). This 
harmonious informal relationship metaphorically presents nations as cordial friends 
in a ‘diverse’ neighbourhood and plays down the institutional necessity of the EU 
to maintain peace.   
4.4.2.3 Extract 5: Marine Le Pen 
1 From then on, from the moment when we abandon the prison 
2 of the European Union, we will see the rebirth of the diversity 
3 of European cultures and the nations that compose it. 
4 This diversity isn’t synonymous with war, contrary to what years 




6 War, on the contrary, is this Union in lock-step. 
7 War is those disconnected elites who are calling for arming 
8 against Mr. Trump or Mr. Putin!(.9) (audience clapping) 
9 A different people isn’t an enemy people. A different people  
10 is one with which I am going to build a relationship. 
 
 In extract 5 Marine Le Pen’s speech also works up an ambivalent notion of 
diversity. She takes up a leadership position, through the first-person plural ‘we’, 
commanding the audience to follow her to ‘abandon the prison of the European 
Union’ (extract 5. line 1 – 2). The rhetoric positions the ‘European Union’ as a 
serious threat to liberty by portraying it to be the most oppressive of disciplinary 
institutions. This is alarmingly threatening, but paradoxically the ‘European Union’ 
is also presented as an ineffectual ‘prison’ that can be effortlessly ‘abandon[ed]’ 
(line 1). For the prison to be abandoned with such ease, potentially ‘we’ (line 1) are 
both inmates and jailors, and the ‘prison’ is of our own making. 
Importantly, on leaving the European Union, ‘we will see the rebirth of the 
diversity of European cultures and the nations that compose it’ (line 3). The 
disciplinary European Union is an oppressor supressing the valued cultural 
diversity between nations. The rhetoric emphasises the urgency of the appeal 
through the repetition of short phrases, ‘from then on, from the moment when’ (line 
1) and presents the ‘rebirth of the diversity’ (line 3) as being singularly contingent 
on leaving the EU ‘prison’. The freedom gained by release from ‘the prison of the 
European Union’ is the freedom to defend the monocultures of individual European 
nations (Rydgren, 2007). Le Pen uses the first-person plural, ‘we’ (line 1 & 2) to 
work up a shared identity with the immediate audience attending the conference 
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and also the extensive audience beyond (Billig et al., 1988; Reicher & Hopkins, 
1996). In this international context ‘we’ (line 1 & 2) extends beyond the speaker’s 
individual nation-state, in an attempt to build political solidarity amongst all 
Europeans who are imprisoned by the ‘European Union’ (line 1 – 2). 
Evidently the ‘rebirth of the diversity’, constituted by discrete bounded 
homogenous national cultures, does not pose a threat to security, (line 4 – 5). On 
the contrary, the speech declares it will enable a renewed peace (line 9 – 10) and 
counters the argument that the EU has facilitated the longest period of peace within 
Europe. It dismisses the troubled legacy of European nationalism – ‘This diversity 
isn’t synonymous with war contrary to what years of ideology wanted to make us 
believe’ (line 4 – 5). Although Europe’s turbulent, violent and at times genocidal 
history indicates the opposite, the speech reassures the audience that a diversity 
between nations does not facilitate antagonistic division and is not a potential 
ingredient for violent conflict (line 4 – 5).  
Conversely, the project of a ‘union’ between European states, which 
marches forward in a ‘lock-step’ of compliant conformity, is explicitly declared to 
be a state of ‘war’ (line 6 – 7). The ‘war’ is between the EU institution and 
individual member states, which are locked into the prison (line 1). The ‘war’ is 
also caused by the ‘disconnected elites’ (line 7) who advocate, ‘arming against Mr. 
Trump or Mr. Putin!’ (line 6 – 7). The expressed security concern and transnational 
political alliance does not only have a Western reach, but it also extends east to ‘Mr 
Putin’ and Russia (line 7). A common populist rhetorical strategy is deployed that 
defends the victimised righteous pure people in opposition to a corrupt ‘elite,’ who 




Crucially, Le Pen proceeds to position herself as a diplomatic peacemaker 
as she explains that, ‘a different people isn’t an enemy people. A different people 
is one with which I am going to build a relationship’ (line 9 – 10). The talk clearly 
embraces diversity, declaring that she will not be hostile to people who are different, 
she will not make them her ‘enemy’, but on the contrary, she will reach out to them 
and ‘build a relationship’ (line 9 – 10).  
4.5 DISCUSSION 
Our analysis shows that the populist radical right speakers, in this public 
international context, position themselves as prototypical members of a 
transnational culturally diverse political collective, which is extensive, expanding 
and enduring. Similar to centre ground politicians the populist radical right, 
construct an aspirational (Condor et al., 2013), inclusive (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) 
and diverse (Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012) political identity, which is often 
referred to as ‘us patriots’. A unified political collective of victorious ‘patriots’ is 
constructed and mobilised, which transcends individual nation-states. The ‘patriot’ 
collective is often presented as limitless and ambiguously inclusive. The speakers 
draw on powerful metaphors to emphasise their extensive and expanding political 
support and orient to an enduring solidarity that is independent of the EU. The 
audience is to understand that ‘Patriots’ reside everywhere, and new support may 
well surface anywhere.  
 The superordinate transnational positioning of the speakers compels them 
to take up a discursive strategy of ambivalent diversity that acknowledges and 
celebrates their diverse political collective. In contrast to previous research 
highlighting the populist radical right’s hostility towards cultural diversity (for 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
159 
 
example Mols & Jetten, 2014; Mols & Jetten, 2016), here they orient to a valued 
notion of national diversity, the difference between national cultures. This 
repertoire of ambivalent diversity accomplishes two matters. One, it dexterously 
manages the ambivalent tension between the core political doctrine of exclusionary 
nationalism versus the mobilisation of an inclusive diverse political community that 
transcends the nation-state. Two, it takes up the valued liberal notion of ‘diversity’ 
and reconceptualises it in favour of exclusionary arguments (Billig, 1987). Whilst 
the liberal opposition are constructed as a disreputable and a diminished marginal 
group that nobody would wish to be a member of (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).  
 The populist radical right’s new sanitised ideology of ethno-pluralism is an 
effective means to distance themselves from their past tainted ideology of biological 
racism whilst maintaining an exclusionary xenophobic agenda (see Bastow, 2002; 
Kutay, 2015; Rydgren, 2007; Spektorowski, 2000, 2003). We expand on this, by 
highlighting how the ideology of ethno-pluralism affords a repertoire of 
‘ambivalent diversity’ that constructs and mobilises an inclusive transnational 
diverse collective, often labelled the ‘us patriots’. We note that De Cleen and 
Stavrakakis (2017) question the ability of the radical right to convincingly construct 
a populist transnational ‘people’ due to the ambivalent tension with their core 
exclusionary doctrine of nationalist nativism. However, it can be argued that this 
ambivalent tension between the particular (the exclusionary nation-state) and the 
universal (a world made up of nation-states), which is fundamental to nationalism 
(Billig, 1995, p. 87) may actually facilitate the construction of a transnational 
‘people’ and render the ideology of ethno-pluralism universally acceptable. 
Nationalism accomplishes this contradiction, between exclusion and inclusion, 




nation-state to be imagined, it has to be imagined within a universal world made up 
of nation-states. The discourse of nationalism is hegemonic as all ‘people’ belong 
to a particular nation-state, at least in theory, and the world of nations is construed 
as natural and taken-for-granted, making the construction of a transnational 
‘people’ unproblematic.  
 Additionally, ambivalent diversity is a rhetorical strategy that presents the 
argument as balanced and rational by embracing the valued commodity of cultural 
diversity. Speakers undermine the liberal interpretation of ‘diversity’, used in 
arguments defending minority rights and celebrating multicultural societies 
(Spektorowski, 2000, 2003), by turning it back on itself through the construction of 
an argument in defence of the victimised majority and national cultural 
homogeneity. Evidently the speakers are not advocating multiculturalism, where 
individuals and minority groups of different cultures within the nation-state are 
afforded equal status (Pehrson, Stevenson, Muldoon, & Reicher, 2014). Quite the 
opposite, cultural diversity is to be protected through, the denial of minority and 
individual rights, restricted movement across national borders and rejection of 
supranational political institutions, such as the European Union. This taking up of 
fundamental elements of the opposing argument and reversing its normative liberal 
understanding is an effective rhetorical strategy (Billig, 1987, p. 270). Previous 
discursive psychology research has noted similar ambivalent reversal of liberal 
values such as equality, justice and rights, to legitimise racial hostility and reject 
affirmative action policy (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 198). Importantly, 
‘diversity’ is not ineptly dismissed, but is skilfully redirected, because it is a 
prevalent cherished value that calls up a broad ‘collective commitment’ to the 
ideological position being presented (McGee, 1980).  
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 Significantly, the speeches celebrate the notion of ‘national diversity’ 
between nation-states, based on valued cultural characteristics that have historic 
continuity. This provides supporting evidence that the ideology of ethno-pluralism 
acts as the foundation for nostalgic discourses celebrating a past golden age of 
discrete monocultural nations (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019). National diversity is 
also akin to harmonious neighbours, compassionate friendships, respectful 
relationship building and ultimately security. Conversely, diversity within nation-
states, due to immigration, was depicted as false, dangerous and having an 
overwhelming homogenising effect, which is harmful to the valued national 
diversity. The ‘patriots’ position themselves as prototypical members of the 
political collective who singularly have the courage to defend the true idyllic 
national diversity, and the victimised majority, against a dishonest, violent and 
oppressive political ‘elite’ that conspire with the exploitive immigrants (Haslam et 
al., 2010). The discourse is reminiscent of Donald Trump’s identity work on the 
campaign trail, offering ‘hope’ to the American people in dark times (Reicher & 
Haslam, 2017b). The speeches consolidate political solidarity through mobilising 
battle cries of collective courage. The reconfiguring of diversity unites and 
mobilises the transnational ‘patriot’ collective by declaring that dominant majority 
national cultures to be the true victims (also see McNeill et al., 2017; Rooyackers 
& Verkuyten, 2012).  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Paradoxically, the globalised interdependent world that the populist radical right is 
hostile towards, potentially compels them to position themselves as global actors 




competent political contenders within the contemporary global environment, their 
ideological position requires the appearance of widespread international support 
and legitimacy. This necessitates the populist radical right leaders to position 
themselves at a superordinate level and mobilise an inclusive diverse transnational 
political collective – us patriots – based on their core ideology of exclusionary 
nationalist nativism. Future research needs to extend this by paying increased 
attention to the transnational identity work done by the populist radical right to 
disseminate their exclusionary ideology and explore how grassroot supporters are 
engaging with this transnational mobilisation. 
 This article reveals the discursive identity work done to facilitate the ‘cross 
national diffusion’ of the populist radical right’s rebranded political identity, the 
‘new master frame’ (Rydgren, 2005). This shift of the core ideology from biological 
racism to cultural racism and ethno-pluralism, not only sanitises the political image 
of the populist radical right but enables the transnational dissemination of the 
exclusionary ideology through the new capacity to construct and mobilise an 
inclusive diverse transnational identity. The populist radical right is no longer 
dependent on a notion of racial superiority, because the ideology of ethno-pluralism 
presents all ethnic cultures as equal but incommensurable and incompatible 
(Rydgren, 2007). Hence, these speakers, in this international context, can be seen 
to efficiently take up a position of transnational populism that speaks to a universal 
‘people’ (cf. De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Moffitt, 2017). The rhetorical strategy 
of ambivalent diversity hijacks the liberal understanding of diversity and redirects 
it in support of anti-immigrant and Euroscepticism by presenting minority diversity 
within nation-states, and the European Union, as intrinsic threats to the cherished 
national diversity between states.  




TORN BETWEEN CONFLICTING NATIONAL INTERESTS: 
COMPETING AND CONFLICTING IDENTITY THREAT DISCOURSES 




This study explores if people’s exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive 
frameworks of identity threat discourses will pattern the shared construction of an 
immigrant group – specifically the potential ambivalent stereotyping of refugees. 
Previous research has tended to ignore the interaction between competing and 
conflicting identity threat discourses by focusing on people’s response to singular 
identity threats that impact either positively or negatively on people’s construction 
of an outgroup (Potter, 1998). For example, symbolic and realistic threat discourses 
tend to increase hostile descriptions and accounts of immigrant groups (Stephan et 
al., 1999). Whilst group image threat discourse tends to reduce hostile description 
and accounts of outgroups (Group Image Threat; Branscombe et al., 1999, p. 49; 
Knowles et al., 2014; Shuman et al., 2018).  
 But these examinations of singular threatening discourses do not reflect real 
world context as they disregard how people manage and interpret the interaction 
between multiple competing and conflicting threat discourses produced by the 
media, political actors, and within everyday social interaction (van Harreveld, 
Nohlen, & Schneider, 2015). The intention of this experiment is not to inspect the 




regularities within shared discourses drawn upon, and expressed, to construct a 
stereotypical notion of refugees within certain discursive contexts – interpretive 
frameworks. Discourses that construct refugees in terms of their threat to their 
national group – the interpretive framework – potentially patterns shared 
constructions of stereotypical refugees. The notion of a stereotypical refugee is a 
socially shared construct, but it is not a fix construct that people carry from one 
situation to another, it is situated with the discursive context. Hence, this study 
explores discursive regularities, the patterning of constructions of stereotypical 
refugees by discourses describing the threat to the nation from that are prevalent 
within the overarching discursive context. In other words, the intention here is to 
be a closer mirror of the social context (Tajfel, 1972), and the cacophony of identity 
threat discourse, than what has been done in previous work on focusing on one side 
of the argument.  
 Also, people’s position on matters of importance are not necessarily unitary, 
fixed, internal objects that they carry from one situation to another. But people are 
better understood to be fluid, context dependent and draw upon ambivalent 
discourses within contentious political debate (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell 
& Potter, 1992, p. 194). People’s evaluation practices within contentious political 
debates are often ambiguous and contain contradictory themes (Billig et al., 1988; 
Potter, 1998). Furthermore, how people manage and interpret their social and 
political world is dependent on shared and collectively produced knowledge and 
discourse (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011). People’s representations of the 
social and political world, and stereotyping of social groups, are a form of meta-
knowledge that is an evaluation of how others think (Goncalves-Portelinha, 
Staerkle, & Elcheroth, 2017). Importantly, this experiment explores how competing 
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and conflicting identity threat discourses, patterns and constrains people’s shared 
evaluations of refugees. This experiment attempts to be a ‘simulation of a truncated 
part of social reality’ (Tajfel, 1972) that explores the social regularities in people’s 
responses to interpretive discursive frameworks, which closely mirror the real-
world context of contentious political debate made up of competing and conflicting 
argument positions.  
 Therefore, this study does not make any presumptions about the internal 
cognitions of the individual participants (for similar see Verkuyten, 2005a) or its 
generalisability beyond the social, cultural and historic context that this experiment 
takes place within. Ambivalent stereotyping of refugees is considered here, to be a 
shared endeavour, dynamically patterned through the contextual interpretative 
framework of conflicting ideological positions (Billig et al., 1988). The main 
competing and conflict discourses within this contentious debate, is between 
compassionate humanitarian concerns for refugees, on the one hand, and the 
perceived economic, security and cultural cost to the potential host community, on 
the other hand (Carens, 2013, p. 222; Every, 2008; Every & Augoustinos, 2008; 
Kirkwood, 2017, 2018; Nightingale et al., 2017). People make sense of their 
political and social world through communication with others and hence, they are 
concerned how others think about the issue and ‘the power of the mass media is 
particularly pertinent here’ (Elcheroth et al., 2011).  
 Hence, this study examines how participants’ report others endorsement of 
ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees, is patterned by exposure to a 
simultaneous combination of competing and conflicting discourses. The discourses 
explored were group image threat discourse (threat to the ingroup’s positive image), 




Branscombe et al., 1999, p. 46) and discourses describing the threat to the nation 
from hosting refugees (namely realistic and symbolic threat; Stephan et al., 1999). 
Although these threat discourses are not diametrically in opposition there is a 
dilemmatic ideological tension (Billig et al., 1988) between maintaining a positive 
humanitarian national image and the perceived potential cost to the nation 
(Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014; Every, 2008; Nightingale et al., 2017). Our central 
prediction is, when participants are exposed to conflicting identity threat discourses, 
they will be more likely to report that others in their nation endorse ambivalent 
constructions of stereotypical refugees on the dimensions of competence and 
warmth (Fiske et al., 2002).   
5.1.1 Ambivalent Constructions of Stereotypical Immigrant Groups  
The stereotype content model indicates that people are not consistently derogatory 
towards outgroups but tend to depict outgroups ambivalently (Cuddy et al., 2009; 
Fiske et al., 2002). The model proposes that there are two central stereotype 
dimensions, warmth and competence, and these are informed respectively by 
evaluations of the intent and capability of the outgroup to harm the ingroup. People 
often endorse an ambivalent stereotype, where the outgroup is evaluated as being 
higher on one stereotype dimension than the other. Hence, people can endorse either 
a paternalistic ambivalent stereotype where the outgroup is depicted as being high 
in warmth and low in competence or an envious ambivalent stereotype where the 
outgroup is depicted as being low in warmth and high in competence.  
 In the paternalistic ambivalent case, the outgroup is evaluated as being 
warm, likable and friendly but not competent and respected. On the other hand, 
people can endorse an envious ambivalent stereotype of the outgroup, where the 
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outgroup is respected and depicted as being of high social status but disliked 
because they hold competitive intentions towards the ingroup. They are high in 
competence because they are considered to have the capacity and ability to harm 
the ingroup (Durante, Tablante, & Fiske, 2017; Fiske et al., 2002). The ingroup may 
construct the outgroup using envious ambivalent stereotyping (high in competence, 
low in warmth) when they evaluate the outgroup is having the capability and being 
more able, and potentially more successful than their ingroup at securing resources. 
The outgroup is depicted as being highly competent at getting what they want and 
potentially obtaining preferential treatment compared to the ingroup in the division 
of resources. 
 Previous Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002) research has shown 
that when people allocate the stereotype dimensions, warmth and competence, to 
specific immigrant groups they tend to be ambivalent due to scoring one dimension 
significantly higher than the other (Lee & Fiske, 2006). Hence, one dimension – 
either competence or warmth – contains a positive evaluation about the target 
immigrant group, whilst the other contains a negative evaluation. For example, 
Japanese, Chinese, Korean, German, French, Middle Eastern, Indian, Russian, 
European, Eastern European and Vietnamese immigrants were all evaluated as 
having an envious ambivalent stereotype, by a US sample, because the immigrant 
groups are evaluated as being significantly more competent than warm (see also 
Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005). Whilst Irish, Italian, African, South American, 
Latino, Mexican, farm workers and undocumented immigrants were all evaluated 
with a paternalistic ambivalent stereotype because these immigrant groups were 




groups to not be significantly different on competence and warmth were Canadian, 
first generation, third generation and documented immigrants. 
 Evidently, this stereotype evaluation is dependent on the stereotypes 
associated with the country of origin of the immigrant group and hence, the implied 
socioeconomic status of the immigrant group (Lee & Fiske, 2006). Competence has 
been shown to have a positive relationship with the evaluated socioeconomic status 
of the immigrant group, whilst warmth has negative relationship with how 
competitive the immigrant group is described as being (Lee & Fiske, 2006). Hence, 
when the host community constructs the immigrant group using envious ambivalent 
stereotyping (high competence but low warmth), the immigrant group is evaluated 
as holding high social status, being successful competitors and capable of achieving 
their goal at the expense of the ingroup (Fiske et al., 2002).  
 In other words, the envious ambivalent construction, presents the competent 
immigrant outgroup as achieving more, receiving preferential treatment and faring 
better than the host ingroup. But their potential success comes at the cost of 
resentment and dislike from the host ingroup who see the immigrant group as being 
cold and impacting negatively on their own level of achievement. Conversely, when 
the host community constructs the immigrant group using paternalistic ambivalent 
stereotyping (low competence but high warmth), the immigrant group is evaluated 
as holding low social status and not being potential competitors (Durante, Tablante, 
& Fiske, 2017; Fiske et al., 2002). In other words, this immigrant group is warm 
and more likable because they are less likely to impact negatively on the host 
ingroup and therefore, are relegated to a lower social status position. Notably, these 
stereotype constructions are patterned by discourses describing the outgroup as 
being a threat to resources and ingroup values (Cuddy et al., 2009). Evidently, the 
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competence dimension has a positive relationship with the evaluated social status 
of the immigrant group, whilst warmth has a negative relationship with the 
evaluated competitiveness of the immigrant group (Lee & Fiske, 2006). 
Furthermore, an experimental study showed that manipulating the social status of a 
fictitious immigrant group constrained reported stereotypes of stereotype 
competence, whilst manipulating competitiveness constrained reported stereotypes 
of warmth (Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske, 2009).  
 However, it is not possible to evaluate the social status or competitiveness 
of refugees as a generic group based on their nation of origin because they can 
originate from many possible nations. Furthermore, previous stereotype content 
model research has tended to be based on the assumption that social groups are 
predetermined and have fixed characteristics such as social status, and the ability 
and intentions to compete with the ingroup. But this is not the stance taken in this 
study as it is assumed that people construct their reality and people are also 
constructed by reality (Verkuyten, 2005b). In other words, social groups are not 
predetermined they are bought into being and their characteristics are contested 
through discourse and social practice (Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001). But there are limitations on the available discourses that people can draw 
upon (Augoustinos, 2017; Billig, 2006; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) 
and social identities that people can perform (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 48) due 
to the vested interests of others that become entrenched in hegemonic discourses 
and institutions. However, it is not the predetermined social category and 
characteristics of the group that patterns stereotypes, but how the outgroup and 
ingroup, and the intergroup power relationship, are constructed within dominant 




patterned by dominant interpretive frameworks, such as descriptions of how 
threatening the outgroup is to the ingroup and how threatening the intergroup 
relationship is to the ingroup’s cherished values. Hence, stereotype constructions of 
refugees – within the limited dimensions of competence and warmth – are 
potentially patterned by the discursive descriptions of the ability and intention of 
refugees to compete with the host community (symbolic and realistic threat 
discourse) and how excluding them may impact negatively on the moral standing 
of the nation (group image threat discourse).  
5.1.2 The Potential Patterning of Constructions of Stereotypical Refugees by 
Group Image Threat Discourse  
Group image threat discourses are frequently aired when a high-status group’s 
moral value is called into question due to mistreatment, exploitation or prejudicial 
transgressions against a lower status outgroup (Branscombe et al., 1999, p. 49; 
Shuman et al., 2018). Social identity theory argues that people, construct their self-
image partly based on their group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Hence, to 
maintain positive self-esteem people are motivated to obtain and maintain a positive 
construction of their social groups and make positive comparisons with relevant 
outgroups. Morality is an essential characteristic that group members draw on to 
make intergroup comparisons (Ellemers et al., 2013; Leach et al., 2007). 
 Therefore, the positive image of a significant ingroup is important to 
individuals and this can come under threat if the group is involved in historic or 
ongoing moral transgression towards an outgroup (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 
2006). Our conceptualisation of group image threat discourse focuses on the 
ingroup’s evaluations of their moral standing in the eyes of other respected third 
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party outgroups and questions the constancy of the ingroup’s own values on 
egalitarian and humanitarian grounds (Branscombe et al., 1999; Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & 
Hanurawan, 2018; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shuman et al., 2018). 
 Powerful high-status groups are particularly motivated to maintain a 
positive moral image due to a desire for social acceptance (Mashuri et al., 2018; 
Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Or to avoid the potential negative impact on their status 
due to the exclusion from a moral community, such as the United Nations, and loss 
of their respected position in the global hierarchy (Shuman et al., 2018). For 
example, high national identifiers exposed to discourses describing America’s 
questionable treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo, showed an increase in reporting 
that the transgression violates their group norms, which increased their reported 
collective guilt and increased reported support for political action to redress the 
transgression (Shuman et al., 2018). 
 Furthermore, high identifying group members who are loyal to the group 
and concerned about their moral image, can highlight the transgressions of their 
ingroup, forcing recognition and potential rectification of illegitimate actions and 
policies (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004; Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; 
Shuman et al., 2018). Hence, American and British samples exposed to group image 
threat discourse, due to involvement in the Iraq war, reported high shame, which 
predicted reported support for political action for withdrawal from the war (Iyer, 
Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). The British sample also showed an increase in anger, 
which predicted reported support for political action for confronting those 
responsible, and offering compensation to Iraq and withdrawal from the war (Iyer 




 Therefore, group image threat discourse, emphasising the moral obligation 
of the nation towards refugees, will potentially increase the evaluated legitimacy of 
refugee’s claim for sanctuary. This potential shift from being evaluated as 
illegitimate migrants to refugees with a legitimate moral claim for sanctuary within 
the nation would potentially increase the evaluated social status of refugees. And 
therefore, potentially increases the evaluation of the capability of refugees to harm 
the nation, particularly as they are now seen to be more likely to gain access to the 
nation. In other words, group image threat discourse depicts refugees as shifting 
from a stateless group, external to the nation, who can be ignored, to people who 
have a legitimate right to be accommodated within the nation. Their social status 
rises from the very bottom as unwanted and stateless to the minimum level of 
potentially being included on limited grounds. According to the stereotype content 
model, evaluating that the outgroup has increased social status should lead to an 
evaluation that the outgroup has increases ability to harm to the ingroup, which 
potentially increases the construction of the outgroup on the stereotype dimension 
of competence (Fiske et al., 2002).  
5.1.3 The Potential Patterning of Constructions of Stereotypical Refugees by 
Discourses Presenting Refugees as a Threat to the Nation 
In opposition to group image threat discourse, is the discourse describing the threat 
to the nation due to hosting refugees. Realistic threat discourse is a description of 
the refugees having a negative impact on the nation’s tangible economic and 
political resources and the citizens’ wellbeing. Whilst symbolic threat discourse is 
a description of refugees having a negative impact on the nation’s values, beliefs 
and culture (Stephan et al., 1999). Extensive research has shown that both symbolic 
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and realistic threat discourses relate to increased hostile constructions of 
immigrants (Stephan et al., 1999; Stephan et al., 1998) and refugees (Schweitzer, 
Perkoulidis, Krome, Ludlow, & Ryan, 2005). A meta-analysis showed that 
discourses describing outgroups as a high realistic and symbolic threat was related 
to negative constructions of outgroups (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Whilst a 
small meta-analysis specifically indicated that symbolic and realistic threat 
discourses are also related to negative constructions of refugees (Cowling, 
Anderson, & Ferguson, 2019). 
 Experimental studies have also confirmed that exposure to symbolic and 
realistic threat discourses increases hostile constructions of immigrants (Costello & 
Hodson, 2011; Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2004; Stephan et al., 2005). Canadian 
participants reading an editorial, describing a fictitious immigrant group as 
economic competitors, endorsed more negative constructions of immigrants and 
immigration (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998), and expressed decreased 
support for policies to empower immigrants (Jackson & Esses, 2000). Australian 
participants presented with an editorial discussing terrorism threat were more likely 
to express support for more restrictive immigration policy (Greenaway, Louis, 
Hornsey, & Jones, 2014). Esses, Medianu, and Lawson (2013) carried out 
experiments using common negative media portrayals of refugees, as bogus 
claimants, terrorists, and as carriers of infectious diseases, which showed that 
participants endorsed hostile constructions that dehumanised refugees.  
Responses to a study using open questions indicated that Australian 
participants’ main concerns about refugees was the evaluated threat to security, 
identity, values and culture, and these evaluations were patterned by negative media 




assumption within prevalent discourse that the well-being of refugees is in conflict 
with the well-being of host citizens (Fakih & Marrouch, 2015). Refugees are 
commonly constructed as being a competitive threat to the host community in in 
terms of economic resources, security, well-being and cultural values (Esses et al., 
2017).  
Previous stereotype content research indicates that the more people evaluate 
an outgroup to hold competitive intentions towards the ingroup the less warm they 
construct the outgroup as being (Fiske et al., 2002). Hence, depicting refugees using 
realistic and symbolic threat discourses is likely to position refugees as holding 
competitive intentions towards the host community and therefore decrease the 
endorsement of construction of refugees on the stereotype dimension of warmth. 
However, this does not provide a premise for how people’s management of the 
combined competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks of simultaneous 
exposure to discourses describing refugees as a threat to the host community 
(symbolic and realistic threat discourses) and the discourse describing the threat to 
the national positive humanitarian image on the patterning of constructions of 
stereotypical refugees.  
5.1.4 The Potential Patterning of Constructions of Stereotypical Refugees by 
Combined and Conflicting Identity Threat Discourses 
The primary focus of this study was to stay close to mirroring the real-world context 
– the interpretive framework – of the contentious immigration debate, which 
contains a cacophony of competing and conflicting identity threat discourses. 
Hence, it explored how exposure to competing and conflicting identity threat 
discourses contains and patterns participants’ reporting that others in their nation 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
175 
 
endorse ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees. Of central interest was 
the potential conflict between the discourse describing the failure of the nation to 
meet its moral and legal obligation towards refugees (group image threat discourse) 
and the discourses describing the material and cultural cost of accommodating 
refugees (realistic and symbolic threat discourses).  
 In this regard, the group image threat discourses explored in the research 
outlined above are diverse, and the depicted material and symbolic cost to the 
ingroup to restore their group’s positive image could be evaluated as being 
significantly different dependent on the nature of the transgression. For example, 
redressing structural racial inequality could be considered more costly for whites in 
general than a nation offering compensation for torture or war. However, the 
opposite cost assessment might also be possible. Importantly, the potential cost of 
restoring the ingroup’s positive image, in relation to its humanitarian treatment of 
refugees, is declared within the discourse describing the realistic and symbolic 
threat from refugees. When people evaluate their group’s moral standing in the eyes 
of others, they potentially also orient to arguments depicting the cost of rectifying 
or maintaining their moral standing; and the dilemmatic tension between these 
discursive positions (Every & Augoustinos, 2013) could potentially lead to taking 
up and espousing an ambivalent construction of the stereotypical outgroup. 
Therefore, it is important to carry out a contextualised exploration of how people 
negotiate ambivalence by looking at their exposure to competing and conflicting 
threat discourses. This study addresses this shortfall by looking at how 
simultaneous exposure to group image threat discourse and the perceived threat 




people’s reporting that others in their nation endorse ambivalent stereotyping of 
refugees. 
 Previous cognitive research has indicated that being exposed to conflicting 
information increases ambivalent responses (Gebauer, Maio, & Pakizeh, 2013; 
Hohman, Crano, & Niedbala, 2016; Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997; Maio, 
Greenland, Bernard, & Esses, 2001; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson, Zanna, & 
Griffin, 1995; van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009; 
van Harreveld, Rutjens, Schneider, Nohlen, & Keskinis, 2014). The prevalence of 
conflicting arguments within the news media pertaining to the politically 
contentious issues of EU integration, increases endorsement of ambivalent 
constructions of the EU (Stoeckel, 2013). Also, when the objectives of a political 
party are seen to conflict with the identity concerns of a party supporter, based on 
important values such as egalitarianism and humanitarianism, they are increasing 
likely to take up ambivalent constructions of the party (Lavine, Johnston, & 
Steenbergen, 2012).  
 Furthermore, group image threat discourse highlighting the moral and 
legitimate human rights of refugees to be accommodated within the potential host 
nation, may increases the evaluated social status of refugees, because they shift 
from being outsiders who can be ignored to becoming prospective fellow citizens. 
This inflated social status should increase evaluations of the capability of refugees 
to inflict harm on the nation and hence, increase endorsement of the construction of 
refugees on the stereotype dimension of competence. However, constructions of a 
positive national group image will also be evaluated in relation to discourses 
describing the cost to the potential host nation outlined by symbolic and realistic 
threat discourse. 
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Hence, we tested the following hypothesis:  
H1: The interaction between group image threat, realistic threat and 
symbolic threat discourses will pattern participants’ expression that others 
in their nation endorse ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees.  
H1a: Participants exposed to conflicting identity threat discourses are more 
likely to express that others in their nation endorse ambivalent constructions 
of stereotypical refugees than those exposed to non-conflicting identity 
threat discourses.  
H1b: Participants will express that others in their nation endorse ambivalent 
constructions of stereotypical refugees when they are exposed to discourses 
declaring all three threats are high and in conflict, and endorsement of 
ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees will be absent when all 
three threat discourses are low and non-conflicting.  
5.2 METHOD 
5.2.1 Design  
The independent variables were the three experimental factors: 1) Group image 
threat discourse; 2) Realistic threat discourse; and 3) Symbolic threat discourse. 
And the dependent variable was ambivalent stereotyping of refugees, where one 
stereotype dimension, competence or warmth, was rated significantly higher than 
the other (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Hence, this experiment was a between-
participant factorial design 2(Group Image Threat discourse: Low versus High) × 
2(Realistic Threat discourse: Low versus High) × 2(Symbolic Threat discourse: 




of participants to one of the eight cells in the design (see Table 5.1 for the layout of 
the between-participant experimental conditions). Thus, each participant had to 
respond to an interpretive framework characterised by different combinations of 
threat discourses. 
Table 5.1 Experimental conditions for between-participant factorial design 
2(Group Image Threat discourse: Low versus High) × 2(Realistic Threat 
discourse: Low versus High) × 2(Symbolic Threat discourse: Low versus High) 
 
High Group Image threat (HGI) 
 




















 Factorial designs have a number of advantages over random control trials 
that are particularly relevant to this study. Factorial design is not restricted by the 
requirement of an experimental control condition, but facilitates the comparison 
between experimental factors that differ on a component of research interest 
(Collins, Dziak, Kugler, & Trail, 2014), in this study, level of identity threat 
discourse (low versus high threat), for three different identity threat factors (Group 
Image Threat discourse, Realistic Threat discourse and Symbolic Threat discourse). 
Furthermore, factorial design affords the efficient testing of main effects and 
interaction effects between a number of factors (Collins et al., 2014), which here 
enables the exploration of the interactive effect of the competing and conflicting 
identity threat arguments within the interpretive framework.  
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5.2.2 Participants  
Power analysis using G*Power 3 assuming a small effect size d = .4 indicated 366 
participants were required for 80% power. To minimize the risk of type II error a 
target of 380 participants was planned. A total of 382 participants took part in the 
study but one participant was dropped from the final analysis because they had 
repeatedly failed the attention check reaching a maximum of ten attempts. 
Therefore, 381 participants remained (age: M = 27.35, SD = 11.10, range = 18 – 69; 
gender: 233 female, 147 male, 1 other; national identification: M = 3.60, SD = 0.87; 
socioeconomic status: M = 3.87, SD = 1.32). Participants were recruited through 
emails to students and staff at the University of Limerick, and posts on Twitter and 
Facebook, and were incentivised with the offer of entry into a €50 prize draw.  
5.2.3 Procedure and Manipulations  
This experiment was presented as an online survey that claimed to be assessing the 
impartiality of reporting on the European refugee crisis (see Appendix 1. 
Experimental Manipulation). After reading and completing a consent page, 
participants were asked for their age and whether they considered themselves to be 
Irish or not. Potential participants under 18 years and those who did not consider 
themselves Irish were then excluded from continuing the study with an explanation.  
 Participants were requested to report their gender and parents’ highest level 
of education as an estimate of socioeconomic status. They then answered four items 
assessing the centrality of national identification (Cameron, 2004) (1 = disagree 
strongly, to 5 = agree strongly; α = .82). This measure made national identity salient 




also Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013). Participants were then asked 
to carefully read the article on the following page about the European refugee crisis 
and Ireland’s response. They were told the article was drawn from a reputable media 
outlet and they would be requested to answer questions assessing the quality and 
impartiality of the reporting.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental 
conditions and asked to read an article constructed by ‘flipping’ phrases in a mock 
report to manipulate each factor as described in more detail below. All conditions 
had the title ‘The European Refugee Crisis’ and the opening sentences, ‘The overall 
number of people seeking asylum across Europe in 2016 was 358,300. Therefore, 
Ireland’s response needs careful consideration’. Each condition contained all three 
experimental factors, group image threat discourse, realistic threat discourse and 
symbolic threat discourse, presented in a random order. Hence, each participant 
would read either high or low group image threat discourse and either high or low 
realistic threat discourse and either high or low symbolic threat discourse in one 
coherent journalistic article. All conditions ended with the line ‘To indicate that you 
have carefully read this extract please click on the title, ‘The European Refugee 
Crisis,’ at the top of this page’. If the participants did not follow this instruction, 
they received a warning message explaining that the study was dependent on their 
close attention to the article and requesting them to reread the article carefully. This 
‘Instructional Manipulation Check’ (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) 
was necessary to ensure that online participants were attentive to the manipulations 
within the study (J. K. Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013).  
All three identity threat factors (Group Image Threat discourse, Realistic 
Threat discourse and Symbolic Threat discourse), were manipulated by exchanging 
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specific words within the text presented to participants that altered the level of threat 
between low and high. The symbolic and realistic threat discourse manipulations 
were based on previously successful manipulations (see Costello & Hodson, 2011; 
Esses et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 2005). The group image threat discourse 
manipulation was novel to this study but drew on Branscombe et al. (1999, p. 46) 
concept of threat to the value of the social identity, particularly the ingroup’s moral 
status and standing.  
 The realistic threat extract was 122 words long with 19 words exchanged 
between high and low threat. High realistic threat discourse depicted refugees as a 
financial burden to host citizens, and as competitors for jobs, housing, health care 
and education (e.g. high realistic threat: ‘If refugees are given asylum in Ireland, 
they will be a significant economic burden and drain tax revenue and workers will 
suffer’). Conversely, low realistic threat discourse presented refugees as a financial 
benefit, contributing skills needed in the labour market, health care and education 
system (e.g. low realistic threat: ‘If refugees are given asylum in Ireland, they will 
be a significant economic benefit and increase tax revenue and employers will 
benefit’).  
 The symbolic threat extract was 138 words long with 12 words exchanged 
between high and low threat. High symbolic threat discourse depicted refugees as 
conflicting with Irish values and beliefs, as they originate from an oppressive 
culture with a non-western religion, and they would be a negative impact on local 
culture (e.g. high symbolic threat: ‘If the refugees come to live in Ireland they will 
dilute and change our traditions and culture’). Conversely, low symbolic threat 
discourse played down the difference in values and beliefs and presented refugees 




refugees come to live in Ireland they will supplement and enhance our traditions 
and culture’).  
 The group image threat extract was 140 words long with 19 words 
exchanged between high and low threat. High group image threat discourse 
question Ireland’s moral and humanitarian standing in the world and argued that 
Ireland will be judged negatively for its inaction in the refugee crisis (e.g. ‘Our 
moral standing in the world is compromised. Our negligible input to alleviate the 
refugee crisis in comparison to other countries is a matter of great humiliation’). 
Conversely, low group image threat discourse celebrates Ireland’s moral standing 
and humanitarian contribution towards refugees (e.g. ‘Our moral standing in the 
world is confirmed. Our substantial input to alleviate the refugee crisis in 
comparison to other countries is a matter of great pride’).  
 Participants proceeded to answer manipulation check questions and four 
cover questions about the quality of the journalistic article. In this batch of 
questions, there was a second attention check question stating, ‘Do not check any 
of the radio buttons in this line’. On correct completion the participants proceeded 
to respond to the dependent variables, which were the two dimensions, competence 
and warmth, from the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002).  
5.2.4 Measures  
The measures were presented in the following order after the experimental 
manipulation. Presentation of individual items were randomised within the block 
of measures.  
5.2.4.1 Manipulation check  
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Three items verified that participants interpreted the extracts as expected: 1) To 
what extent does the article above portray refugees coming to Ireland as a threat to 
Ireland’s economic status and the well-being of Irish people? 2) To what extent 
does the article above portray refugees coming to Ireland as a threat to Irish culture 
and the Irish way of life? 3) To what extent does the article above portray Ireland’s 
response towards the refugees as a threat to how Ireland is seen by others and its 
moral standing in the world? (1= not at all, to 5 = extremely). 
5.2.4.2 Stereotype content dimensions competence and warmth  
Participants were asked how they thought most other Irish people view refugees 
coming to Ireland, on the two stereotype dimensions: 1) warmth (using warm and 
friendly; α = .78) and 2) competence (using competent and capable; α = .78); giving 
a total of four items, two for each stereotype dimension. ‘As viewed by most people 
how [warm/friendly/competent/capable] are these refugees?’ (1 = not at all, 5 = 
extremely). Ambivalent stereotyping of refugees was present when one dimension 
was rated significantly higher than the other (Cuddy et al., 2007).  
5.2.5 Context and Reflexivity 
 Counter to traditional understandings, in this study I hold that experiments 
are unable to isolate the individual from the broader social, cultural and historic 
environment (Adams & Stocks, 2008; Spears & Smith, 2001; Tajfel, 1972). Also, 
the researcher cannot be assumed to be entirely objective and neutral in the research 
process. Within an experiment the participant is unable to contest the social and 
political relationship that they have entered into or importantly contest and 
reinterpret the artificial discursive environment imposed on them through the 




relationship (Spears & Smith, 2001). I, the experimenter, chose the wording of the 
experimental manipulations, hence I constructed the discursive environment within 
the experiment, based on what I considered was politically significant at the time, 
not the participant. Hence, there needs to be an acknowledgement of the context 
that the experiment took place within and how it locates me as the researcher (for a 
more detailed description of the context see chapter 2 and for a more detailed 
reflexivity see section 2.2.5).  
 This online experimental study was run in February 2016, with an Irish 
sample, at a time when some Europeans were still drawing on sympathetic 
discourses to describe the refugees attempting to enter Europe. This sympathetic 
position was also confirmed, specifically in Ireland, through an analysis of 
discourse from a phone-in programme, on Irish RTE national radio, over a six-
month period from 1st August 2015 (see chapter 3). Notably, this discourse analysis 
covered the period when pictures of Aylan Kurdi’s body – the three year old Syrian 
refugee boy who drowned in the Mediterranean – were released on the internet. 
However, it has to also be noted that there is not a historic propensity for people to 
draw on sympathetic discourses to construct refugees. Quite the contrary, it has 
been well documented that there is prevalence for public discourse to describe 
refugees negatively and as being a threat to the nation (for example Bates, 2017; 
Esses et al., 2017; Every & Augoustinos, 2008; S. Goodman, 2008; S. Goodman, 
2010; S. Goodman & Burke, 2010; S. Goodman & Narang, 2019; S. Goodman et 
al., 2017; S. Goodman & Speer, 2007; Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2011; 
Hanson-Easey et al., 2014; Kirkwood, Goodman, et al., 2015; Kirkwood et al., 
2013b; Kirkwood, McKinlay, et al., 2015; Lynn & Lea, 2003; O'Doherty & 
Augoustinos, 2008; S. Parker, 2018b, 2019; Wroe, 2017). And this discourse, which 
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is hostile towards people seeking asylum is also prevalent within the Irish print 
media (Haynes et al., 2006).  
 It is important to highlight that the data and findings from the discourse 
analysis discussed above (also see chapter 3) informed the experimental 
manipulations used here. An attempt was made to keep the wording of the threat 
manipulations to be closely aligned to the discursive environment that the 
participants experienced in their everyday social world. Hence, the experimental 
manipulation also stayed close to universal and historic concerns pertaining to 
accommodating of refugees. The realistic and symbolic threat discourse 
manipulations were mainly adapted from previous research (Costello & Hodson, 
2011; Esses et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 2005). Whilst the group image threat 
discourse manipulation was based on the concept of the threat to the value of the 
social identity, particularly the ingroup’s moral status and standing (Branscombe et 
al., 1999, p. 46).  
 But I could have made different choices about the wording of the 
manipulations. For example, the group image threat discourse manipulation could 
have been more Irish specific. Due to the Irish history of colonial occupation, 
systematic starvation (Nally, 2011), and forced migration, there was a common 
narrative in the Irish media that compared the plight of past Irish migrants 
attempting to escape famine by crossing the Atlantic in the ‘coffin ships’ and 
refugees drowning in the Mediterranean (for example Delaney, 2015). But I 
avoided an Irish-specific group image threat discourse, manipulation and used more 
universal concerns, because it could facilitate future studies in an alternative 




 However, it is also important to note in relation to the group image threat 
discourse employed here that, at the time of this study, Ireland had been strongly 
reprimanded by the UN for its negligent treatment of people seeking asylum 
through its direct provision system and this was highlighted within the Irish media 
(United Nations, 2015). The direct provision system institutionalises asylum 
applicants in cramped conditions and removes all forms of agency for extended 
periods of time. It is an oppressive means to disempower and separate applicants 
from Irish society and deter people seeking asylum in Ireland. It has also been 
likened to Ireland’s historic propensity to institutionalise and hide away the 
unwanted (Lentin, 2016, 2018; Thornton, 2014). But even though Ireland was 
reprimanded by the UN and parallels have been drawn between the oppressive 
direct provision system and institutions of the past, it has also been noted that the 
Irish people tend to respond to this situation in a similar way to how they did in the 
past, by looking away (Lentin, 2018). In other words, Ireland has a history of 
institutionalising the unwanted and also a history of maintaining a questionable 
moral self-image by claiming ignorance. Therefore, the threat discourses examined 
here were highly relevant for the Irish context at the time. But making certain threat 
discourses salient within the experiment may be contextually questionable because 
the discourse chosen could be ignored within the overarching discursive 
environment and possibly ignored even within the experiment itself. It has to be 
acknowledge that although I tried to mirror the real world social context within this 
experiment, what is an important argument within the immigration debate for me, 
as somebody who is concerned about the refugee issue, may have little relevance 
for some people and for some of the participants within this experiment.   
5.3 RESULTS 
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Participants did not differ significantly across experimental conditions in age F(7, 
373) = 1.02, p = .419, national identification F(7, 373) = 0.89, p = .517 or gender 
χ2(7, N =381) = 1.496, p = .983. But participants were significantly different in 
socioeconomic status F(7, 373) = 2.34, p = .024, ηp
2 = .042 (small effect) across 
only two conditions (M = 4.33, SD = .19) and (M = 3.34, SD = .19). Hence, the 
measure of socioeconomic status was used as covariate in the forthcoming analysis 
even though it had a negligible non-significant effect on the results.  
Manipulation checks showed that the participants interpreted the articles as 
expected. There was a significant difference in the expected direction for realistic 
threat discourse F(1, 299.08) = 512.98, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62 (large effect), between 
those exposed to the high realistic threat (M = 4.09, SD = .88) and low realistic 
threat (M = 1.82, SD = 1.00) discourses. There was a significant difference in the 
expected direction for symbolic threat discourse F(1, 299.74) = 423.74, p < .001, 
ηp
2= .59 (large effect) between those exposed to the high symbolic threat (M = 3.92, 
SD = 1.08) and low symbolic threat (M = 1.77, SD = .87) discourses. And there was 
a significant difference in the expected direction for group image threat discourse 
F(1, 312.47) = 171.69, p < .001, ηp
2= .36 (moderate effect) between those exposed 
to the high group image threat (M = 3.74, SD = 1.32) and low group image threat 
(M = 2.15, SD = .98) discourses.  
 A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed within-between participant multivariate analysis of 
covariance was performed on ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees 
using a multivariate general linear model. This investigated how the interaction 
between-participant independent variables, which was the three experimental 
factors, group image threat discourse (high or low) and realistic threat discourse 




difference between the within-participant dependent variables, namely the 
stereotype measures of competence and warmth. This was a profile analysis with 
only two dependent variables, competence and warmth, which were entered into 
the model as two separate within-participant repeated measures that were measured 
on the same scale (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013, p. 356).  
 Therefore, the multivariate test examined if the means of the two within-
participant dependent variables, competence and warmth, were significantly 
different, and hence, could be considered ambivalent, across the between-
participant, independent variable, which was the experimental groups. After 
adjustment by the covariate socioeconomic status, the analysis tested the three-way 
interaction of between-participant experimental manipulations on the within-
participant mean difference between competence and warmth, and found it to be 
significant F(1, 372) = 6.78, p = .010, Wilk’s Lambda = .98, ηp
2 = .018 (small 
effect). Hence, in support of H1 the three-way interaction between group image 
threat, realistic threat and symbolic threat discourses patterned the mean difference 
between ratings of competence and warmth. Such that in certain experimental 
conditions participants reported that others in their nation endorse ambivalent 
constructions of stereotypical refugees.  
 The three-way interaction was probed by following the steps recommended 
by Maxwell and Delaney (2003, p. 377). Firstly, the simple two-way interactions 
were tested within the two levels of the realistic threat factor (high versus low), 
which facilitated tests of H1a and H1b. When realistic threat discourse was high the 
simple two-way interaction between symbolic threat discourse and group image 
threat discourse was significant F(1, 189) = 7.74, p = .006, ηp
2 = .04 (small effect), 
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but when realistic threat discourse was low the interaction was non-significant F(1, 
182) = .459, p = .499.  
 Next the simple main effect of group image threat discourse was tested for 
the two levels of symbolic threat discourse (high versus low) when realistic threat 
discourse was high. In support of hypothesis H1a and H1b exposure to conflicting 
identity threat arguments patterned reporting that others in the nation endorse 
ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees. When all three threat 
discourses, realistic, symbolic and group image threat were high (i.e. the high 
threats from refugees were in conflict with the high threat to the positive national 
image), competence (M = 2.46, SD = .81) was significantly higher than warmth (M 
= 2.22, SD = .80) F(1, 372) = 5.21, p = .023, ηp
2 = .014 (small effect). See Figure 
5.1 and Table 5.2.  
 However, counter to expectations, when realistic and symbolic threat 
discourses were both high and group image threat was low (i.e. the high threats 
from refugees were not in conflict with low threat to the positive national image) 
the relationship between competence and warmth was also ambivalent. But in this 
condition the relationship between competence and warmth was now the reverse of 
the previous condition where group image threat was high. In this condition 
competence (M = 2.06, SD = .82) was now significantly lower than warmth (M = 
2.46, SD = .91) F(1, 372) = 11.55, p =.001, ηp
2 = .03 (small effect).  
 To a certain extent this finding undermined the hypothesis H1a because 
evidently participants exposed to some non-conflicting identity threat arguments 
also reported that others in their nation endorse ambivalent constructions of 




characteristic of ambivalent stereotyping occurred, where competence was rated 
lower than warmth, and this appears to be patterned by both realistic and symbolic 
threat discourses being high and group image threat discourse being low. 
Interestingly the ambivalent stereotype relationship, between competence and 
warmth, was reversed between the conflicting condition (high group image threat) 
and non-conflicting condition (low group image threat). Hence, exposure to group 
image threat discourse appeared to pattern the characteristic of the ambivalent 
relationship between competence and warmth when both symbolic and realistic 
threat discourse was high. See Figure 5.1. 
  
 
Figure 5.1 Competence and Warmth plotted against Group Image Threat discourse 
when Realistic and Symbolic Threat discourse were both high with 95% confidence 
interval error bars 
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 As the two-way interaction between symbolic threat and group image threat 
discourses was non-significant when realistic threat discourse was low the simple 
main effects within the low realistic threat cells are interpretable (Maxwell & 
Delaney, 2003). When realistic threat discourse was low the simple main effect for 
group image threat discourse was non-significant F(1, 182) = 1.03, p = .311, whilst 
the simple main effect of symbolic threat discourse was significant F(1, 182) = 8.41, 
p = .004, ηp
2 = .044 (small effect). Hence, when realistic threat discourse was low 
and symbolic threat discourse was low there was no significant difference between 
competence and warmth F(1, 376) = .623, p = .431 but when symbolic threat 
discourse was high, competence (M = 2.52, SD = .83) was significantly higher than 
warmth (M = 2.28, SD = .83) F(1, 376) = 8.29, p = .004, ηp
2 = .022 (small effect) 
(See Table 5.2 for details of all the conditions). Therefore, when realistic threat 
discourse was low the only condition in which participants expressed that others in 
their nation would endorse ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees was 
when symbolic threat discourse was high. This is supportive of H1a because in this 
condition there is a conflict between low realistic threat discourse and high 
symbolic threat discourse.  
 Furthermore, in support of hypothesis H1a and H1b when realistic threat 
discourse was low there was no simple main effect for group image threat discourse 
because there was not a conflict between high group image threat discourse and low 
realistic threat discourse. Specifically, when all three threat discourses were low 
(hence no threat and no conflict) and also when realistic and symbolic threat 
discourses were low and group image threat discourse was high (i.e. when low 
threat from refugees does not conflict with high threat to the positive image of the 




warmth. Hence, in these non-conflicting conditions participants did not report that 
others in their nation endorse ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees. 
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Table 5.2 Experimental Patterning of the Mean Difference between Competence 
























































































































































In line with expectations, exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive 
frameworks patterned and constrained people’s shared constructions of 
stereotypical refugees. Specifically, the interaction between competing and 
conflicting identity threat discourses revealed a social regularity where participants 
tended to express that others in their nation endorse ambivalent constructions of 
stereotypical refugees. This has important theoretical implications, because 
previous research has tended to focus on interpreting the constraint of a single 
isolated identity threat discourse on peoples responses (for example Costello & 
Hodson, 2011), instead of exploring the interaction of competing and conflicting 
arguments as done here. This study better reflects real-world social context of 
contentious political debate consisting of many conflicting and competing 
interpretive frameworks.  
 The findings indicate that in the conditions where the interpretive 
framework contained conflicted identity threat discourses, participants tended to 
express that others in their nation endorse a construction of stereotypical refugees 
that could be consider ambivalent because one stereotype dimension was expressed 
to be significantly higher than the other. Conversely, in the conditions where the 
interpretive framework contained no conflict between the identity threat discourses 
and where both realistic and symbolic threat discourses were low, expressing that 
other members of the nation endorsed ambivalent constructions of stereotypical 
refugees tended to be absent.  
 Firstly, participants in the condition where the interpretive framework 
contained high realistic and symbolic threat discourses, which were in conflict with 
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high group image threat discourse, tended to express that others in their nation 
would endorse an envious ambivalent construction of stereotypical refugees, where 
competence was rated significantly higher than warmth (Fiske et al., 2002). Hence, 
refugees in this condition were constructed as being respected (high competence) 
potentially due to exposure to high group image threat discourse, which raises the 
evaluated social status of refugees as they are depicted as having a moral and 
legitimate claim to be accommodated in the prospective host nation. In contrast to 
being depicted as stateless unwanted others, refugees become a people who have a 
moral right to be included within the nation. But the refugees under this interpretive 
framework are also described by participants as not being particularly liked (low 
warmth), potentially because the refugees are depicted as holding negative 
competitive intentions towards the nation due to being an economic burden and 
cultural liability (Fiske et al., 2002).  
 Envy of refugees may appear to be counterintuitive, but it fits well with the 
common argument employed by the populist radical right that refugees receive 
preferential treatment and take advantage of the naive benevolence of host citizens 
(Fakih & Marrouch, 2015; Nightingale, Muldoon, & Quayle, 2020) (also see 
chapter 4. Section 4.4.2.1 Extract 3: Frauke Petry) and UK citizen officers 
(Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014) and Australian politicians (O'Doherty & 
Augoustinos, 2008). In this interpretive framework that patterns an envious 
ambivalent construction of refugees participants read an extract that described 
refugees as being a burden on the host nation’s economic resources and problematic 
for the nation’s cultural identity and values, alongside the conflicting argument that 
the nation is seen by others as failing to meet its moral and legal obligation of 




was described as being under threat and presented alongside a high cost to the host 
nation to rectify this damaged national image by way of accommodating more 
burdensome and problematic refugees. In this interpretive framework the refugees 
are potentially evaluated as achieving their goal of inclusion – or otherwise the 
nation positive moral image will be tarnish – and being a hostile competitor with 
host citizens on economic and cultural terms. In the long run the refugees made end 
up being better off than the host citizens, because they have the moral right to be 
included and will take advantage the nations resources and undermine the nations 
culture. This finding counters previous stereotype content model research into the 
stereotyping of immigrant groups based on the predetermined fixed characteristics 
of that group, such as country of origin or social status (Caprariello et al., 2009; Lee 
& Fiske, 2006; Lin et al., 2005). This study shows that the constructions of 
stereotypical refugees are flexible and situated and potentially better understood to 
be patterned by how the immigrant group is described within competing and 
conflicting threat discourses.   
 However, there was an unexpected outcome not directly predicted. 
Participants in the condition with a non-conflicting interpretive framework, who 
were exposed to high realistic discourse and high symbolic threat discourse and low 
group image threat discourse also reported that others in their nation endorse 
ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees. But here, warmth was rated 
significantly higher than competence, which was the inverse of the previous 
condition discussed, where all three threats where high. In other words, when the 
interpretive framework depicted the threat from refugees (i.e. realistic and symbolic 
threat) as high then participants tended to express that others in their nation endorse 
ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees. But the characteristic of this 
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ambivalent construction was dependent on whether the group image threat 
discourse was high and conflicting or low and non-conflicting. When the group 
image threat discourse was high and conflicting, participants expressed that others 
in their nation endorse envious ambivalent stereotyping of refugees, where 
competence was rated higher than warmth. Conversely, when the group image 
threat discourse was low and non-conflicting, participants expressed that others in 
their nation endorse paternalistic ambivalent stereotyping of refugees, where 
competence was rated lower than warmth.  
 In the condition where the interpretive framework patterns a paternalistic 
ambivalent construction of stereotypical refugees, the warm refugees are liked but 
not respected because they are constructed as incompetent. This is potentially due 
to participants also being exposed to low group image threat discourse, portraying 
the nation as meeting its moral obligation for the accommodation of refugees. In 
other words, the social status and hence the competence of the refugees, was low 
because the nation is justified in its limited response towards refugees and therefore, 
they can be legitimately excluded from the nation. Refugees are potentially liked 
and receive a high rating of warmth in this condition, because even though they are 
depicted as an economic burden and cultural liability for the host nation, they are 
perceived as having little opportunity to impose themselves on the nation. Again, 
we see how people’s construction of refugees is less dependent on fixed 
characteristics of the immigrant group, as suggested in previous stereotype content 
research (Caprariello et al., 2009; Lee & Fiske, 2006; Lin et al., 2005), but is 
flexible, situated and patterned by the interpretive framework of competing and 




 In further support of our hypothesis, in the other experimental conditions, 
where the interpretive framework was not conflicted between identity threat 
discourses, participants were less likely to express that others in their nation endorse 
ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees. These non-conflicting 
interpretive frameworks occurred when all three identity threat discourses were low 
and where realistic and symbolic threat discourses were both low and group image 
threat discourse was high. In these conditions, participants were exposed to an 
interpretive framework claiming that refugees were not a threat to the nation, but 
they would be a potential cultural and economic benefit, and this ideological 
position does not conflict with either high or low group image threat discourses. 
Hence, in the interpretive framework contained high group image threat discourse 
and low threat from refugees discourse, the claim is made that the nation’s moral 
standing is judge negatively, but this is potentially rectified by accommodating an 
increased number of refugees who are depicted as potentially making a positive 
economic and cultural contribution to the nation. Therefore, this lack of argument 
conflict patterns a construction of stereotypical refugees, which is not ambivalent. 
 Furthermore, in the two conditions where the interpretive framework 
contained high symbolic threat and low realistic threat discourses, the participants 
also expressed that others in their nation endorse an envious ambivalent 
construction of stereotypical refugees. Under these interpretive frameworks, 
competence was constructed as being higher than warmth for both high and low 
group image threat discourses. The ambivalent construction of refugees is still 
potentially patterned by conflicting identity threat discourses, because there is an 
ideological conflict within interpretive framework. There is a conflict between high 
symbolic threat discourse and low realistic threat discourse because the refugees 
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are depicted as being an economic asset but culturally problematic. Also, there is a 
conflict within the interpretive framework with high group image threat discourse 
and high symbolic threat discourse.  
 Envious ambivalent constructions of stereotypical refugees (competence is 
rated higher than warmth) appears to be patterned by high symbolic threat discourse 
being present, which potentially reduces constructions on the warmth dimension. 
Whilst endorsement of paternalistic ambivalent constructions of stereotypical 
refugees tends to be patterned when both realistic and symbolic threat discourses 
were high and group image threat is low. Arguably this is prevalent position in 
everyday discourse that displays sympathy towards the warm but incompetent 
refugees (Nightingale et al., 2017) (also see chapter 3). Refugees are often presented 
within dominant discourse as being a burden on economic resources and being 
problematic for the majority culture (Esses et al., 2017), whilst the moral and legal 
obligation of the nation to offer sanctuary to refugees is potentially less prevalent 
within everyday discourse. And as noted earlier in this chapter there is a tendency 
for the Irish public to disavow their moral obligation to people seeking asylum 
(Lentin, 2016, 2018; Thornton, 2014). 
 The findings here extend the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002), 
because instead of directly manipulating the social status and competitiveness of 
immigrant groups based on their country of origin (Caprariello et al., 2009), this 
study used interpretive frameworks containing competing and conflicting identity 
threat discourses. Arguably these evolving public discourses, drawn from the 
overarching discursive context in relation to the contentious immigration debate, 
describing the threat to the nation, are more pertinent than preconceived notions 




indicates that people’s construction of the outgroup is not deterministically based 
on characteristics of the group, but instead are flexible, situated and patterned by 
identity threat discourses made relevant in the situation (as the media or politicians 
may do). This study indicates that people do not hold fixed internal attitudes that 
they carry from one situation to another but highlights the situated flexible self (Jost 
& Kruglanski, 2002; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, 2016). People are reactive to the 
social context and effortlessly draw on ambivalent discourses to construct 
outgroups, particularly when conflicting and competing arguments are salient 
within the interpretive framework. This is of particular importance in relation to the 
politically contentious immigration debate where the discursive environment is 
flooded with a cacophony of competing and conflicting positions.  
5.4.1 Limitations and Further Research 
The experimental study attempted to closely mirror the overarching contested 
discursive contexts, identified in studies one and two, and explored how the 
combined simultaneous competing and conflicting threat discourses patterns 
people’s shared construction of stereotypical refugees. Traditionally research has 
focused on how threat discourses constrain or enable participants’ responses in one 
direction. For example, symbolic and realistic threat is seen to increase hostile 
response towards immigrants (Costello & Hodson, 2011). This traditional research 
strategy is potentially, in part, driven by the experimental method employed and the 
ambition to uncover a statistical significance with a large effect size by attempting 
to shape participant responses in only one direction. In contrast this study here 
attempted to stay closer to representing the messy social world containing 
competing and conflicting arguments, although it needs to be acknowledged that 
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experiments could never fully represent the nuanced cut and thrust of social 
interaction. But due to exploring how people manage competing and conflicting 
arguments, the patterning of one argumentative position potentially reduces and 
constrains the pattern of the opposing position. Hence, staying closer to the real-
world interaction in relation to people’s construction of an outgroup potentially 
returns smaller statistical effect sizes as was seen here. However, in light of 
ongoing, everyday negotiation and management of competing and conflicting 
arguments, produced by the media, political actors and social interactions, the 
interactive experimental statistical effect sizes exposed here are reasonably 
substantive. The manipulations of each identity threat were dependent on only 200 
words in total and 13 words being changed between high and low threat conditions.  
 Also, previous research has indicated that negative information has a 
stronger influence when evaluating conflicting information (Nohlen, van 
Harreveld, & Cunningham, 2019) and a stronger asymmetrical influence on 
ambivalence (Snyder & Tormala, 2017). It was certainly the case in this study that 
participants expressing that others endorse ambivalent constructions of 
stereotypical refugees was more evident in the conditions containing high threat 
discourses. Hence, the negative threat content in the extracts may at times have 
masked the patterning of the conflict between identity threat arguments. This could 
benefit from further examination.  
 Furthermore, experiments limit participants’ potential responses and 
importantly they tend not to allow space for the participants to contest or debate the 
discursive situation. Therefore, this study could be improved upon by running a 




construction of refugees using their own words, which would closer resemble a 
natural social interaction (Tajfel, 1972). 
5.4.2 Meaning for Practice  
The results here lend support to the finding that the media and political actors need 
to be highly sensitive to how they depict refugees and immigrant groups (see also 
Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996). It extends this finding by highlighting that the media 
and political actors need to be cautious when questioning the nation’s response 
towards refugees and take in to account how this may interact with competing and 
conflicting identity threat arguments. Of particular significance here is the portrayal 
of the nation as being morally questionable due to not meeting its obligation for the 
accommodation of refugees can potentially pattern constructions of refugees as 
warm and likeable. If a commentator is questioning the moral standing of the nation, 
in order to maintain high levels of perceived warmth for refugees, they should also 
address the argument claiming refugees to be an economic burden and culturally 
problematic. A threat to the group’s positive image may lead the audience to feel 
that the cultural values of their nation is under attack on two fronts. One being an 
overarching moral reference group, such as the UN, and the other being the refugees 
themselves by potentially bringing their own culture to the host nation. However, 
deploying an argument that brings the nation’s moral standing into question can 
also increase constructions of refugees as competent and capable. In sum, advocates 
on behalf of refugees should be more vocal in countering the pragmatic cost to the 
nation arguments (realistic and symbolic threat discourses) and not exclusively rely 
on moral humanitarian arguments (Every, 2008; Nightingale et al., 2017) (also see 
chapter 3). 






In this chapter I will draw together the findings and conclusions of the three 
empirical papers (see chapters 3, 4 and 5) in relation to the overarching aims of this 
research project. The intention was to examine if people take up and deploy 
ambivalent discourses within the contentious immigration debate? And if so, how 
are ambivalent discourses negotiated, presented and strategically employed? What 
is potentially accomplished through ambivalent discourses within the contentious 
immigration debate? How do evolving interpretive frameworks potentially pattern 
ambivalent discourses used to construct immigrant groups? How are ambivalent 
discourses patterned by competing and conflicting identity concerns? 
 The main finding from the first study (see chapter 3 and section 6.1 below), 
was that these speakers advocating on behalf of refugees, in the context of national 
phone in radio program in Ireland, constructed an ambivalent paternalism towards 
refugees, potentially due to the overbearing hegemonic discourse of ‘banal’ 
nationalism (Billig, 1995) and ongoing and historic hostility towards refugees (for 
example S. Goodman, 2008, 2010; S. Goodman & Burke, 2010; S. Goodman & 
Speer, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003). These speakers laboured on their embodied 
emotional distress in response to the refugee crisis but struggled to confront the 
politically contentious question of how and where the refugees should be 
accommodated. This is potentially due to these speakers, in this context, attempting 
to find a commonplace with the broad national audience by building a politically 
acceptable affective alliance, based on sympathy for the refugees, whilst avoiding 




in this context, appeared unable to counter the ‘cost to the nation’ argument which 
implicitly leaves the refugees as being depicted as an economic burden and cultural 
concern (see section 6.1.2). And these speakers also avoid explicitly highlighting 
their nation’s moral and legal responsibility towards refugees (see section 6.1.3).  
 In contrast to study one, the second study (see chapter 4) showed that the 
discourse of these populist radical right politicians, in the context of an international 
stage, were not ambivalent towards immigrants but were consistently hostile (see 
section 6.2). It also needs to be noted that these populist radical right speeches rarely 
draw on the category of refugees but employed the term immigrant to included 
refugees and any other immigrant group deemed as being unwanted. Additionally, 
these populist radical right speeches, in this context, tended to present their political 
collective as active courageous protectors of the victimised cultural majority against 
the out of control influx of immigrants facilitated by a political elite (see section 
4.4). However, even though these populist radical right speeches, in this 
international context, tended to be forthright in their hostility towards immigrants, 
it was noticeably how these speakers also took up a similar ambivalent rhetorical 
strategies in order to accomplish their political project and construct and mobilise 
a positive political collective.  
 The ambivalent strategies employed within the talk of study one and study 
two, draw on divergent ideological themes. The advocates on behalf of refugees, in 
the context of the first study, employed an ambivalent paternalism, which relied on 
a mobilising a collective through shared emotional discomfort in response to the 
plight of refugees but paradoxically avoided a pragmatic argument of unambiguous 
and unconditional inclusive solidarity with refugees (see chapter 3). Whilst the 
populist radical right speeches, in the context of the second study, deployed a 
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repertoire of ambivalent diversity, which mobilised an inclusive diverse 
transnational collective, often referred to as ‘us patriots’, based on their 
contradictory core ideology of exclusionary nationalist nativism (see chapter 4). 
Importantly, the hegemonic discourse of everyday taken-for-granted ‘banal’ 
nationalism and the moral right to exclude unwanted others (Billig, 1995), 
potentially facilitated and empowered the rhetoric of these populist radical right 
speakers, in the context of study two, but constrained and problematised the rhetoric 
of these refugee advocates, in the context of study one.  
 The third study was an experiment that explored if people’s exposure to 
competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks, of identity threat discourses, 
patterned the shared construction of an immigrant group – specifically the potential 
ambivalent stereotyping of refugees (see chapter 5). The results of this study 
indicated that the interaction between the three competing and conflicting threat 
discourses did pattern shared constructions of stereotypical refugees (see section 
5.3 & 6.3 below). Specifically, when participants are exposed to high realistic threat 
discourse and high symbolic threat discourse, they tended to report that others in 
their nation will endorse an ambivalent construction of stereotypical refugees. But 
the specific relationship between the two stereotype dimensions, competence and 
warmth, was patterned by whether the group image threat discourse was high or 
low.  
 Hence, when participants were exposed to high realistic threat discourse and 
high symbolic threat discourse and low group image threat discourse, they tended 
to report that others in their nation would endorse a construction of stereotypical 
refugees as being high in warmth but low competence, which is an ambivalent 




argued that this is a common hegemonic discursive portrayal of refugees as an 
economic burden, cultural concern and the nation being morally sufficient and 
unobligated to offer increased accommodation to refugees. Hence, the discourse of 
these advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study one (see chapter 3 and 
section 6.1 below), may be orienting to, and constrained by, this hegemonic 
position. This potentially leaves them little option (especially within the constraints 
imposed by the response options in the study) but to take up an ambivalent 
paternalistic position that implicitly accepts the arguments against refugees 
presenting them as an economic burden and cultural concern. And accepting there 
is little or no moral and legal obligation towards them. Hence, these speakers, in the 
context of study one, potentially resort to mobilising a collective in support of 
refugees, through a paternalistic ambivalent discourse, which acknowledges their 
shared emotional distress in response to the plight of the warm but incompetent 
refugees, whilst avoiding directly addressing the pragmatic arguments against 
refugees. 
 Conversely, participants who are exposed to high realistic discourse and 
high symbolic threat discourse and high group image threat discourse tended to 
report that others in their nation would endorse an envious ambivalent construction 
of stereotypical refugees as being high in competence but low in warmth (Fiske et 
al., 2002) (see section 5.3 & 6.3.3). Again, it can be argued that the presentations 
of refugees as an economic burden and cultural concern is a hegemonic discourse. 
But the high group image threat discourse, which presents the nation as not meeting 
its moral and legal obligations towards refugees, is potentially less evident within 
the discursive environment. Nevertheless, it could be speculated that these populist 
radical right speeches, in the context of study two, consider that they have won the 
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pragmatic ‘cost to the nation’ argument, because it is the hegemonic position, but 
need to counter the moral and legal obligation to refugees (see chapter 4). Hence, 
they take up a discursive position as the courageous defenders of the victimised 
majority and employ an rhetorical strategy of ambivalent diversity, which is a form 
of envious ambivalent discourse, because it presents the cold and capable 
immigrants, as being recipients of preferential cultural recognition and treatment. 
These populist radical right speeches, in the context of study two, construct 
immigrants as being intent on reaping the economic, cultural and welfare benefits 
of the benevolent nation.  
  In sum, there is evidence across the three studies that these advocates on 
behalf of refugees on a national stage, in the context of study one, are constrained 
under the weight of hegemonic taken-for-granted ‘banal’ nationalism which 
assumes that nations have the moral right to exclude unwanted others (Billig, 1995). 
Whilst these populist radical speeches delivered on an international stage, in the 
context of study two, are discursively liberated and empowered. These advocates 
explored here, passively share their affective embodied discomfort in response to 
the plight of refugees, whilst these populist radical speeches, construct and mobilise 
a courageous diverse transnational collective – the patriots – defending against the 
preferential treatment offered to immigrants.  
6.1 CONSTRUCTING A SYMPATHETIC AFFECTIVE ALLIANCE IN 





6.1.1 Relieving Collective Emotional Discomfort or Building an Affective 
Alliance in Support of Refugees 
The first research strand of this project analysed general public discourse that was 
sympathetic toward the refugees during the 2015 European ‘refugee crisis’ (see 
chapter 3 on page 78). The analysis employed critical discursive psychology 
(Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and rhetorical psychology (Billig, 
1987; Billig et al., 1988). And also drew on the concept of affective-discursive 
practice (Wetherell, 2013a, 2015). The primary finding was, these speakers in the 
context of this study laboured on describing, in detail, their shared embodied 
emotional distress in response to the plight of the refugees. However, explicitly 
declaring a radical politically contentious argument stating that the refugees should 
be accommodated in Ireland appeared to be problematic. Hence, the sympathetic 
discourse fell short of making unconditional and unambiguous claims of inclusive 
political solidarity with the refugees (Subasić et al., 2008). This is not to say the 
speakers were entirely silent on the issue of offering sanctuary to the refugees, in 
Ireland, but when it came to deploying an affective-discursive repertoire 
(Wetherell, 2013a, 2015) that touched on this politically contentious issue, the 
speakers appeared to be cautious and the repertoires were potentially less readily 
available and problematic to express.  
 The discourse advocating on behalf of refugees, in the context of study one, 
was potentially constrained by overpowering hegemonic discourses that present 
nation-states as having the unquestionably moral right to exclude unwanted ‘others’ 
(Billig, 1995), and depicting refugees as bogus (Lynn & Lea, 2003) and a burden 
on host citizens (Fakih & Marrouch, 2015; S. Goodman & Speer, 2007). These 
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taken-for-granted commonsense arguments constructing refugees as problematic, 
restrict the discursive position in support of refugees to an ambivalent paternalism. 
These speakers in this context, potentially resort to a concern about ‘our’ collective 
emotional discomfort, because the argument is politically palatable, and therefore, 
potentially persuasive for listeners who are less supportive towards refugees.  
 In other words, taking up and performing an affective-discursive subjective 
position (Wetherell, 2013a, 2013b, 2015) that focusses on a shared sympathetic 
emotion, which is a culturally recognisable, normative and an acceptable response 
towards refugees, is potentially an attempt to seek a commonplace with the 
audience. Conversely, a politically radical position, questioning the legitimacy of 
the protection of privilege through national borders, is potentially problematic and 
may deter support from the audience. In this regard, the sympathetic identity 
performed by these speakers in this context, constructs an affective alliance that 
potentially mobilises a collective in support of refugees (Reicher & Jogdand, 2017). 
It serves the rhetorical function of social influence to potentially persuade others to 
join the sympathetic collective by taking the high moral ground (Condor et al., 
2013; Sindic & Condor, 2014).  
 However, the ambivalent paternalistic argument is inward focussed and 
laboured on the embodied emotional distress of the speakers in order to construct a 
sympathetic affective alliance in support of refugees. This sympathetic position 
strips refugees of their agency and is implicitly accepting of, and reifies, the taken-
for-granted assumption that refugees are an economic burden and cultural problem 
for host nations. It also maintains an entrenched power relationship by constructing 
wealthy nations’ responsibility towards refugees as generously benevolent and not 




nations have the privilege to experience this affective position (McConville et al., 
2019; Wetherell, 2013b) of generous benevolent sympathy towards refugees, but 
makes questionable its efficacy in disrupting and instigating structural change. 
Potentially the sympathetic repertoire does little more than relieve the emotional 
discomfort, through collective acknowledgement of this embodied experience and 
the consequential advocacy of ambiguous and limited help for refugees.  
 This rhetorical strategy, based on shared sympathy, potentially lacks 
potency and strength (for similar see Every, 2008; Every & Augoustinos, 2008) 
because it tends to avoid explicitly addressing more concrete concerns, such as 
basic human rights, and legal and moral obligations of wealthy nation-states. Also 
as Every (2008) has previously pointed out, emotional – ‘duty to others’ – 
arguments tend to be superseded by pragmatic – ‘cost to self’ – arguments (‘cost to 
self’ can be extended to the group level of ‘cost to the nation’). It was particularly 
noticeable that even though these speakers in this context did much discursive work 
describing their affective sympathetic position they avoided or found it problematic 
to address the pragmatic issue of the ‘cost to the nation’, to which I turn next. 
6.1.2 The Problematic ‘Cost to the Nation’ Argument 
These advocates who drew on sympathetic repertoires, in the context of study one, 
do not present the refugees as a potential asset to the nation. Quite the opposite, 
they either avoid the pragmatic ‘cost to the nation’ argument or they place limits on 
the acceptable number and length of stay of refugees. This implicitly provides 
support for the argument that refugees are indeed an economic burden and cultural 
problem for the potential host nation. It undermines the potential value and agency 
of refugees.  
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 One speaker Pat, within study one, brought the contentious issue of where 
the refugees should seek sanctuary to the attention of the audience by reporting a 
former conversation that he had with some of the refugee men (see section 3.4.2.2 
Extract 8: Pat 21/08/2015 on page 127). He recounts the refugees’ request for 
asylum in his country by directly drawing on the words of the refugees. This 
discursive strategy provides direct robust evidence of what the refugees desire 
(Holt, 1996), but the speaker Pat is not personally making this contentious request 
even though he is making an argument in support of refugees. He does not explicitly 
state that more refugees should be allowed into Ireland. Pat merely proceeds to tell 
the audience that the situation is ‘difficult’. In other words, it is an indisputable truth 
that the refugees desire sanctuary in Pat’s country, Ireland, because they are 
reported to have asked him, but according to Pat himself this request is also 
problematic. The pragmatic concern about refugees potentially being a burden on 
the nation is avoided except for the speaker referring to how difficult the situation 
is. Evidently, the speakers silence on allowing refugees into Ireland and directly 
addressing the ‘cost to the nation’ argument, presents the issue as problematic 
(Billig, 2006). 
 Other speakers, within the context of this first study, also labour on their 
sympathetic affective position, but also appear to find it problematic presenting a 
contentious political argument explicitly declaring that the refugees should be 
offered sanctuary in Ireland. William, another speaker on the program, avoids 
making direct demands on the audience and is ambiguous about where the asylum 
seekers should find refuge. He also hedges the issue by stating what the government 
could do and not what the government should do or are obligated by international 




line 6). And again, William avoids the pragmatic concern of whether refugees are 
seen to be a burden or asset to the potential host nation.  
 Mary, from the same study, was stronger in her direct demand that Ireland 
should do more to ‘help’ refugees (see section 3.4.1.6 Extract 6: Mary 3/09/2015 
on page 119). But her repertoire was also quick to add conditions on how far this 
‘help’ should extend. She considers it unnecessary to offer refugees a new home 
where they could start a new life. She justifies a temporary offer of ‘help’ for 
refugees by claiming that they will want to return to their own country eventually. 
Although she declares that Ireland’s offer to take six hundred refugees was a 
‘disgrace’, she proceeds to point out that she is not suggesting Ireland should take 
a much larger number, such as ‘eighty-two thousand’, which evidently would be 
too many. Again, this necessity to declare the acceptable quantity and only offering 
temporary accommodation for refugees, implicitly indicates that refugees are a 
problem and definitely not an asset to the host nation. Importantly, these tentative 
attempts to justify a limited offer of sanctuary for refugees stands in stark contrast 
to the extensive, and detailed, affective repertoires of embodied emotional distress 
employed by these speakers in this context.  
 However, Mary in study one, implicitly addresses the pragmatic ‘cost to the 
nation’ argument, but she does not counter it. She takes up a common-ground with 
the audience (see Billig, 1987, p. 217), some of whom are potentially hostile to 
refugees, by pointing out that she agrees with the taken-for-granted assumption that 
people belong to individual nations states and that is their home. This home nation 
is where they want to live and should reside. The central point is not that Mary 
avoids advocating for open borders or even support for a more liberal border 
regime, but she avoids contesting the argument that refugees are a potential 
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economic or cultural problem. She merely argues that refugees should be offered 
temporary help. Mary’s repertoire appears to draw on a commonplace with the 
audience by implying ‘what she is not’ (Billig, 1987, p. 269). She is not advocating 
that refugees be offered permanent residence and a place to build a new life. She 
does not support an unconditional number of refugees entering the country. 
People’s legitimate home is the country that they come from. Although her 
argument is sympathetic towards refugees, she also implicitly presents them as a 
problematic burden.  
 Mary’s argument appears to lack direct concern for what the refugees 
themselves might actually desire. She is potentially correct in certain instances but 
also ignores that families may desperately be searching for somewhere secure to 
raise their children into the future. Refugees attempting to escape a fractured 
country in the grip of civil war or ethnic violence are possibly resigned to the 
realisation that they are never likely to return. Even if the internal civil violence is 
brought to an end, it could take many generations to heal the divisions and rebuild 
a peaceful nation. And those in the minority, or politically contentious positions, 
who fled the country are potentially resigned to the knowledge that they will never 
feel safe in their country of origin. The primary argument in support of increasing 
accommodation of refugees is constructed on what ‘we’ want and a concern for 
relieving our shared emotional discomfort. The repertoires declare a means to put a 
stop to our shared ‘heart break’ and bring the national collective to a positive 
affective state by way of temporary and quantifiable ‘helping’ of refugees.  
 Importantly, Mary does not directly address the ‘cost to the nation’ 
argument by making a claim that refugees could be an asset to the nation. Quite the 




universal world made up of bounded nation-states in which individuals belong to 
particular nations (Billig, 1995). Hence, implicitly reifying refugees as a 
problematic burden and culturally unwelcome. These speakers, in the context of 
study one, appear to constructs their argument based on a, less researched, denial 
of excessive liberalism – ‘I’m no starry-eyed liberal but …’ (Billig, 1987, p. 270). 
Also these speakers, in the context of study one, are not seen to take up the opposing 
argument, that refugees are a burden, and invert its normative understanding in 
favour of her own position in support of refugees.  
6.1.3 Hiding the Nation 
Of further interest from the first study was the way some of these speakers, who 
drew on sympathetic repertoire, were ambiguous about their own country’s 
responsibility towards the refugees. According to Pat’s own disclosure (see section 
3.4.2.2 Extract 8: Pat 21/08/2015 on page 127), when the refugees ask him if they 
can go to his country, which they think is England, he does not proceed to tell the 
refugees he is not English but he is Irish. He does not suggest they should possibly 
attempt to head to Ireland. By his own admission it is ‘difficult’ and he keeps Ireland 
hidden during the reported conversation with the refugees. What is important here, 
is not what Pat reportedly said or did not say to the refugees but is what he does not 
say to the Irish radio audience. He does not explicitly request that the refugees 
should be offered sanctuary in Ireland. The repertoire that he draws on hints towards 
Ireland’s responsibility but avoids explicitly stating this. Instead the affective 
repertoire tentatively conveys a sympathetic argument through the retelling of a 
former conversation with the refugees. But even this story avoids explicitly making 
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an accusation that Ireland is even a requested or potentially a desired destination 
for the refugees.  
 However, although Ireland’s responsibility was not explicitly mentioned, 
the sympathetic request for Ireland to help the refugees is implied by Pat bringing 
his reported conversation with the refugees to the notice of the listening Irish 
audience. But importantly this cautious repertoire that touches on the contentious 
issue of where the refugees want to go, stands in stark contrast to Pat’s detailed and 
elaborate description of his embodied emotional discomfort that he also expresses 
to the audience. For example, Pat and other speakers drawn on the trope ‘it’s just 
heart breaking’ to describe their embodied emotional response to the plight of the 
refugees (see section 3.4.1.2 Extract 2: Pat 21/08/2015 on page 111; line 7).  
 It is also notable that William makes many repetitions and false starts as his 
talk stumbled towards getting his central point over to the listening audience (see 
section 3.4.2.3 Extract 9: William 21/08/2015 on page 131). Similar to Pat, he never 
directly mentions Ireland but ambiguously talks about the refugees needing to move 
west through Europe. However, it needs to be noted at this juncture that Billig 
(1995) highlighted that the nation, to which a speaker is referring, is often assumed 
and can be evoked without it necessarily being explicitly stated for an audience. But 
in previous discursive work exploring hostile responses to refugees it is notable that 
the name of nation was explicitly and repeatedly stated (see O'Doherty & 
Augoustinos, 2008). When the character of the nation is contested and an argument 
justifying the exclusion of refugees is being presented, the nation becomes hot and 
it is named. Contrastingly, in the context of this study, exploring arguments 
supporting refugees, these speakers appear to be tentative about pointing an 




the moral obligation to vulnerable individuals on the nation’s boundary is being 
highlighted, by these speakers in this context, explicitly naming the nation was 
avoided and even hidden.  
 William and Pat avoided explicitly pointing the accusatory finger directly 
at Ireland as both sidestep directly mentioning Ireland. The speakers appear to 
engage in discursive work building sympathy for the refugees but also show 
concern for protecting the positive image of the Irish nation. However, Mary 
explicitly orientates to the potential damage done to the positive moral image of the 
national group if it does not increase its offer of help to the refugees (see section 
3.4.1.6 Extract 6: Mary 3/09/2015 on page 119 line 9). The choice of the word 
‘disgrace’, that Mary draws upon, is particularly noteworthy as it defines the loss 
of reputation or respect for those in a position of power due to a dishonourable 
action. Mary also draws a comparison between helping the refugees and another 
temporary benevolent national event, the ‘Special Olympics’, and describes the 
collective affective response of joy that the country would potentially experience if 
it offers temporary help to the refugees.  
6.1.4 Summary 
In closing, it is important to reiterate, I am not claiming that the internal disposition 
of the speakers is insincere, which is potentially far from the case. This study 
highlights that these advocates on behalf of refugees, in this context, struggle to 
present a politically contentious case of unconditional inclusive political solidarity 
with refugees under the hegemonic weight of anti-refugee discourse. Furthermore, 
in line with the epistemological position of discursive psychology we cannot know 
or attempt to make inferences about the internal position and cognitions of the 
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speakers (S. Goodman, 2017b). The object of analysis here, was the discourse in 
itself and what is being accomplished through the discourse. Specifically, explored 
is the action orientation of the sympathetic discourse and importantly what was 
potentially being left unsaid (Billig, 2006; Murray & Durrheim, 2018, 2019). The 
strategy used to persuade the audience to temporarily help a limited number of 
refugees primarily draws on a shared affective position, which is potentially a 
normative and even a culturally expected response to the humanitarian crisis.  
 A discourse of ambivalent paternalism is apparent because the speakers 
struggle to make explicit unambiguous and unconditional demands of inclusive 
political solidarity with the refugees. The repertoires present a position of 
sympathy, concern and helping but fail to orient to the basic human rights and legal 
obligation to accommodate people seeking sanctuary from war and violence. 
Explicit arguments of what should be done, politically and structurally, to address 
the plight of the refugees is also lacking. The discursive position robs refugees of 
their agency and implicitly constructs them as a problematic burden for whom we 
should feel sympathy and offer temporary and limited accommodation.  
 It can be argued that on the one hand, the discursive strategy of ambivalent 
paternalism may be potentially persuasive by building an affective alliance between 
people who have the privilege to feel the same sympathy towards the refugee crisis 
and avoids a more contentious radical political argument. However, on the other 
hand, the argument is potentially weak and lacking political expediency (Carens, 
2013; Every & Augoustinos, 2008). The sympathetic position was notably inward 
focussed (Leach et al., 2002). Talking about our discomfort and preoccupied with 
image management. The discourse potentially works up an affective alliance 




political solidarity with the refugees. The discourse also lacked detail of how the 
refugees should be accommodated and was even ambiguous on where they should 
be accommodated. Importantly, the sympathetic talk implicitly presents the 
refugees as a problematic burden and undermines their potential worth for the host 
nation. 
6.2 CONSTRUCTING AN INCLUSIVE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL 
COLLECTIVE THROUGH AMBIVALENT DIVERSITY  
The second study (see Chapter 4 on page 136) was a critical discursive psychology 
(Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and rhetorical psychology (Billig, 
1987, 1991) analysis of speeches by leading European populist radical right 
politicians on an international stage. The initial objective, as in study one, was to 
explore these speeches for ambivalent discourses pertaining to immigrants. 
However, on closer examination the discourse within the speeches was found to be 
consistently and singularly hostile towards immigrants and immigration. It also 
worthy of note that these speakers, in this context, rarely employed the category 
label ‘refugees’, but tended to use delegitimising generic terms, ‘immigrants’ for 
all those deemed unwelcome (for example see section 4.4.2.1Extract 3: Frauke 
Petry; line 2 & 5). This hostile discourse towards immigration, immigrants and 
implicitly refugees, or people seeking asylum, by the populist radical right is well 
documented in previous research (for example Finlay, 2007; S. Goodman & 
Johnson, 2013; Johnson & Goodman, 2013; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Sakki 
et al., 2017; Sakki & Pettersson, 2016; Wodak, 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008). 
Hence, this analytic path was not pursued, but attention was turn to how these 
populist radical right speakers, on this international stage, employ a rhetorical 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
219 
 
strategy of ambivalent diversity to mobilise an inclusive transnational collective 
based on the ideology of exclusionary nationalist nativism.  
6.2.1 Mobilising the Active Courageous Transnational Patriots  
In contrast to the advocates on behalf of refugees, these populist radical right 
speakers on this international stage, celebrate the extensive and expanding 
transnational membership of their political collective often referred to as ‘us 
patriots’. Included within the patriot membership are those who voted in support of 
Brexit (the UK leaving the European Union) and for Donald Trump as US president 
and unspecified victories across Europe (for example see section 4.4.1.1 Extract 1. 
Janice Atkinson and section 4.4.1.2 Extract 2: Geert Wilders4.4.1.2). The 
transnational membership was not only limited to America and European nations 
as Marine Le Pen even identifies the Russian president, ‘Mr. Putin’, as an ally of 
the patriot movement (see section 4.4.2.3 Extract 5: Marine Le Pen; line 8). The 
speakers regularly applauded their increasing political fortune and expanding 
transnational membership across Europe and America. The repertoires employed 
contained unlimited lists and strategic ambiguities of where on the globe new 
patriot members will arise. Furthermore, even though Janice Atkinson expresses 
enthusiasm for the Brexit referendum result, in support of the UK leaving the 
European Union, she finds it necessary to reassure the patriot collective that she and 
the British people are committed to ongoing membership. In other words, despite 
her one of core political desires being fulfilled, by the UK leaving the European 
Union, which means she will no longer hold membership of the European 




and the supporters of Brexit, enduring commitment to the patriot collective (see 
section 4.4.1.1 Extract 1. Janice Atkinson; line 5). 
 Importantly, these populist radical right speeches, on this international 
stage, mainly draw on a pragmatic ‘cost to the nation’ argument to mobilise a 
political collective – us patriots – as active courageous defenders of the nation (for 
example see section 4.4.1.2 Extract 2: Geert WilderExtract 2: Geert Wilders 
(Punctuation from subtitles). The speakers appeared to draw on a taken for granted 
assumption, which required little supporting evidence, that immigrants are a 
problematic burden and cultural concern. They depict international migration using 
apocalyptic discourse that potentially evokes fear of the ‘other’ and anger towards 
an oppressive political establishment, primarily the European Union. They present 
themselves as the solution to this problem, as active courageous defenders against 
these enemy ‘others’ (for example see section 4.4.1.2 Extract 2: Geert Wilders & 
4.4.2.3 Extract 5: Marine Le Pen). But, at the same time, their speeches are 
strategically cautious, averting fears that their nationalist ideology would bring a 
repeat of past European conflict (see section 4.4.2.2 Extract 4: Harald Vilimsky; 
line 7) and, paradoxically, they even present themselves as capable of building 
peaceful relationships with people who are ‘different’ (see section 4.4.2.3 Extract 
5: Marine Le Pen; line 9 & 10).  
 Their position as courageous defenders, capable of adverting an otherwise 
inevitable catastrophe, was notably more forthright than the advocates on behalf of 
refugees, in the context of study one. These populist radical right speakers on this 
international stage did not present themselves as average members of the patriot 
collective, but they construct themselves as exceptional prototypical members, who 
singularly have the capacity, with the support of the patriot collective, to save the 
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‘people’ from an apocalyptic future (see also Wodak, 2019). For example, Geert 
Wilders present himself as being the embodiment of the ‘courage’ that he receives 
from being in the presence of other patriots (see section 4.4.1.2 Extract 2: Geert 
Wilders on page 149; line 9).  
 This fearful and embattled talk was not only deployed in relation to 
immigration but was also used to describe the European Union. Many of the 
speakers depict the European Union as an oppressive institution that they are at war 
with. For example, Marine Le Pen depicts the European Union as being prison that 
is supressing cultural diversity and is imposing war on individual nation states (see 
section 4.4.2.3 Extract 5: Marine Le Pen on page 155). Similarly, Janice Akinson 
claims the nations need to ‘unshackling’ themselves from the ‘unaccountable anti-
democratic EU’ (see section 4.4.1.1 Extract 1. Janice Atkinson on page 147).  
 The patriots are mobilised to actively defend against the impending 
disruption of a world made up of a patchwork of monocultural nations. This 
positioning is considerably different to the discourse drawn upon by the advocates 
on behalf of refugees in the context of study one, in the context of the first study. 
The advocates discourse was more passive and inward looking as they share their 
embodied emotional distress in reaction to the refugee crisis and avoided, or even 
indulge, the pragmatic ‘cost to the nation’ argument.  
6.2.2 Mobilising the Collective Through Ambivalent Diversity  
As previously discussed (see also section 4.5), the speeches of the populist radical 
right politicians, in the context of study two, works up a transnational political 
collective, often labelled ‘us patriots’, which is extensive, expanding and enduring. 




of exclusionary nationalist nativism, by celebrating an ambivalent diversity 
between bounded culturally homogenous nation-states. This notion of diversity 
accomplishes two rhetorical strategies. Firstly, the normative egalitarian 
understanding of diversity, that protects the open cultural expression of minority 
groups, is co-opted and used to justify the exclusion of minority cultures from 
dominant majority cultures. Therefore, the argument is constructed as rational 
(Billig, 2012) by not displaying thoughtless disregard for the cherished liberal value 
of cultural diversity. Instead the common understanding of diversity is reversed and 
deploying it in service of minority exclusion and protection of dominant majority 
cultures. Secondly, it facilitates the speakers’ performance as leaders, as 
entrepreneurs of identity (Haslam et al., 2010) on an international stage, through 
the construction of a transnational inclusive political collective that is culturally 
diverse. However, membership is dependent on adherence to the core ideology that 
the true cultural diversity is constituted through bounded culturally homogenous 
nations. This is an efficient rhetorical strategy within an interconnected globalised 
world (Gleibs & Reddy, 2017). Even though the speakers privilege national 
concerns, their ability to stand on an international stage and make an appeal to a 
culturally diverse ‘people’, expands the membership of the political collective to 
being universally inclusive. Arguably, whatever core political ideology is being 
forwarded in the present globalised world, constructing the political identity as 
having transnational appeal is going to increase the legitimacy and reach of the 
political collective (Gleibs & Reddy, 2017).  
 Importantly, these populist radical right speakers, in this context, position 
themselves as the defenders of the victimised majority group, which is a common 
rhetorical strategy within populist radical right discourse (also see G. O. Edwards, 
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2012; Johnson & Goodman, 2013; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Verkuyten, 
2013; Wodak, 2019; Wodak, KhosraviNik, & Mral, 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008). 
This victim positioning is particularly evident where Frauke Petry claims that the 
cultural majority is being denied the cultural recognition that is bestowed upon 
immigrants. And this form of cultural diversity is a bogus product of European 
bureaucrats (see section 4.4.2.1 Extract 3: Frauke Petry; line 2 & 3). These populist 
radical right speakers, on this international stage, present themselves as the 
guardians of a true cultural diversity between culturally homogenous nations. They 
claim that the protection of this genuine cultural diversity from the immigration, 
which is encouraged by prominent political actors within the European Union, is a 
major concern for the majority – the ‘people’. As noted by Wodak (2019), this 
populist anti-elite rhetoric, in a European context, often targets the European Union. 
Frauke Petry also describes a true diversity between monocultural nation states, 
which is hostile to immigration, and this ideological position is supported by other 
speeches at the conference (for example see section 4.4.2.2 Extract 4: Harald 
Vilimsky on page 154 and section 4.4.2.3 Extract 5: Marine Le Pen on page 155).  
 Interestingly, the speakers are quick to reassure listeners that this liberation 
and reestablishment of national diversity will not lead to conflict. On the contrary 
it will bring about harmonious and neighbourly friendship between nation-states. 
Marine Le Pen, states that diversity between nations does not mean war and people 
who are different are not an enemy, but they are people she will seek to build a 
relationship with. This appeal to relationship building with people of difference is 
an explicit expression of the ambivalence towards cultural diversity, particularly 




immigrants. The speeches make explicit presumptions about distinct, static and 
essentialist national cultures.  
 Wodak (2013) outlines three characteristics of populist radical right 
discourse. Firstly, the populist radical right position themselves as representing all 
the ‘people’. Secondly the ‘people’ are defined as all holding the same political 
beliefs, which are in line with their own (also see Haslam et al., 2010). Third, 
nation-states are made up of a homogenous group of people (Wodak, 2013). Study 
two shows that the rhetorical strategy of ambivalent diversity accomplishes all three 
of these objectives but also transcends the nation-state with ease. The speakers are 
not merely representatives of their nation, but they represent an inclusive diverse 
transnational ‘people’.  
 Counter to De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) and Moffitt’s (2016, 2017) 
argument that the populist radical right find it problematic to convincingly mobilise 
transnational populism, these speakers on this international stage appear to have 
little difficulty working up a transnational political identity. It is potentially 
somewhat short sighted to assume that the populist radical right would struggle to 
build solidarity across nation-states, when understandings of nationalism and the 
moral right to exclude others is so pervasive and universally accepted (Billig, 1995). 
People tend to consider, the world made up of a patchwork of nations within which 
individuals belong to a particular nation, is the natural order. Hence, even though 
the core ideology of nationalist nativism appears paradoxical, it actually facilitates 
the production of a transnational collective. Furthermore, the rhetorical strategy of 
ambivalent diversity enables Rydgren’s (2005) notion ‘cross national diffusion’ of 
the populist radical rights rebranded ideological position the ‘new master frame’. 
In other words, the transnational mobilisation of the ‘patriot’ collective, through the 
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rhetorical strategy of ambivalent diversity, provides an understanding of how 
populist radical right exclusionary ideologies are being seen to spread across the 
globe.  
 Crucially, although the populist radical right speeches, in this context, were 
singularly and consistently hostile towards immigration, they draw on an 
ambivalent rhetorical strategy that attempts to garner support for an exclusionary 
ideology by celebrating a cultural diversity between monocultural nations. This 
positions the transnational patriot collective as outward looking and inclusive. 
Sharing a universally accepted ideology based on a true cultural diversity alongside 
an exclusionary hostility towards immigration. The transnational mobilisation of 
the patriot collective is not hindered by the ideology of nationalist nativism, but this 
ideological position actually facilitates the extensive, expanding, and enduring 
membership of the collective.  
 Conversely, the advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of the first 
study (see chapter 3), resorted to an inward looking shared emotional response 
towards the plight of refugees, and are reticent about making contentious political 
demands and therefore, place conditional limitations on the potential 
accommodation of refugees. Their rhetorical strategy to mobilise a collective is 
based on a shared affective position, the emotional response towards the ‘difficult’ 
situation, within an environment that is universally hostility towards international 
migration.  
6.2.3 Summary 
These populist radical right speakers, in the context of this intentional stage, appear 




us patriots – based on their core ideology of exclusionary nationalist nativism. They 
celebrate their extensive and expanding global membership and orient to their 
enduring commitment to the patriot collective, which is independent of European 
Union membership. They present themselves as prototypical courageous defenders 
of the naively benevolent majority, whose culture receives inadequate recognition 
from the political elite, compared to the ‘masses of immigration’. Their speeches, 
in this context, appear to orient to a universal taken-for-granted understanding that 
immigrants are problematic and construct the patriot collective as active protectors 
of the true cultural diversity between monocultural nations. Conversely, the 
advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study one, struggle to construct a 
politically contentious, unconditional and unambiguous inclusive solidarity with 
refugees. The difference between the discourse of these populist radical right 
speeches, in the context of study two, and these advocates on behalf of refugees, in 
the context of study one, is potentially due to the universally accepted ‘banal’ 
nationalism of a world made up of nation states, to which individuals belong and 
nations have the moral right to exclude unwanted others (Billig, 1995). Next, I turn 
to a summary of the experimental study (see chapter 5) exploring if people’s 
exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks, of identity threat 
discourses, will pattern the shared construction of an immigrant group.  
6.3 COMPETING AND CONFLICTING IDENTITY THREAT 
DISCOURSE AND CONSTRUCTING THE STEREOTYPICAL REFUGEE 
6.3.1 Self-Stereotyping Patterns How People Stereotype Others 
The experimental study, within the contemporary context of this research project, 
explored if people’s exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive 
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frameworks, of identity threat discourses, would pattern the shared construction of 
an immigrant group – specifically the potential ambivalent stereotyping of refugees 
(see chapter 5 and see chapter 2 for more detail of the context). This experiment 
was, in part, informed by the findings from the two discursive studies (see chapters 
3 & 4), particularly in relation to the content of the identity threat discourses 
employed in the manipulations. The manipulations even drew on two direct quotes 
found in the data of the first discursive study. For example, one quote in support of 
refugees was, it is ‘just heart breaking’, and the second opposing refugees, was the 
nations response being described as ‘punching above our weight’. The experiment 
also drew on the main arguments, for and against the accommodation of refugees, 
that have been evidenced in other discursive work (for example S. Goodman, 2007; 
S. Goodman, 2010; Lynn & Lea, 2003). 
 Furthermore, discursive and rhetorical psychology theory also informed the 
theoretical approach to the experiment, along with the social identity approach, 
which were discussed in detail in chapter 1. One main point, worthy of brief 
reiteration here, before revisit the findings, is how people stereotype themselves, in 
terms of what values, beliefs and characteristics that are important to their own 
social group, patterns how they stereotype others (Elcheroth et al., 2011). 
Importantly, these values, beliefs and characteristics of the group are not fixed, but 
are contested through discourse, and affective practice (Wetherell, 2014a), and this 
is also the foundation of mobilising collective action in support of a particular 
political project (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Within the contentious immigration 
debate the primary social identity of significance is national identity. There are 
other intersecting identities that also inform responses to the issue of immigration, 




 Hence, the experiment manipulated participants’ exposure to competing and 
conflicting identity threat discourses. Specifically, it draw on three discourses 1) 
declaring their nation’s moral obligation towards the accommodation of refugees 
(group image threat discourse); 2) describing how potentially problematic refugees 
are to the host nation due to being presented as a burden on resources (realistic 
threat); 3) describing how refugees are a negative impact on cultural identity 
(symbolic threat). The tension between these competing and conflicting arguments 
can be summarised as a conflict between the ‘duty to the other’ versus ‘cost to the 
nation’. 
 Importantly, unlike previous experimental research, all three identity threat 
discourses (group image, realistic and symbolic threat) were presented 
simultaneously to participants as either high or low in each condition. Hence, 
participants were asked to respond to a combination of all three identity threat 
discourses: 1) high or low realistic threat discourse and 2) high or low symbolic 
threat discourse and 3) high or low group image threat discourse. The outcomes 
measured were participants reporting how others from their national group would 
endorse the stereotype dimensions of competence and warmth to refugees (Fiske et 
al., 2002). An ambivalent construction of stereotypical refugees was considered to 
be present, if there was a significant difference between the dimensions of 
competence and warmth.  
 The experiment indicated that the three identity threat discourses had an 
interactive patterning on participants reporting that others endorsed ambivalent 
constructions of stereotypical refugees (see section 5.3). Hence, people confronted 
with competing and conflicting identity threat arguments tended to report that 
others in their nation would endorse an ambivalent construction of stereotypical 
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refugees. Conversely, participants in the condition where all three threats were low, 
and hence, not in conflict, did not reported that others would endorse an ambivalent 
construction of stereotypical refugees because competence and warmth were not 
rated significantly different from each other (see table 5.2).  
 However, when both realistic and symbolic threat discourses were high the 
participants tended to assume that others would endorse an ambivalent construction 
of stereotypical refugees, but the relationship between the dimensions warmth and 
competence was dependent on whether the group image threat discourse was high 
or low threat (this is clearly depicted in figure 5.1 in the results section 5.3). Hence, 
when symbolic and realistic threat discourses were both high and the group image 
threat discourse was low then warmth of refugees was rated significantly higher 
than competence, which can be described as paternalistic ambivalent construction 
(Fiske et al., 2002). Conversely, when symbolic and realistic threat discourses were 
both high, but in this condition the group image threat discourse was also high, the 
relationship was inverted so warmth was now rated significantly lower than 
competence, which can be described as envious ambivalent construction (Fiske et 
al., 2002). I will now discuss the outcomes of these two conditions separately. 
Firstly, the paternalistic ambivalent construction (see section 6.3.2) and then the 
envious ambivalent construction (see section 6.3.3). 
6.3.2 Paternalistic Ambivalent Construction of Stereotypical Refugees 
When realistic threat and symbolic threat discourses were both high and group 
image threat discourse was low, there was no conflict between the identity threat 
arguments, but participants in this condition reported that others in their national 




refugees, where warmth is rated significantly higher than competence (Fiske et al., 
2002) (see figure 5.1 and table 5.2 in section 5.3). The ambivalent stereotype 
construction is paternalistic, because the warm but incompetent refugees are 
presented as being liked but not respected (Fiske et al., 2002). Arguably this is due 
to the refugees not being described as capable of inflicting competitive harm on the 
nation, because of the low group image threat discourse, which depicts the nation 
as meeting its moral and legal obligation and, therefore, there is no requirement to 
accommodate additional refugees.  
 The identity threat arguments were not in conflict because high symbolic 
and high realistic threat discourse because both claim that refugees are a potential 
problem to the host nation, whilst low group image threat claims the nation’s 
response to refugees is morally justified and legally sufficient. In brief the 
participants read that refugees are a potential burden on resources and a negative 
impact on cultural identity, but the positive image of the nation is not being 
questioned due to its present offer of sanctuary to an adequate number of refugees. 
This condition indicates that participants exposure to the pragmatic ‘cost to the 
nation’ arguments, in the form of high symbolic and high realistic threats 
discourses, alongside an absence of a ‘duty to others’ argument, in the form of group 
image threat discourse, patterns the response that others will endorse a paternalistic 
ambivalent construction of stereotypical refugees, where warmth was rated 
significantly higher than competence.  
 Hence, the ambivalent construction of stereotypical refugees can occur 
when people are orienting to an argument depicting refugees as a problematic threat 
without a conflicting moral humanitarian argument being present. Low group image 
threat discourse, which plays down the moral and legal responsibility of the nation 
AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES  
231 
 
to offer refugees sanctuary, potentially decreases the evaluated social status of the 
refugees as it orients to an acceptable level of exclusion of refugees outside of the 
nation. These findings are in line with previous stereotype content model theory 
and research, because social status is seen to pattern ratings of competence (Fiske 
et al., 2002). The evaluated capability and competence of the refugees is decreased 
because they can do little to contest their situation and are solely dependent on the 
moral and legal obligations being implemented by the nation, which is beyond their 
control. 
 The presentation of refugees as a potential problem to the host nation, 
alongside the claim that the nation is doing enough to meet their moral and legal 
obligation to accommodate refugees, is arguably a hegemonic discourse and 
commonplace within the media (e.g. S. Goodman & Speer, 2007; Haynes et al., 
2006; Lynn & Lea, 2003). The pervasive constructions of refugees as an economic 
and cultural problem, and asylum applications as generally being bogus, invalidates 
the moral and legal obligation towards refugees (Every & Augoustinos, 2008; Lynn 
& Lea, 2003). Hence, people exposed to this rhetorical position may construct 
refugees using ambivalent paternalistic discourse. This does not necessarily mean 
they will advocate structural change. Quite the opposite, it can be argued that the 
propagation of a paternalistic power relationship is a means to maintain the 
inequitable and discriminatory status quo (Durrheim et al., 2014; Jackman, 1994; 
Nadler, 2016; Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009). Furthermore, it is 
likely that the advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of the first discursive 
study (see chapter 3 and section 6.1), are also regularly exposed to this hegemonic 
position and orient to it when they are attempting to mobilise collective support on 




 For example, one speaker, Pat, struggles to explicitly address the 
contentious issue of where the refugees should find sanctuary and instead, covertly 
describes a conversation that he had with some refugees previously and admits that 
a political solution is ‘difficult’ (see section 3.4.2.2 Extract 8: Pat 21/08/2015 on 
page 127). Similarly, Mary is seen to take up an ambivalent paternalism discourse 
by stating that more needs to be done to help the refugees because it will make the 
nation feel good. But she avoids contesting the argument that refugees are an 
economic burden and cultural problem. She even indulges this argument, by claim 
that the refugees should only be offered temporary accommodation for a limited 
number (see section 3.4.1.6 Extract 6: Mary 3/09/2015 on page 119). Therefore, in 
the face of the hegemonic hostile discourse towards refugees, and within the limits 
of the available response options these advocates, in the context of study one, 
appear to have little rhetorical option other than to work up an affective position of 
sympathy towards the warm but incompetent refugees in order to mobilise a 
collective in support of refugees. 
6.3.3 Envious Ambivalent Construction of Stereotypical Refugees 
In the condition where both realistic and symbolic threat discourses were high and 
group image threat discourse was also high, hence the identity threat arguments 
were in conflict, participants tended to report that others from their nation will 
endorse an envious ambivalent construction of stereotypical refugees, where 
competence was rated significantly higher than warmth (Fiske et al., 2002) (see 
figure 5.1 and table 5.2 in section 5.3). The ambivalent stereotype is envious 
because the cold but competent refugees are not liked, but they are respected, 
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potentially due to them being capable of inflicting competitive harm on the nation 
(Fiske et al., 2002). 
 The refugees in this condition are depicted as a problem to the host nation, 
and the nation is also morally and legally obligated to do more to accommodate 
these problematic refugees. Hence, participants exposed to this condition, report 
others in their nation endorse a construction of stereotypical refugees as being more 
competent, arguably because they are evaluated as having the ability to implement 
their negative intentions on the host state due to the discursive emphasise on the 
moral and legal obligation of the nation to offer refugees sanctuary. The social 
status of the refugees in this condition is increased because they are presented as 
having the moral and legal right to be included within the nation. Hence, the 
refugees in this condition are evaluated as being more capable and competent of 
inflicting their competitive intentions on the nation because as they may have to be 
accommodated within the nation in order to redress the moral image of the nation.  
 The notion of being envious of refugees may appear odd, but it is common 
to describe refugees, who have been settled in a host nation, as receiving 
preferential treatment over the indigenous population (e.g. Every & Augoustinos, 
2007; Every & Augoustinos, 2008; Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2011; Hanson-
Easey et al., 2014; O'Doherty & Augoustinos, 2008; Reicher & Ulusahin, 2020; 
Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Verkuyten, 2013). This envious ambivalent 
positioning of host citizens, as victims who are being taken advantage of by 
immigrants, was also evident within the second study of populist radical right 
speeches (see chapter 4 on page 136 and section 6.2 above). For example, Frauke 
Petry claims that immigrants are receiving preferential cultural recognition that host 




 Hence, it can be argued that these populist radical right speakers, in the 
context of study two, employ an envious ambivalent discourse towards immigrants 
because they are potentially orienting to the group image threat argument that 
implicates the nation has a moral and legal obligation to accommodate more 
refugees. Although these populist radical right speeches, in the context of the 
second discursive study, avoided directly and explicitly addressing the question of 
the nation’s moral obligation towards refugees, they are potentially countering this 
argumentative position by constructing how immigrants are given preferential 
treatment and are taking advantage of the naive humanitarian generosity offered by 
host citizens (see chapter 4 and section 6.2). It also needs to be noted that these 
populist radical right speeches tended to draw on the category of immigrants and 
avoid the term refugees.  
6.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
The primary intentions of this research project were to explore if people draw upon 
and deploy ambivalent discourses within contentious political debate – specifically 
the immigration debate? And if so, what opposing ideological themes are drawn 
upon, or left unsaid, and what potentially brings them into being. And what is 
potentially being accomplished through the deployment of these ambivalent 
discourses? Additionally examined, was how people’s exposure to competing and 
conflicting interpretive frameworks of identity threat discourses patterned the 
shared construction of an immigrant group – specifically the potential ambivalent 
stereotyping of refugees. The findings here indicate that ambivalent discourses are 
commonly employed within the contentious immigration debate and the competing 
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and conflicting themes drawn upon, or avoided, are dependent on the context, the 
argument being countered or presented, and the collective being mobilised.  
 Therefore, I argue that these advocates on behalf of refugees, explored in 
the context of study one (see chapter 3), can be seen to draw on an ‘ambivalent 
paternalism’ discourse, because they labour on a performance of their shared 
emotional distress, in response to the plight of refugees, in an attempt to mobilise a 
narrow affective alliance offering limited and temporary help to refugees. Whilst, 
on the other hand, these advocates conspicuously avoid radical arguments that 
could potentially alienate and lose support of the audience. For example, they avoid 
claiming unconditional and unambiguous inclusion of the refugees and avoid 
contesting the national character and interests. Also, it is important to emphasise 
that these advocates in this context do not construct refugees as having value and 
being a potential benefit for the nation. As highlighted within the experimental 
study (see chapter 5), this patterning of an ‘ambivalent paternalistic’ discourse 
potentially occurs because the advocates, in the context of study one, are in part, 
orienting to an evaluation of the overarching competing and conflicting interpretive 
framework where discourse describing the symbolic and realistic threat from 
refugees is negative and prevalent whilst group image threat discourse is weak and 
often absent. 
 Conversely, the populist radical right speeches, explored in the context of 
study two (see chapter 4), are seen to draw on a rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent 
diversity’, which positions host citizens as being ‘envious’ of the cultural 
recognition bestowed upon immigrants by the political elite. This rhetorical strategy 
of ‘ambivalent diversity’ also facilitates the mobilisation of an extensive, expanding 




right speeches do not present immigrants as being a benefit to the nation, but they 
certainly construct them as taking advantage of host citizens and, hence, attributing 
more agency to immigrants than offered by the advocates in the context of study 
one.  
It also needs to be highlighted at this juncture that the label ‘immigrant’, 
used by these populist radical right speeches, orients to unwanted people crossing 
international borders and this implicitly includes refugees and people seeking 
asylum. This is particularly evident by the way the category of ‘immigrant’ is 
described as moving in uncontrolled numbers – ‘masses of immigrant’ – which at 
the time, and context, of study two can be assumed to include people fleeing war 
and violence who are attempting to find sanctuary in Europe. This category label 
‘immigrant’ is also an efficient means to delegitimise refugees and people seeking 
asylum (S. Goodman, Sirriyeh, & McMahon, 2017; S. Goodman, & Speer, 2007). 
As highlighted within the experimental study (see chapter 5), this patterning 
of an ‘envious ambivalent’ construction of refugees – such as portrayed within the 
rhetorical strategy ‘ambivalent diversity’ – potentially occurs because these 
populist radical right speakers, in the context of study two, are in part, orienting to 
an evaluation of the overarching competing and conflicting interpretive framework 
where discourses describing the symbolic and realistic threat from refugees 
(referred to as immigrants in the speeches) is negative and prevalent. Whilst group 
image threat discourse is also evaluated as being highly threatening.  
The important point being highlighted here, is the way the opposing 
arguments are structured is potentially patterned by the argument’s orientation to 
the level of threat to nations moral and legal standing (group image threat 
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discourse). Whilst both sides of the immigration argument are accepting of the 
hegemonic claim that refugees or immigrants are an economic burden and cultural 
concern (high realistic and high symbolic threat discourse). Acceptance of the claim 
that the nation is meeting its moral and legal obligation (low group image threat 
discourse) potentially patterns an ‘ambivalent paternalism’ argument where 
speakers work up feelings of sympathy towards refugees and makes offers of 
dependency-orientated helping (Nadler, 2002) as oriented to by the advocates in the 
context of study one.  
 Although one might assume that questioning the moral and legal 
obligation of the nation towards refugees might have been a robust rhetorical 
strategy, it is notable that these advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of 
study two, never explicitly draw on this argument (cf. Every, 2008, 2013; Every, & 
Augoustinos, 2013). They do express a claim that the nation’s offer of help is 
insufficient, but never explicitly question the nations moral and legal position. This 
rhetorical strategy by these advocates, in the context of study one, is surprising and 
somewhat hard to explain. But it is worth emphasising, at this point, that it is the 
experimental study (chapter 5), which helps to explain this rhetorical conundrum 
by indicated that these advocates, in the context of study two, may evaluate the 
nation as meeting its base line moral and legal obligation towards refugees (low 
group image threat discourse). But it is only due to the level of the ‘crisis’ that more 
needs to be done to help a limited number of refugees temporarily. Plus, if these 
advocates, in this context, were to explicitly question and claim the nations is not 
meeting its moral and legal obligation towards refugees their argument may be 




Conversely, rejection of, and attempts to counter the argument that the 
nation is not meeting its moral and legal obligation (high group image threat 
discourse) potentially patterns an ‘envious ambivalent’ argument as evident with 
the rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’ drawn on by the populist radical 
right speeches in the context of study two. Here the position of the victim is 
inverted. Host citizen are constructed as the group that sympathy should be 
bestowed upon because they are treated unfairly in comparison to immigrants or 
implicitly refugees. The question of the nation’s moral and legal obligation towards 
refugees becomes obsolete because it is only justifiable if these people seeking 
sanctuary are the true victims who deserve protection. Again it needs to be emphasis 
that it is the experimental study (see chapter 5), which provides an understanding 
why these populist radical right speeches, in the context of study two, take up an 
peculiar rhetorical strategy that positions host citizens as victims and envious of  
treatment given to immigrants or implicitly refugees.  
 Furthermore, the point being made here is not based on the individual 
speakers’ internal processing of the arguments, for and against immigrants or 
refugees, but it is how these arguments are potentially patterned by the competing 
and conflicting interpretive frameworks – particularly identity threat discourses – 
within the broad overarching discursive environment (see study three chapter 5). 
What ‘we’ can think, feel and say is constrained or enabled – patterned – by the 
dominant discourses within ‘our’ shared social world (Billig, 1987; Van Dijk, 1993; 
Wetherell, 1998, 2015). And I use ‘we’ in the collective sense.  
Put simply, both sides of the immigration debate are patterned within a 
discursive environment that is predominantly hostile to immigration and refugees 
because they are constructed as being a strain on resources and a cultural concern 
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(high symbolic and realistic threat discourses). But the evaluation of the nation’s 
moral and legal obligation towards refugees (group image threat discourse) appears 
to pattern the arguments differently dependent on the side of the debate. On the one 
hand, the advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study one, potentially 
evaluate the nation’s moral and legal obligation concern as being onside with their 
position but too radical to explicitly draw upon. Therefore, their argument is 
patterned to an ‘ambivalent paternalism’ and mobilisation of the political collective 
is constrained to a narrow affective alliance.  
 Conversely, these populist radical right speakers, in the context of study 
two, potentially evaluate the nations moral and legal obligation as being counter to 
their position and, therefore, patterns the argument deployed to an envious position 
embedded within the rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’, which enables an 
extensive, expansive and enduring transnational mobilisation. Interestingly, the 
claim that the nation is not meeting its moral and legal obligation towards refugees 
is efficiently challenged by delegitimising refugees (implicitly labelled as 
immigrants by the populist radical right) through a construction of them being in 
receipt of preferential treatment compared to the benevolent host citizens. In other 
words, the moral and legal obligation of the nation, in itself becomes questionable, 
because the immigrants are taking advantage of the benevolent naive host citizens. 
The rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’ actually positions the liberal notion 
of cultural diversity, that offers cultural recognition to minorities, as being 
dishonest, immoral and potentially even illegal.  
 Interestingly, these findings resonate with Verkuyten’s (2005a) results 
showing that when immigrants are describe using situational discourse, as lacking 




immigrants are described using individualised discourse, as having choice to 
migrate multiculturalism is rejected and the immigrants are expected to assimilate. 
In this project we see how descriptions of the level of agency, and whether an 
immigrant group has the moral and legal right to demand entry into the nation, can 
pattern constructions of the immigrant group, as seen in the experimental study (see 
chapter 5). It is also noteworthy, how the advocates on behalf of refugees, in the 
context of study one, depict them as lacking agency, being a dependent burden and 
draw on a discourse of ‘ambivalent paternalism’. Conversely, the populist radical 
right speeches, in the context of study two, present the host citizens as being 
‘envious’ of the preferential treatment acquired by the agentic immigrants and 
refugees. In other words, describing immigrant groups as having agency dismisses 
the legitimacy of their claim to inclusion and equal rights.  
6.4.1 Ambivalent Rational Arguments  
 It appears that the ambivalent discourses employed by the speakers, 
explored within this project, are potentially a means to render their argument as 
rational (Billig, 2012). But this strategic procurement of a rational position takes 
different discursive forms dependent on the context and the argument being 
forwarded and is certainly not governed by liberal social norms (Billig, 2012). Quite 
the opposite, I argue there is evidence here showing that appearing excessively and 
unrealistically liberal within the contentious immigration debate can, in this epoch, 
and these contexts, be synonymous with appearing irrational (see study 1. chapter 
3). Whilst, on the other hand, liberal values can also be effortlessly co-opted in 
arguments of exclusion of immigrants (see study 2. chapter 4.). Taking up a default 
position of exclusion within the immigration debate appears to be the rational 
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stance, potentially based on hegemonic neoliberal pragmatism (Lueck et al., 2015), 
and the taken-for-granted assumption that the world made up of nation-states is 
natural and the nation has the moral right to exclude unwanted others (Billig, 1995).  
These two hegemonic anti-immigrant positions highlight the potential 
weakness and impotency of the moral and legal obligation of the nation towards 
refugees (or immigrants as labelled by the populist radical right). Furthermore, 
people’s use of ambivalent discourses is highly flexible and context dependent. 
Hence, the experimental study (see chapter 5) showed that people’s responses, of 
how others in their nation endorse ambivalent constructions of stereotypical 
refugees, was patterned by exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive 
frameworks of identity threat discourses. It is important, at this point, to highlight 
the effective and novel employment of an experimental study within this research 
project to further explore the flexible self and how the discourses people draw upon 
are patterned by the context and the arguments they encounter (de Ruiter & Albert, 
2017; Jost & Kruglanski, 2002; Kendrick, 2017; Verkuyten, 2005a).  
 This project adds substantial support to Billig’s (2012) notion that 
successful rhetoricians need to present their argument as balanced and rational to 
persuasively counter the opposing position. A wealth of research has documented 
the ‘ambivalent expression’ of prejudice denial – ‘I’m not prejudice but …’ 
(Augoustinos & Every, 2007, 2010; Billig, 1987, p. 269; 1991, p. 125; 2012; S. 
Goodman, 2017a; S. Goodman & Rowe, 2014; Van Dijk, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 
1992, p. 212). However, less research attention has highlighted speakers’ denial or 
avoidance of appearing excessively liberal. Billig (1987, p. 272) points out that 
denials of prejudice are not entirely dependent on identity management and evoked 




He highlights that speakers, not only defend against accusations of being 
prejudiced, but they may also deny being excessively and unrealistically liberal by, 
for example, using the denial – ‘I’m no starry-eyed liberal but …’. Hence, speakers 
need to be aware of potential opposing arguments and pro-actively counter them. 
An effective counter is to take up the opposing position, reverse its normative 
understanding, and use it in service of one’s own position. This renders the 
argument rational and balanced by addressing both sides, and thus, it becomes 
harder to refute. The argument is also presented as occupying the rational middle-
ground (Billig & Marinho, 2017).  
 In this regard, we also need to examine what is left unsaid (Billig, 2006) in 
the discourse employed by these advocates on behalf of refugees in the context of 
study one. They appear to strive for the rational middle-ground by avoiding 
politically radical arguments based on liberal tolerance. Instead they draw on an 
‘ambivalent paternalistic’ discourse that orients to their shared embodied emotional 
distress in response to the plight of refugees. They avoid contesting the pragmatic 
‘cost to nation’ argument (Every & Augoustinos, 2013) as they do not construct 
refugees as having value and being a potential benefit to the nation. These advocates 
also avoid explicitly contesting the character of the nation by questioning if the 
moral and legal obligation towards refugees is being met. They potentially consider 
attempting to directly and explicitly counter the assumption that refugees are an 
unwanted economic burden and cultural concern, is too contentious and would lose 
support for their attempt to mobilise help for refugees. The repertoire that these 
advocates draw upon makes the claim that they feel sympathetic towards the plight 
of the refugees, but they are not making unrealistic overtly liberal demands. They 
are not advocating open borders or even that an unlimited number of refugees are 
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welcome to live permanently in Ireland. Or that refugees would make a positive 
contribution to the nation. Instead they draw attention to the plight of the refugees 
and merely suggest a limited additional number could be helped temporally.  
 This position suggests an implicit concern that contesting the ‘cost to the 
nation’ argument would not be received well by the national audience, despite 
strong economic evidence that, in the long run, immigrants and refugees are a 
significant benefit to host nations (for example Färber & Köppen, 2020). And 
although many refugees may well desire to return to their country of origin, most 
are also looking for a secure place to rebuild their lives and find a new home (S. 
Parker, 2018a). Refugees also declare their desire for the opportunity to make a 
positive economic and civic contribution to the host community (Bakewell, 2000; 
S. Goodman, Burke, Liebling, & Zasada, 2014; S. Goodman et al., 2015; Kirkwood, 
2012; Long, 2013). But for these advocates, in this context, they avoid contesting 
the value of refugees and resort to working up a sympathetic position through a 
performance of embodied emotional distress. They potentially evaluate this 
rhetorical strategy, that avoids appearing overtly and unrealistically liberal, as being 
an acceptable and persuasive position for the national audience. Furthermore, 
linking affective practice (Wetherell, 2015) to the construction of a rational 
mobilising argument, as seen in study one, has also received little previous research 
attention and is worthy of further exploration. 
 Conversely, the speeches by the populist radical right, in the context of 
study two, draw on a rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’. This rationalises 
the argument by not discrediting the valued notion of diversity. But instead hijacks 
and reverses the liberal understanding of diversity – offering cultural recognition to 




implicitly refugees (Billig et al., 1988). This is an efficient means to discredit 
immigrants – including refugees – by positioning host citizens as losing their 
cherished bounded and fixed national monocultures. This construction of the naive 
benevolent host citizens as the true victims in the intergroup relationship has been 
well documented in previous work (also see G. O. Edwards, 2012; Johnson & 
Goodman, 2013; Reicher & Ulusahin, 2020; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; 
Verkuyten, 2013; Wodak, 2019; Wodak et al., 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008). The 
experimental study (see chapter 5) carried out here extends this work because it 
offers the explanation that discourses hostile to immigration and refugees, present 
host citizens as the true victims in order to undermine arguments claiming the nation 
is not meeting its moral and legal obligation towards refugees. One can see how 
inverting the victim position can potentially make short shrift of the affective 
arguments that attempt to work up sympathy for refugees (such as those made by 
the advocates on behalf of refugees in the context of study one, see chapter 3). The 
rationalising rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’ also serves as an efficient 
means to mobilise collective action through the construction of positive, 
aspirational and ascendant political identity (Condor et al., 2013). It positions the 
argument as universally accepted and facilitates the mobilisation of a transnational 
culturally diverse political collective – the patriots.  
6.4.2 Ambivalent Solidarity Discourse 
 Furthermore, the collective action of immigrants and refugees, a relatively 
powerless minority, is unlikely to affect the status quo unless they gain political 
solidarity from the majority power holders, the citizens of wealthy host nation 
(Subasić et al., 2008). Hence, it is imperative to understand the discursive process 
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by which the power holders potentially move from a position of sympathy for 
migrants to forming political solidarity with them that actively challenges the 
authority blocking their entry into a host nation. The political solidarity model 
(Subasić et al., 2008) proposes a tripolar intergroup dynamic of social change, 
where the three groups of interest are the minority, majority and authority. To 
achieve social change the minority needs to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
powerful majority to successfully challenge the authority that upholds the status 
quo (Subasić et al., 2008). If the minority and majority form an alliance based on 
shared norms and values, then the ensuing political solidarity will challenge the 
authority and push for policy change.  
 However, minority migrant groups trying to gain access to wealthy nations 
are relatively voiceless. And national groups are not politically homogenous on the 
contentious immigration debate and this diversity of conflicting political views are 
open to negotiation and persuasion. Hence, the formation of inclusive political 
solidarity that may grant migrants access to a nation is primarily dependent on the 
consolidation and mobilization of the majority (for example European citizens) 
through political actors’ identity performance (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007) 
contesting the character of the nation (Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001). The relevant norms and values are contested by actors performing salient 
identity positions through recognisable patterns of discourse (Durrheim et al., 2016; 
Klein et al., 2007). The main contested positions are between being inclusive and 
humanitarian versus under threat and unable to bear the burden of migrants, as 
explored in the experimental study (see chapter 5). 
European citizens, for example, are in a position of privilege and power that 




that is sympathetic towards migrants (Wetherell, 2012a, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a). 
Speakers can potentially draw on prized humanitarian norms and values of caring 
and concern, and these can be performed for an audience in an attempt to form 
political solidarity with migrants and, therefore, endorse inclusion (Levine, Prosser, 
Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Haslam, 2009). But due to 
the taken-for-granted global order of bounded nation states, in which individuals 
belong to specific states (Billig, 1995, p. 15), these advocates on behalf of refugees, 
in the context of study one, who drew on sympathetic repertoires, also appeared to 
find it problematic to advocate inclusion of those outside the national community. 
Hence, they struggle to challenge the authority that upholds the status quo (Subasić 
et al., 2008). Therefore, the inherent power relationship prescribed by a universally 
accepted global order appears to restrict these speakers who advocate on behalf of 
refugees to resort to well-intended but ineffectual dependency-orientated helping 
discourse (Nadler, 2002). Whilst, on the other hand, these populist radical right 
speeches, in the context of study two, are enabled by hegemonic understandings of 
nationhood. Therefore, they can effortlessly take up an argument that inverts the 
liberal notion of cultural diversity – recognition for minority groups – and hence, 
undermines inclusive solidarity with minority immigrant groups.  
Dependency-orientated helping takes the form of paternalistic concern and 
caring for a disadvantaged group, but it also deprives them of their autonomy. 
Hence, it is an effective means for a privileged group to reinforce a positive ingroup 
identity by upholding prized humanitarian norms and values whilst perpetuating 
dominance and inequality. Ambivalent paternalism has been evidenced in race, 
class and gender relationships where benevolence is used as a means to cloak 
hostility and systemic inequality (Glick & Fiske, 2012; Jackman, 1994). 
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Paternalism is clearly displayed by white employers towards black domestic 
workers in South Africa as a means to maintain inequitable power relations 
(Durrheim et al., 2014).  
Previous research has also shown that host citizens are seen to display 
ambivalent paternalism towards refugees, as sympathetic talk is deployed in 
conjunction with disapproving messages on Australian talkback radio (Hanson-
Easey & Augoustinos, 2011). Speakers are also seen to draw on ambivalent 
repertoires to justify stronger restrictions on immigrants, by depicting their nation 
as having a humanitarian history, which is generous towards refugees but is now 
being abused (Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014; Every & Augoustinos, 2008; 
Kirkwood, 2018; O'Doherty & Augoustinos, 2008; S. Parker, 2019). Again, note 
the positioning of citizens of wealthy nations as victims due to their benevolence. 
Also, political speakers can orient to the humanity of refugees in order to elicit 
sympathy for them, but this discursive position can also reinforce ‘othering’ of 
refugees within the paternalistic relationship (Kirkwood, 2017).  
 This project also extends previous research, exploring the discourse used in 
an attempt to mobilise help, solidarity and protection, offered to the Jewish minority 
by the Bulgarian majority during the Second World War (Reicher et al., 2006). This 
work highlighted the ‘rhetorical dimension’ of the arguments put forward that 
define the boundary and character of the nation in government documents at the 
time. It showed that the majority group claimed that the minority should be offered 
protection because they were included and described as being legitimate members 
of the nation (also see Levine et al., 2005). The Jews were also included by 
describing them as being fellow human beings and fellow professionals. Secondly, 




national norms and values. The nation was characterised as being humanitarian and 
duty bound to assist others, even if they are from a minority outgroup. Thirdly, 
mobilising arguments declare that anti-Semitism would negatively affect national 
interests. Particularly, in terms on how the nation would look in the eyes of others 
if it did not protect the vulnerable minority. This also resonates with Ambedkar’s 
rhetorical strategy (an activist for – Dalit – untouchable Hindus) that positions the 
discrimination and humiliation of Dalits as an affront to all Hindus and is an attempt 
to build a compassionate nation (Reicher & Jogdand, 2017).  
 Reicher and colleagues (2006) acknowledge that their research could not 
make any claims about how effective the arguments within the government 
documents were on the mobilisation of the majority to protect the Jewish minority. 
In contrast, this project here, attempted to go beyond only exploring the 
deconstruction of the discourses, within the contentious immigration debate, by also 
exploring, through the use of an experiment (see chapter 5), how competing and 
conflicting interpretive frameworks patterned constructions of an immigrant group. 
Also, results from the experiment were interpreted in relation to the construction of 
arguments within the contentious immigration debate as discussed above on page 
234.  
It is worthy of note that the experiment undertaken here employed similar 
discourses – specifically group image threat discourse – to those exposed in Reicher 
and colleagues (2006) work, such as the moral obligation to the minority outgroup 
and how the nations values and norms might be contravened and the national 
interest adversely affected. Of particular note is how this group image threat 
discourse, when interacting with competing and conflicting discourses hostile to the 
minority group (realistic and symbolic threat discourse), patterned constructions of 
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the minority outgroup – in this case refugees (see chapter 5). The findings from this 
experiment indicate that discourses depicting the threat to national interests and 
moral standing might not always be beneficial to minority groups because the 
minority group can be constructed using an ambivalent paternalistic stereotype 
where they are portrayed as being liked (warm) but incompetent. This paternalistic 
position could lead to dependency helping that does little to disrupt the status quo, 
but instead potentially serves to maintain inequality, exclusion and discrimination.  
 Furthermore, counter to Reicher and colleagues (2006) research into 
solidarity discourse, these advocates on behalf of refugees, explored in the context 
of study one, never draw on explicit claims of inclusion of refugees by using the 
referents ‘us’ or ‘we’. This may hardly be surprising as the refugees that the 
speakers orient to, are outside the nation. But it is also curious that discourse 
employing the first-person plural for refugees, appears to be unavailable even for 
these advocates, in this context, attempting to mobilise support on behalf of 
refugees.  
If we ponder momentarily about the wealth and diversity of minority 
categories that ‘we’ can include, if ‘we’ so wish, as being part of ‘us’, as long as 
they were born within the territory of the nation-state or receive citizenship, as 
shown by Reicher and colleagues (2006) work. Conversely, for those born in 
another jurisdiction, or adrift in the Mediterranean sea, or in a refugee camp on 
European soil, or awaiting an asylum application in direct provision, or the 
increasing number of stateless people who wonder among ‘us’, it is a discursive 




Furthermore, these speakers, in the context of study one, never positioned 
their argument at a superordinate transnational level by referring to the protection 
of ‘our’ fellow human beings. Even, on the few occasions that these advocates 
presented more explicit demands of inclusion within the nation, the claims were 
tentative, hesitant, and ambiguous. They also had to rationalise their position by 
stating that the refugees should only be offered temporary accommodation in 
limited numbers. And as already noted these advocates failed to present the refugees 
as being in the national interest in terms of being an economic asset.  
 Crucially, the possibility of political action and social change through 
collective mobilisation is constrained or enable by meta-representations of what 
people believe other group members think about the issue (Goncalves-Portelinha et 
al., 2017). The expression of certain viewpoints within political debate, particularly 
those advocating radical social change, are limited by speakers’ evaluation of how 
other group members think (Elcheroth et al., 2011). The hegemonic position makes 
certain discourses more problematic and less readily available (Van Dijk, 1993; 
Wetherell, 1998). In other words, meta-representations constructing immigrants as 
a problematic burden potentially constrains the attempts of speakers’, in the context 
of study one, to mobilise unambiguous and unconditional inclusive political 
solidarity with refugees or immigrants (Subasić et al., 2008). These representations 
also undermine attempts to present refugees as valued human beings, who can make 
a positive economic and cultural contribution to the host community and people 
who have a legitimate right of movement. In contrast, the populist radical right 
speeches, in the context of study two, are enabled in the claim that immigrants are 
conspiring with the political elite to undermine host citizens cultural life.  
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 This research appears to indicate that the pragmatic ‘cost to the nation’ 
argument overrides and suppresses the humanitarian ‘duty to others’ concern 
(Every & Augoustinos, 2013) and this is potentially why these advocates on behalf 
of refugees, in the context of study one, avoid contesting the moral and legal 
obligation of the nation. And why exposure to an interpretive framework, 
containing discourses claiming refugees to be highly threatening to national 
resources and culture (realistic and symbolic threat discourse), alongside different 
levels of group image threat discourse (questioning the moral and legal obligation 
of the nation to refugees), patterns the shared ambivalent construction of 
stereotypical refugees (see the experimental study chapter 5). Even in the 
sympathetic talk, of these advocates, in the context of study one, the refugees are 
implicitly presented as being an inconvenient unwanted other that can only be 
tolerated in limited numbers for a temporary length of time (cf. Reicher et al., 2006). 
The availability of repertoires that mobilise a collective for social change, ‘making 
the world anew’, and explicitly questioning the legitimacy of the status quo are 
limited and supressed, if not entirely absent (Subasić, Reynolds, Reicher, & 
Klandermans, 2012). These advocates resort to a discourse of ambivalent 
paternalism to garner minimal help for the dependent refugees, potentially to avoid 
alienating the national audience with more radical demands. Whilst the populist 
radical right speeches, in the context of study two, are emboldened by the 
hegemonic discourse and effortlessly discredit the rights of minority immigrant 




6.4.3 Ambivalent Mobilising Discourse  
 Previous mobilization research has highlighted speakers’ tendency to 
contest the character of the nation and present themselves as prototypical of the 
national group in an attempt to mobilize a national political collective in line with 
their political project (for example Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012; Khan, Svensson, 
Jogdand, & Liu, 2017; Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Wood & Finlay, 2008). In 
contrast, in this project, we see that these advocates on behalf of refugees, in the 
context of study one (see chapter 3), tended to avoid explicitly contesting the 
character of the nation. Whilst these populist radical right speeches, in the context 
of study two (see chapter 4), take up a superordinate transnational position and 
contest universal understandings of cultural diversity. Hence, this project shows 
how people are highly flexible, context dependent and inventive in the discourses 
and rhetorical strategies they use to mobilise a political collective. Particularly, 
evident was the way orators can expand or contract the boundary of their political 
collective (see also Gkinopoulos & Hegarty, 2018), draw attention to alternative 
identifying characteristics such as shared emotion (Billig & Marinho, 2017; Reicher 
& Jogdand, 2017) and, at times, moderate their argument so it is more politically 
palatable (Castro, Uzelgun, & Bertoldo, 2017). Further evidence for this context 
dependent flexibility and dynamic patterning of arguments within the contentious 
immigration debate is provided through the experimental study (see chapter 5). This 
study indicates that people’s shared ambivalent construction of an immigrant group 
is patterned by the competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks that they 
encounter, particularly in relation to discourses depicting the level and type of threat 
to the nation.   
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 The advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study one, (see 
chapter 3) calling into a widely listen to, peak time, Irish national radio phone-in 
program, were seen to avoid or only tentatively question the moral, humanitarian 
and legal responsibility of the nation towards refugees. This cautious argument is 
particularly notable when compared to these advocates detailed description and 
extensive performance of their share affective response to the plight of the refugees 
arriving at the shores of Europe. Subsequently, these speakers, in this context, 
tended to avoid or only tentatively position themselves as prototypical 
entrepreneurs of the national identity (cf. Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). It appeared 
problematic for these speakers to explicitly present themselves as spokespersons 
for the nation and suggest their political concern, the helping of refugees, to be 
aligned with national interests. Instead, these advocates in this context, resort to 
performing ‘entrepreneurs of emotion’ (Reicher & Jogdand, 2017) by working up 
their shared affective response to the plight of refugees. They attempt to mobilise 
the collective by telling the audience who they are and defining how they should 
feel (Reicher & Jogdand, 2017) as the speakers outline what they consider to be an 
acceptable and ‘normal’ emotional reaction (Campbell et al., 2017; McConville et 
al., 2019; Wetherell, 2003). They mobilise the political collective by defining the 
shared ‘norms’ important to the political group (Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 
2012) and these primarily orient to their shared affective position. 
 This also extends the findings of Gkinopoulos and Hegarty (2018), showing 
that political actors can present themselves as representing a broad national ingroup 
or if they lack national majority support, they can narrow the political collective. 
These advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study one, are tentative 




the construction of a narrow affective alliance based on a shared emotional 
response. Importantly, these speakers in this context, also draw a consequential link 
between their emotional response and their desired political action the temporary 
and limited helping of refugees. Hence, they mobilise a narrow moral community 
within the national group, potentially due to the concern that their argument does 
not hold majority support. This argument receives further support from the 
experimental study (see chapter 5), showing that participants exposed to low group 
image threat – indicating that the nation is meeting its moral and legal obligation 
towards refugees – are constrained to an ambivalent paternalistic construction of 
stereotypical refugees.  
 However, it also needs to be acknowledged that the narrowing of the 
political collective to an affective alliance is not rigid. At times these advocates, in 
the context of study one, cautiously orient to the nation’s affective position and how 
it will transition to a state of ‘joy’ through the temporary accommodation of a 
limited number of refugees. Or they modestly, ambiguously and hesitantly request 
that their nation ‘could’ do more to help refugees. Also, some speakers were seen 
to search for fellow nationals who were engaged in helping the refugees, potentially 
to construct a positive humanitarian image of the nation. The narrow affective 
alliance is, at times, mapped onto the broader nation, indicating that the collective 
boundary is highly flexible and can expand and contract dependent on what is being 
done in the discourse.  
 But previous research has also shown that activists who draw on radical 
arguments, demanding social change, are negatively assessed by the audience and 
are less persuasive (Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013). 
Hence, environmental activists maintain a positive self-image by refraining from 
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radical arguments demanding significant change to society, which potentially could 
invoke strong disagreement from the opposition (Castro et al., 2017). Instead they 
draw on moderate arguments that avoid directly contesting the hegemonic position. 
Similarly, these advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study one, tend 
to mobilise a narrow affective alliance that takes up the sympathetic ‘norm’ towards 
refugees and tentatively suggests that more should be done to help them. But they 
avoid more radical arguments explicitly highlighting the nation’s moral and legal 
humanitarian responsibility.  
 Furthermore, these advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study 
one, also avoid contesting the hegemonic assumption within national discourse that 
refugees are a problematic burden (S. Goodman, 2008; Kirkwood, Goodman, et al., 
2015, pp. 192 - 193; Lynn & Lea, 2003). For example, national policy documents 
from Britain’s ‘earned citizenship’ agenda are seen to construct a distinction 
between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ migrants, based on those deemed to make an 
economic contribution and successfully integrate (Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014; 
Andreouli & Howarth, 2013).  
Similarly, previous research has exposed a common construction of a 
categorical dichotomy between ‘bogus’ and ‘genuine’ refugees, which serves to 
question the legitimacy of all refugees (Lynn & Lea, 2003). The category ‘illegal 
immigrants’ is also used to delegitimise refugees (S. Goodman & Speer, 2007). And 
it is notable that the populist radical right speeches, in the context of study two, 
tended to employ the label ‘immigrants’, which implicitly included refugees (see 
chapter 4). Citizen officers construct ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ applicants and 
justified exclusion of some applicants by claiming that Britain’s humanitarian 




2014). Similarly, Gert Wilders (a Dutch populist radical right politician and 
attendant of the ENF conference chapter 4) is seen to claim that the Muslim 
minority is incompatible with Dutch tolerance (Verkuyten, 2013).  
The mainstream media maintains a hegemonic hostility toward immigrants 
and people seeking asylum (for example Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; Esses et al., 
2017; Fakih & Marrouch, 2015; S. Goodman & Burke, 2010; S. Goodman et al., 
2017; Haynes et al., 2006; Lueck et al., 2015; United Nations, 2018). This 
discursive environment perpetuates a commonsense understanding that immigrants 
are a problematic unwanted burden that the nation has the legitimate right to 
excluded (Billig, 1995), and immigrants are often the political target for all social 
problems within the nation (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017, p. 134).  
 Hence, it is not entirely surprising that these advocates on behalf of refugees 
(see chapter 3), in the context of a popular, peak-time, national phone-in radio 
program, tailor their talk to the concerns of the national audience (Elcheroth et al., 
2011) by not deploying a radical open border argument that might be self-defeating 
(Castro et al., 2017). However, it is more surprising that these advocates, in this 
context, also avoid explicitly contesting the moral and legal responsibility of the 
nation and avoid constructing the refugees as being a potential benefit to the nation. 
Potentially, this is also due to them not wanting the argument to appear too radical 
and irrational in light of the dominant narrative that immigrants and refugees are a 
problematic burden. And the nation is meeting it moral and legal obligation towards 
refugees, which is the low group image threat discourse employed within the 
experimental study (see chapter 5). The discourse of these advocates, in this 
context, even indulges the notion that refugees are a dependent problem because it 
appeared necessary for these advocates to clarify their position by placing 
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limitations on the time length and number of refugees that can be accommodated. 
The helping talk is well intentioned – but ambivalently paternalistic – as refugees 
are implicitly constructed as being a dependent burden of little worth to the nation.  
 In stark contrast to these advocates on behalf of refugees, the leading 
representatives of Europe’s populist radical right speaking on an international stage, 
who espouse a core ideology of nationalist nativism, are seen to position themselves 
as prototypical of a culturally diverse transnational political collective, at times 
referred to as the ‘patriots’ (see study two chapter 4). Evidently, these populist 
radical right speakers in the context of study two, whose central concern are national 
interests, are not tied to mobilising the nation, as shown in previous research (for 
example S. Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Johnson & Goodman, 2013; Khan et al., 
2017; Reicher & Haslam, 2017b; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Verkuyten, 
2013), but they can broaden their mobilisation to present themselves as prototypical 
leaders of a transnational and culturally diverse political collective.   
The findings here extend previous research because it shows how political 
speakers, even with a core ideology of inward looking exclusionary nationalist 
nativism, can expand the collective that they are attempting to mobilise to an 
inclusive and culturally diverse transnational group. They draw on a repertoire, 
celebrating their political collective as globally extensive and continually 
expanding. And they even express a commitment to patriot membership that will 
endure beyond their own individual nation achieving radical right policy change 
such as the UK leaving the European Union.  
In other words, for these populist radical right speakers, in this international 




policy (Gleibs & Reddy, 2017). These speakers construct themselves as being the 
courageous protectors of the true cultural diversity between monocultural nation 
states, and therefore, defenders of the victimised transnational majority who are 
naively benevolent towards immigrants and are being taken advantage of by 
political elites (also see G. O. Edwards, 2012; Johnson & Goodman, 2013; Reicher 
& Ulusahin, 2020; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Verkuyten, 2013; Wodak, 
2019; Wodak et al., 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008).  
  In order to mobilise an inclusive diverse transnational collective these 
populist radical right speakers, in this international context, employ a rhetorical 
strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’, which allows the speakers to position themselves 
at a superordinate level as entrepreneurs of identity who are prototypical because 
they can, with the support of the patriot collective, defend the true diversity between 
monocultural nation-states. Similar to how Barack Obama was seen to present 
himself as the embodiment of American ethnic diversity in order to extend his 
inclusive political reach (Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012), these populist radical 
right speakers position themselves as the embodiment and protectors of a true 
cultural diversity between nations. Their inclusive discourse – potentially enabled 
by the universal acceptance of the world made up of bounded nation states (Billig, 
1995) – diminishes the opposition, supportive of immigration and multiculturalism, 
to a collective that nobody would wish to be a member of (Reicher & Hopkins, 
1996). This stance facilitates a discursive position that attempts to mobilises an 
extensive, expanding and enduring, transnational and culturally diverse collective 
– the patriots.  
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6.4.4 Ambivalent Discourse Enabling Transnational Populism  
 Importantly, this research also adds to the debate of how the populist radical 
right is managing into gain increasing international support and influence. And 
whether the populist radical right can convincingly accomplish transnational 
populism based on their core ideology of nationalist nativism that is exclusionary 
and hostile to immigration. De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017; original emphasis) 
define transnational populism as constructing ‘a transnational people-as-underdogs 
as a political subject that supersedes the boundaries of the nation-state, rather than 
merely linking up national people-as-underdogs’. They cite examples of true 
transnational populism as the Occupy Movement and the DiEM25, a pan-European 
democracy movement. They argue that populist radical right, such as the Europe of 
Nations and Freedom group within the European parliament, are better understood 
as doing international populism than transnational populism, because their concept 
of the ‘people’ is dependent on the nation-state (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; 
Moffitt, 2016, 2017).  
 However, the populist radical right speeches, in the context of study two, 
are seen to construct a people that is truly transnational because they orient to 
culturally diverse people – the patriots – that, yes, is dependent on the nation-state, 
but also transcends the nation-state. They work up the globally extensive, 
expanding and enduring membership of this patriot collective. De Cleen and 
Stavrakakis (2017) also concede that the difference between transnational and 
international populism is a ‘matter of degree’. They appear to contradict themselves 
accepting that at times, the populist radical right is seen to construct a transnational 




multiculturalism and lenient immigration policy. Moffitt (2016, 2017) also 
acknowledges that at times Gert Wilders (leader of the Dutch, Party for Freedom 
and attendant of the ENF conference chapter 4) can be seen to be doing 
transnational populism. Whilst Caiani (2018) provides extensive evidence that, 
beside the radical rights’ traditional emphasis on the nation, they are increasingly 
engage in transnational politics and this transnational collaboration is particularly 
evident when there is a supranational target such as the EU.  
 Although De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) correctly stress the ambivalent 
tension between the construction of an inclusive transnational ‘people’ and the 
exclusionary doctrine of nationalist nativism, they also acknowledge the populist 
radical right can manage to construct a transnational ‘people’, ‘to some extent’ 
(original emphasise). Furthermore, the ambivalent tension between the particular 
(the exclusionary nation-state) and the universal (a world made up of nation-states), 
which is fundamental to nationalism may actually facilitate the construction of a 
transnational ‘people’ (Billig, 1995, p. 87). Nationalism accomplishes the 
contradiction, between exclusion and inclusion, within everyday ‘banal’ 
articulation and social practice. In order for a particular nation-state to be imagined, 
it has to be imagined within a universal world made up of nation-states. The 
discourse of nationalism is hegemonic as all ‘people’ belong to a particular nation-
state, at least in theory, and the world of nations is construed as natural with a taken 
for granted ‘foreverness’.  
 Hence, the nationalist ideology offers the political narrator the opportunity 
to point to the particular nation that ‘people’ identify with. whilst working up an 
all-inclusive identity that presents themselves as the protector of the universal world 
order, constituted through a world made up of nations-states to which all ‘people’ 
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belong. Although, the underlying doctrine of nationalism is based on exclusion, no 
other ideology is potentially more universally accepted and comes close to 
achieving the same level of totalitarian inclusion. This marrying of the particular 
and universal within ‘banal’ nationalism is clearly evident within the strategy of 
‘ambivalent diversity’ employed by these populist radical right speeches in the 
context of study two (see chapter 4). 
 Indeed, the populist radical right appear to have a newfound vitality, 
potentially due to them reaching out beyond the boundaries of their national borders 
and forming international collaborations (Caiani, 2018). White supremacism and 
anti-Muslimism are a transnational phenomenon spreading throughout America, 
Europe and Russia (Beirich, 2013). And anti-Muslimism also appears to be on the 
increase in China, India and Myanmar. Previous discursive work has shown that 
the discourse taken up and deployed by populist radical right speakers, displays 
significant similarities across Europe, Australia and America. In this regard, Sakki 
and Pettersson (2016) note that the radical rights’ construction of an enemy ‘other’ 
that resides within and outside the nation, is not discourse unique within Sweden 
and Finland but it is a ‘transnational’ phenomenon.  
 The populist radical right parties within Europe are not isolated entities, but 
they draw on each other’s successful political repertoires (Rydgren, 2005). The 
populist radical right has rebranded their political image to a sanitised ‘new master 
frame’, which has move away from ‘biological racism’ to ‘cultural racism’. Hence, 
their ideology has shifted to ethnopluralism, which celebrates and essentialises the 
cultural difference between monocultural nation-states. The ‘new master frame’ 
was seen to achieve electoral success for the French National Front in the 1980’s 




‘cross-notional diffusion’ (Rydgren, 2005). Arguably the recent rise of the populist 
radical right has become a global phenomenon and the rhetorical strategy of 
‘ambivalent diversity’ is the discursive process that facilitates ‘cross-national 
diffusion and transnational populism. 
 The populist radical right is evidently, increasingly participating in 
transnational politics, but social psychological research into how they are 
discursively managing and interacting within these transnational political 
communities – particularly in light of its ambivalent tension with their fundamental 
ideology of nationalist nativism – has been lacking. Hence, the analysis in study 
two (see chapter 4) exploring how the populist radical right mobilises a 
transnational culturally diverse collective is crucial. And highlighting the rhetorical 
strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’ provides an understanding of how the populist 
radical right can convincingly perform transnational populism and achieve ‘cross-
national diffusion’ (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Moffitt, 2016, 2017) of the ‘new 
master frame’ (Rydgren, 2005). 
6.4.5 Summary 
 In closing, this research project has shown that deployment of ambivalent 
discourses are, at times, evident within the contentious immigration debate. This is 
potentially due to the requirement that persuasive arguments need to appear rational 
and this rationality is not, necessarily, prescribed by tolerant liberal norms and 
values (Billig, 1987, 2012). Quite the opposite, arguably the default rational 
position within the contentious immigration debate is the exclusion of the 
burdensome and unwanted other (Billig, 1995; Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017).  
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 Furthermore, this project highlights that the construction of stereotypical 
immigrant groups and, hence, the formulation of rational arguments is dependent 
on the how the argument orients to dominant competing and conflicting interpretive 
frameworks of identity threat discourses. These identity threat discourses also have 
implications for the mobilisation of solidarity with immigrants and refugees, which, 
in certain contexts, can be problematic (Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; 
Reicher et al., 2006; Subasić et al., 2008). Arguably, readily available discursive 
resources advocating the inclusion of those from other nation-states, even those 
seeking sanctuary, are limited. Whilst anti-immigrant arguments co-opt liberal 
understandings, such as cultural diversity recognition for minority groups, and 
deploy them in service of arguments legitimising exclusion.  
 The advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study one, are seen to 
avoid radical arguments potentially because they do not want to alienate the 
national audience (Castro, Uzelgun, & Bertoldo, 2017). Specifically, the arguments 
supportive of refugees avoid attempting unambiguous and unconditional inclusion 
of refugees. They are seen to be implicitly accepting of the hegemonic claim that 
refugees are a dependent economic burden and cultural concern for the potential 
host nation. Hence, contesting this position is also avoided. But instead these 
advocates resort to a position of ‘ambivalent paternalism’ which labours on their 
shared emotional response to the plight of refugees and offers limited and 
temporary dependency-orientated helping (Nadler, 2002), which does not threaten 
the status quo (Subasić et al., 2008).   
 Surprisingly, these advocates also avoid explicitly questioning whether the 
nation is meeting its moral and legal obligation towards refugees. Potentially 




audience. In support of this conclusion is the evidence from the experimental study, 
indicating that when the nation is presented as meeting its moral and legal 
obligation (low group image threat discourse) then  the construction of stereotypical 
refugees is patterned to an ‘ambivalent paternalism’. Hence, these advocates, in the 
context of study one, resort to mobilising a narrow affective alliance potentially 
because they consider that national support for increased accommodation of 
refugees is lacking (Billig & Marinho, 2017; Gkinopoulos & Hegarty, 2018; 
Reicher & Jogdand, 2017). 
 Conversely, the populist radical right speeches, in the context of study two, 
evidently need to counter this claim that the nation is not meeting its moral and 
legal obligation. But they do not do this by addressing it head on, instead they take 
up a rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’. This positions the citizens of host 
nations as being envious and naive victims of unscrupulous immigrants and 
refugees who manage to obtain preferential treatment with the help of the political 
elite. The rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’ potentially neutralises the 
claim that the nation is not meeting its moral and legal obligation by inverting the 
understanding of who needs protection. This interpretation also receives support 
from the experimental study because participants exposed to high group image 
threat discourse are seen to endorse an envious ambivalent construction of refugees 
as being competent but not liked. These findings further previous research which 
has shown that powerful privileged groups take up a position of victimhood to 
legitimise exclusion and discrimination (see G. O. Edwards, 2012; Johnson & 
Goodman, 2013; Reicher & Ulusahin, 2020; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; 
Verkuyten, 2013; Wodak, 2019; Wodak et al., 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008). 
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 Counter to previous mobilisation research which highlights how 
entrepreneurs of identity tend to evoke the nation (for example Augoustinos & De 
Garis, 2012; Khan, Svensson, Jogdand, & Liu, 2017; Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher 
& Hopkins, 1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; 
Wood & Finlay, 2008), the advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study 
one, avoid explicitly presenting themselves as representing the nation. Whilst the 
populist radical right speeches, in the context of study two, are seen to transcend 
the nation through the rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’. Even though 
they draw on a core ideology of nationalist nativism, they also celebrate a true 
cultural diversity between monocultural nation states.  
 I argue that the discourse employed by these advocates on behalf of 
refugees, in the context of study one, is constrained by hegemonic understandings 
of the world made up of nation states, and immigrants being a burden and cultural 
concern. Whilst anti-immigrant arguments, as drawn upon by the populist radical 
right speeches, in the context of study two, are enabled and this facilitates the 
mobilisation of an extensive, expanding and enduring, culturally diverse, 
transnational collective – the patriots. This ability for these populist radical right 
speakers, in the context of study two, to take up a rhetorical strategy of ‘ambivalent 
diversity’ positioning  themselves at a superordinate level above the nation explains 
how they can achieve transnational populism (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; 
Moffitt, 2016, 2017) and ‘cross-national diffusion’ of the ‘new master frame’ 
(Rydgren, 2005).     




The evidence from this project indicates these populist radical right speeches, in the 
context of study two, take ownership of the pragmatic ‘cost to the nation’ argument 
that presents immigrants as an economic burden and a cultural problem. They state 
this position as fact and offer little or no evidence but draw on dramatic alarmist 
discourse. Conversely, these advocates on behalf of refugees, in the context of study 
one, are cautious and tentative, and resort to sharing their embodied emotional 
discomfort in an attempt to build an affective alliance in support of refugees. I have 
argued that the advocates potentially take up this passive position, in preference to 
a more contentious political argument that contests the hegemonic assumptions that 
refugees are a problem, in order not to alienate and lose persuasive power over the 
audience. However, it might be time for advocates on behalf of refugees to contest 
the taken for granted assumption that refugees inevitably have a negative impact on 
the nation, because their passive, or possibly better described as a submissive 
argument position, is potentially losing the debate. Furthermore, the claim that 
immigrants and refugees are an economic burden is not support by evidence (for 
example Färber & Köppen, 2020). 
 The voices of the populist radical right explored in this project certainly 
appear emboldened. And are managing to present their position as a universal, even 
global, commonsense understanding of how we should respond to immigration 
movements. In contrast sharing embodied emotional discomfort in response to the 
plight of refugees is unlikely to promote significant structural change and counter 
the pragmatic argument of the populist radical right, even if this argument is 
unfounded. At the time of writing in 2020 the so called European ‘refugee crisis’ 
continues, whilst the EU members states struggle to come to an agreement on how 
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to distribute people seeking asylum and manage the deteriorating situation in 
southern Europe (Rankin, 2020).  
 Others have also argued that shared humanity arguments, presented by 
advocates on behalf of refugees, are possibly limited in convincing national 
audience, who struggle to see beyond the issue of cultural difference (Bates & 
Kirkwood, 2013). Humanitarian arguments are easily dismissed by the opposition, 
because they are ‘positioned as emotional, impractical and excessive’ (Every, 2008; 
Every & Augoustinos, 2013). Arguments that shame those opposed to refugees is 
dependent on middle class affective values and may well be counterproductive, 
because the response is anger, hostility and denial (Every, 2013). Drawing on 
‘practical, pragmatic and moderate’ arguments that appeal to the mainstream on 
behalf of refugees is potentially more effective in persuading sceptical host citizens 
(Every & Augoustinos, 2013). Therefore, advocates on behalf of refugees should 
avoid emotional language and need to directly address, and counter, concerns about 
the economic burden and potential social and cultural impacts. 
6.6 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
A limitation of the two discursive studies (see chapters 3 & 4) was their reliance on 
small samples. But this also has the benefit of affording a deep and detailed analysis 
of discourses within the specific contexts and by specific actors on opposing sides 
of the immigration debate. In the overarching conclusion in this chapter I have 
proceeded to draw comparison between these two discourse studies. Hence, it is 
important to note, that I am not attempting to make generalisable comparative 
conclusions across the two discursive studies, particularly in light of the different 




(politicians versus general public) and discursive form (prepared speeches versus 
off-the-cuff). This said it was valuable to highlight the use of ambivalent discourse 
and what they accomplish between the different ideological and subjective 
positions taken up by the speakers in the two studies because, as far as I am aware, 
this has tended to go unexplored.  
 Furthermore, some concluding comparisons between the two discourse 
studies were also drawn with the experimental study (see section 6.3), which could 
be criticised due to the difference in ontological and epistemological assumption 
between the methodologies. However, this issue has been addressed previously in 
section 1.7 and I reiterate that this project takes a ‘middle-ground’ between a 
positivist and constructionist position (Verkuyten, 2005b, p. 28). Hence, the person 
can be seen to construct their reality and they are also constructed by reality. 
Furthermore, a constructionist position and the assumption that the self is flexible 
and context dependent, does not outlaw an experimental exploration (Harré, 1999; 
Jost & Kruglanski, 2002; Spears & Smith, 2001) as long as an appropriate 
epistemological understanding of the experiment as a social context is adopted.  
Specifically, the experimental methodology was employed in order to 
explore if people’s exposure to competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks, 
of identity threat discourses, would pattern the shared construction of an immigrant 
group – specifically the potential ambivalent stereotyping of refugees. In this 
regard, the experiment explores if threatening discourses patterns people’s 
construction of refugees but avoids pointing to inaccessible internal cognitive 
processes (Verkuyten, 2005a). I am also tentative about making generalisable 
conclusions due to the incorrect assumption that experiments are isolated from 
social, cultural and historical context (Tajfel, 1972). It also needs to be noted that 
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the experimental methodology does not afford participants the opportunity to share, 
contest and negotiate the discursive situation within which they find themselves 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 41), but that this is also characteristic of very 
important social contexts like voting (also discussed in sections 1.7 & 1.8).  
  I will expand on this by exploring some limitations specific to the 
experimental study that are worthy of discussion. The experiment made Irish 
national identity salient by requesting that the participant responded to four national 
identification items at the beginning of the experiment. But the participants proceed 
to be subjected to isolated surveillance by a hidden experimenter. The participants 
are separated and are unable to communicate with others negotiating the same 
discursive experience (Spears & Smith, 2001). In other words, the participants are 
individualised and unable to contest what it means to be Irish in relation to the 
accommodation of refugees with others experiencing the same experimental 
scenario (Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). They are unable to build 
shared understandings about what it is to be Irish and jointly manage the 
information about refugees presented to them (Elcheroth et al., 2011). 
 For the future, I recommend progressing with the valuable comparative 
investigation between speakers who are hostile towards immigration and those who 
are more sympathetic and how they construct their arguments within the 
contentious immigration debate. It is particularly worthy of exploration from a 
critical viewpoint that takes into account hegemonic discourses that potentially 
constrain some discourses and enable others. I would also suggest exploring how 
the opposing sides negotiate and coproduce their rhetorical positions in a head to 




 Furthermore, I recommend more research attempts to combine discourse 
analysis with experimental or quantitative work, and at the very least uses 
discursive research to inform further quantitative exploration (for a similar 
arguement see de Ruiter & Albert, 2017; Jost & Kruglanski, 2002; Kendrick, 2017; 
Verkuyten, 2005a). Even considering the shortfalls of the experimental 
methodology and the potential epistemological criticism of combining it with 
discourse analyses, it has been effective in this research project by providing a 
comprehensive understanding of how people’s exposure to competing and 
conflicting interpretive frameworks, of identity threat discourses, will pattern the 
shared construction of an immigrant group.  
 Although, this said, there is plenty of room for further exploration of other 
ideological positions pertaining to the contentious immigration debate. Also, more 
inventive experimental methods should be considered such as using open ended 
questions, which allow the participants more opportunity to construct and evaluate 
the outgroup and their ideological position in their own words (Jost & Kruglanski, 
2002). Additionally, it is worth considering experimentally exploring group 
responses that allow debate, deliberation and contestation of group identities, and 
building of shared understandings that would better resemble real world interaction. 
And finally, the experimental manipulations could be flexible and responsive to the 
ideological position of the participant and the broader social, cultural, and political 
context. In general experiment still have a place in social psychology but they need 
to be more contextualised and the researcher needs to more reflexive of their role 
and structural power relations.  
6.7 CONCLUSION 
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Ambivalent discourses are, at times, evident within the contentious immigration 
debate. Their deployment is an efficient means to render the argument rational and 
mobilise collectives. They can accomplish conditional limited solidarity or entirely 
undermine solidarity. Furthermore, ambivalent constructions of an immigrant 
group can also be patterned by competing and conflicting interpretive frameworks 
of identity threat discourses.  
 The advocates on behalf of refugees explored within study one (see chapter 
3), attempted to persuade the Irish people, and government, to do more to help the 
refugees arriving at the shores of Europe. But they appeared to find this endeavour 
problematic and tended to avoid politically contentious arguments. Instead, they 
resorted to the construction of an affective alliance, in order to mobilise collective 
support on behalf of refugees, by sharing their experience of embodied emotional 
distress in response to the ‘refugee crisis.’ The talk was tentative, hesitant, 
ambiguous and they placed limitation on how long refugees should be 
accommodated for and how many. They never explicitly stated the nation’s moral 
and legal obligation towards the accommodation of refugees. And they never 
directly addressed the pragmatic, ‘cost to the nation’ argument, by presenting the 
refugees as having agency, and being a potential economic asset and positive 
cultural influence. These advocates, in the context of study one, appeared to be 
constrained to a discourse of sympathetic ‘ambivalent paternalism’ and unable to 
achieve unambiguous and unconditional inclusive political solidarity with refugees 
(Reicher et al., 2006; Subasić et al., 2008).  
 In stark contrast, the speeches by the populist radical right politicians, in the 
second study (see chapter 4), were forthright, unambiguous and singularly hostile 




strategy of ‘ambivalent diversity’ that oriented to a ‘true’ cultural diversity 
dependent on discrete, bounded, culturally homogenous nation-states. This 
afforded two efficient discursive accomplishments. Firstly, it not only discredited 
the liberal value of cultural diversity that protects free and equal expression of 
minority cultures, but it also skilfully hijacked cultural diversity and inverted its 
normative understanding for redeployment in support of their argument, protecting 
dominant majority homogenous national cultures. Secondly, this strategy facilitated 
the speakers presenting themselves as prototypical representatives of an inclusive 
diverse transnational political collective, often referred to as ‘us patriots’, based on 
the core ideology of exclusionary nationalist nativism. These populist radical right 
speeches, in this international context, were outward looking and described the 
courageous fight to advert an apocalyptic future. They celebrated the political 
collective ‘us patriots’ as being globally extensive, expanding and enduring.  
 Although I acknowledge the significantly different context and positioning 
of the speakers in the two different discourse studies, it is notable that the discourse 
of these advocates on behalf of refugees, speaking to the nation, did not claim the 
authority to propose concrete solutions, and were hesitant and constrained. 
Conversely these populist radical right politicians spoke authoritatively and 
appeared to present themselves as being ‘entitled to offer solutions’ (Gibson & 
Smart, 2017) to a transnational diverse audience recommending the exclusion of 
immigrants. These populist radical right speakers potentially benefit from the taken-
for-granted understanding that individuals belong to a particular nation-states 
within the universal world of nations-states and these nation-states have the moral 
right to exclude unwanted others (Billig, 1995). Along with the pervasive discourse 
presenting refugees as bogus and problematic (Every & Augoustinos, 2008; S. 
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Goodman & Speer, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003). These advocates on behalf of 
refugees, in the context of study one, struggle to address and counter these taken-
for-granted hegemonic arguments. 
 The experimental study (see chapter 5) indicated that ambivalent 
stereotyping of refugees is related to people’s contested definition of the important 
values, beliefs and characteristics of their national. There was an interaction 
between the identity threat concerns that potentially resembles an ambivalent 
tension or ideological dilemma between competing and conflicting interpretive 
frameworks of identity threat arguments. On the one hand, arguments that present 
refugees as being an economic and cultural problem to the nation interacted with 
arguments, on the other hand, that highlighted the nation’s moral, humanitarian and 
legal obligation to offer refugees sanctuary.  
 There are two concluding points to highlight. Firstly, when refugees are 
constructed as being an economic and cultural problem to the nation and the 
argument declaring the nations moral obligation towards refugees was absent, 
people reported that other members of their nation may endorse a paternalistic 
ambivalent construction of stereotypical refugees, where warmth was rated higher 
than competence. It can be argued that this presentation of the refugees as a problem 
and a lack of moral and legal obligation for the nation to accommodate them, is a 
hegemonic position that these advocates, in the context of study one, orient to when 
they are attempting to mobilise collective support on behalf of refugees. Providing 
a potential explanation why these advocates resorted to an ambivalent paternalistic 
discourse. The advocates did not foreground the refugees’ capability, agency or 
rights, or how they could be an asset to the nation, but they focus on their shared 




 Secondly, when refugees were constructed as being an economic and 
cultural problem to the nation and the argument declaring the nations moral and 
legal obligation towards refugees was also present, people reported that other 
members of their nation may endorse an envious ambivalent construction of 
stereotypical refugees, where warmth was rated lower than competence. Although, 
these populist radical right speakers, in the context of study two, never directly 
address the issue of the nation’s moral or legal obligation towards refugees, they 
implicitly counter this argument by taking up an envious ambivalent position that 
presents the generously benevolent host population as victims of the cold, 
unscrupulous but competent immigrants. 
 In sum, due to the universally accepted hegemonic ‘banal’ nationalism that 
assume nations have the moral right to exclude (Billig, 1995), these advocates on 
behalf of refugees take up a paternalistic ambivalence, which displays a passive 
sharing of their embodied emotional distress in response to the plight of warm but 
incompetent refugees. Conversely, these populist radical right speakers take up an 
envious ambivalence that portrays themselves, ‘us patriots,’ as the active 
courageous protectors of the victimised majority against the cold and competent 
immigrants. Hence, the universal everyday ‘banal’ nationalism is potentially 
fanning the flames of anti-refugee and anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
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Appendix 1.  Experimental Manipulation 
The manipulations are as follows and words in the square brackets were switched 
across [high/low] threat conditions. Every condition opened with the sentence: “The 
overall number of people seeking asylum across Europe in 2016 was 358,300. 
Therefore, Irelands response needs careful consideration.” And every condition 
closed with the sentence: “To indicate that you have carefully read this extract 
please click on the title, "The European Refugee Crisis," at the top of this page.” 
All participants read all three threat extracts which were randomly ordered and 
randomly presented as high or low threat.  
Realistic threat  
If refugees are given asylum in Ireland, they will be a significant economic 
[burden/benefit]. At this point Irish employment has [not/fully] recovered from 
2008 levels and [workers will suffer/employers will benefit] from an influx of 
[unskilled/skilled] refugees. There are currently [few/many] unoccupied homes in 
Ireland and incoming refugees will be settled in communities that have [no 
space/space] for them. The expense of resettling refugees will be 
[enormous/minimal] as economically [unproductive/productive] refugees will 
[drain/increase] tax revenue. 
The refugees will [require/contribute to] health care and education, and incoming 
[unskilled workers/skilled professionals] will [cause/alleviate] serious shortages in 
the Irish health care and education systems. Refugees will be [poorly/effectively] 




treatment before arrival. Most refugees have experienced violence and war, which 
some experts have [warned/found], makes people more motivated to seek 
[violence/peace] in the countries that accepts them. 
 
Symbolic threat 
When you strip away trivial aspects, the values and beliefs of the refugees arriving 
at the borders of Europe are very [different from/similar to] those of Irish people. 
At the heart of Irish culture is the engaged community, and refugees are fleeing 
their own countries due to the [lack of/significant] appreciation for this core value. 
Refugees come from different religious and cultural backgrounds, which will 
[threaten/enrich] the mainstream beliefs and principles of the Irish population. As 
has been seen in other countries, when refugees arrive, they bring with them their 
[oppressive/vibrant] ways of life that [negatively undermine/positively expand] 
local culture. If the refugees come to live in Ireland, they will [dilute/supplement] 
and [change/enhance] our traditions and culture. Most of the refugees 
[disregard/cherish] basic principles of human rights and [oppose/support] equality 
and diversity legislation, taken for granted in Ireland. 
Group image threat 
Ireland is being [criticised/applauded] for its [uncaring/benevolent] response to the 
refugee crisis. We offer a [small/large] humanitarian budget [in absolute 
terms/relative to our size] and have provided [negligible/substantial] humanitarian 
support to the refugees. Our moral standing in the world is 
[compromised/confirmed], as recent media reports described Ireland’s contribution 
to the refugee crisis as ["just heart breaking"/"punching above our weight"]. 
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Our [negligible/substantial] input to alleviate the refugee crisis in comparison to 
other countries is a matter of great [humiliation/pride]. Despite the desperate 
situation, we are [failing/succeeding] to uphold important ethical principles, which 
protect basic human rights and Irish people can be certain that the world sees our 
actions as morally [shameful/commendable]. The historical legacy for future 
generations, will see our [failure/endeavour] to help in the refugee crisis as 
[inexcusable/admirable] as we are judged to have [disgracefully 
neglected/honourably fulfilled] our moral obligation. 
